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PREFACE
The papers in this volume were presented during the thirtieth annual 
Public Lecture Series sponsored by the Department of Economics at 
Western Michigan University. The Lecture Series was made possible 
through the financial support of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employ 
ment Research and the College of Arts and Sciences of Western Michi 
gan University.
Several of my colleagues in the Economics Department and at the 
Upjohn Institute assisted with the progress of the Lecture Series, 
including Raymond E. Zelder, William D. Bosshardt (now at Florida 
Atlantic University), and Timothy J. Bartik. I thank Randall W. Eberts 
and Robert G. Spiegelman of the Upjohn Institute for their continued 
support of the Series. Judith K. Gentry and Natalie M. Lagoni pro 
duced the book expeditiously. I am grateful to all for their help, as well 
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Ask an academician, a government worker, a policy analyst, a politi 
cian, and a member of the general public what the underground econ 
omy is all about and you will surely get a wide variety of answers. This 
diversity is reflected in this volume, where six different papers about 
the underground economy—its many facets, its various consequences, 
and a multitude of interpretations—are presented.
Our fascination with the underground economy is as many-faceted 
as are our definitions of it, but it is safe to assume that we are intrigued 
with the underground economy in part because it is difficult to directly 
observe and directly measure. Whereas one can be reasonably assured 
of estimates of automobile production in the United States in a given 
year, we are less confident of the estimates offered for tax compliance, 
domestic marijuana consumption, the volume of illegal gambling, or 
the extensiveness of barter trade. Hence we dig deeper and ask, how 
were these numbers obtained? If alternative assumptions are made, 
how would the estimates change? Will a different methodological 
approach confirm or contradict these estimates?
Because of its nature, because participants in the underground econ 
omy hide their participation, direct measurement of the magnitude of 
underground economic production and participation is usually not pos 
sible. We normally have to find other methods, often relying on indirect 
measures to find traces of underground economic activity. In this book, 
alternative methods are used to track the underground economy, rang 
ing from monetary measures to direct survey methods to experimental 
techniques.
The chapters by Edgar Feige and by Peter Reuter focus on measur 
ing the size and volume of underground economic activity. Feige uses 
monetary techniques to measure the volume of unreported economic 
activity taking place. Previous studies estimating the size of the under 
ground economy, which is presumed to bear some relationship to the 
level of unreported income, have used the currency ratio method. In
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this method increases in the currency-to-checkable-deposit ratio are 
assumed to be associated with increases in unreported income because 
individuals find it easier to camouflage unreported income if it is kept 
as cash. However, Feige notes that the estimates offered thus far using 
the currency-to-deposit ratio or some variant of it have assumed that all 
U.S. currency circulates domestically. We are continually reminded, 
however, that U.S. currency plays an important role in many foreign 
countries, as evidenced in part by its use in black and parallel-dollar- 
currency markets. Feige extensively examines what is known about 
U.S. currency holdings abroad to derive estimates of the proportion of 
U.S. currency that circulates domestically. With currency estimates 
taking into account the volume of overseas holding of U.S. currency, 
Feige is able to obtain and report estimates of the size of the under 
ground economy using a variant of the currency-to-deposit ratio 
method that better reflects U.S.-only underground economic activity.
Reuter, on the other hand, takes a hard look at a specific subsector of 
the underground economy—the illegal drug market. This market is, to 
the best of our knowledge, the largest of all the illegal markets, and 
thus its size is of concern to those interested in learning about the 
extensiveness of the underground economy.
Reuter suggests that U.S. government estimates pertaining to the 
size of this market are grossly inadequate and inconsistent. He cleverly 
shows how individually scrutinized estimates can be shown to be 
implausible and how the collective estimates of related markets or vari 
ables within the market are inconsistent. Why are such poorly engi 
neered figures offered to the public? Overall, they do not offer 
guidance for good policy making and hence do not result in alterations, 
improvements, or development of drug policy. They are often offered 
instead to legitimize policy decisions that are derived independent of 
good estimates.
Reuter notes that good estimates are important and that they could 
serve a valuable function in evaluating, for example, the effectiveness 
of policies to reduce illegal drug consumption or the scope of drug 
markets.
The papers by Richard Freeman and James Aim are concerned with 
criminal behavior of individuals. Freeman concentrates on youth, in an 
attempt to gain an understanding of what leads to criminal behavior. 
What policies could be implemented if we wish to reduce criminal
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activity among our youth? Since criminal activity during youth seems 
to be associated with subsequent behavior and economic attainment, it 
is especially important to understand how our current economic poli 
cies may encourage or deter youth from engaging in crime. Freeman 
obtains data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to under 
take his investigation and arrive at conclusions regarding participation 
in underground activities.
Aim looks at a different category of criminal activity—tax evasion. 
He too asks how economic policy affects the degree of tax cheating 
that takes place. To get around the problem of getting individuals to 
truthfully admit the degree to which they cheat on taxes, Aim employs 
experimental methods to track tax compliance. Under these carefully 
controlled methods and with careful experimental design he is able to 
generalize how changes in the variables in the hands of policy makers 
can alter behavior, causing the general compliance rate to rise or caus 
ing tax cheating to increase.
The papers by Ann Witte and Alejandro Fortes serve as an overview 
of the underground economy in the Americas. Witte's paper points to 
some of the ambivalent attitudes we have had regarding the under 
ground economy in the United States over the past several decades. In 
many cases we argue that certain behaviors and participation in the 
underground economy are not acceptable. We do not always seem 
entirely convinced of this position, however, and we end up engaging 
in less enforcement. Witte suggests that what constitutes the under 
ground economy has changed over time. Variations in enforcement 
serves as a precursor to real changes in institutions and laws pertaining 
to underground activity. There is significant fluidity in the definition of 
what is legal and what is not, and participation in the underground 
economy does not necessarily mean that one is "beating the system."
Fortes adds another dimension or perspective to the underground 
economy discussion. This results from his studies of underground 
economies in Latin America. While there is reasonable consensus of 
what constitutes the underground economy in the industrialized econo 
mies, the consensus is less broad for those who study developing econ 
omies. This may be because of the more diverse form taken by the 
underground economy in less-developed countries, and perhaps 
because there is a less clear distinction between what we term formal 
and informal production in these economies. The linkages between the
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underground and aboveground economies are stronger in developing 
economies, making for more difficult delineation of the two categories 
of production.
Despite the additional challenges faced by researchers who measure 
the underground economy for developing nations, Fortes offers esti 
mates of the magnitude of this sector for many of the Latin American 
economies over the past several decades. He employs several different 
methodologies and concludes that there is considerable informal pro 
duction taking place in these countries.
Though the underground economy is a somewhat elusive and vari 
ously defined concept, these studies suggest that a great deal is known. 
By using various approaches, economists and others have actually 
learned much about unrecorded and illegal production. Despite the 
diversity of approaches, many common conclusions seem to emerge. 
First, the underground economy is significant in size. Second, growth 
and persistence in the underground economy are not relegated to a par 
ticular historical period, geographic region of the world, or stage of 
development. Both developed and developing economies seem to be 
faced with significant underground sectors. Third, economic policy can 
play a significant role in determining whether economic agents partici 
pate to a greater or lesser degree in the underground economy.
Nonetheless, despite knowing a great deal about the underground 
economy, this collection of papers also brings to our attention that 
much has yet to be learned. Because of the diverse nature of under 
ground economic activities, a variety of approaches is probably the 
best route to better understand the underground. Unlike many eco 
nomic inquiries, it may be more appropriate and fruitful to employ 
economists (and noneconomists) from almost all the different subspe- 
cialties to add to our body of knowledge about the underground econ 
omy. Labor economics, macroeconomics, public finance, criminology, 
experimental economics, urban economics, and international econom 
ics all have contributed and have more contributions to make so that we 
can better understand the underground economy. The studies presented 
here attest to this.
Overseas Holdings of U.S. Currency 
and the Underground Economy
Edgar L. Feige
University of Wisconsin—Madison
Many public policy decisions require analytical and empirical 
knowledge concerning the size, growth, causes, and consequences of 
the "underground economy." This paper seeks to clarify the meaning of 
underground activity, updates various discrepancies and fiscal esti 
mates of its size and growth, and examines the empirical implications 
of new evidence concerning the growing use of U.S. currency through 
out the world for indirect monetary estimates of the underground econ 
omy in the United States.
The popular term "underground economy" is inexact, covering a 
wide range of economic activities that encompass the production and 
distribution of illegal goods and services, as well as legal activities 
whose concealment from or misrepresentation to governmental author 
ities involves tax evasion or benefit fraud. Given the diversity of hidden 
activities, it is necessary to develop a taxonomy of "underground econ 
omies" that identifies specific types of underground behaviors and sug 
gests appropriate methods for estimating their size and their unique 
economic implications. The general penchant to hide underground eco 
nomic activities often precludes direct observation of their occurrence, 
necessitating the use of indirect measures that seek to uncover the foot 
prints of hidden activities left behind in the sands of observable eco 
nomic indicators. Currency, being an anonymous medium of exchange, 
is regarded as the preferred means of payment for economic transac 
tions that economic actors seek to conceal. As such, cash stocks and 
flows are a natural starting point in the search for knowledge concern 
ing the underground economy. The total amount of currency in circula 
tion is also one of the best-measured macroeconomic indicators, since 
the production and distribution of currency by the government is 
strictly monitored and carefully recorded. 1 However, our knowledge 
concerning the location and circulation of the public's holdings of U.S.
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currency is meager. There are no reliable estimates of the varying 
amounts of U.S. currency circulating overseas, therefore no way of 
determining the domestic money supply and its change over time. This 
paper develops alternative means of calculating the proportions of cur 
rency held domestically and overseas and presents estimates of net out 
flows of U.S. currency over time. New estimates of domestic holding 
of U.S. currency are then used to reestimate the size and growth of the 
domestic underground economy.
One of the most puzzling macroeconomic anomalies is the huge 
amount of U.S. currency outstanding ($390 billion) and its surprisingly 
persistent growth. Despite widespread predictions of the advent of the 
cashless society, and decades of cash-saving financial innovations, the 
per capita holdings of U.S. currency increased from $160 in 1961 to 
$1,450 by the end of 1994. Adjusting for inflation, real per capita cur 
rency increased by 70 percent, and the proportion of the Ml money 
supply composed of currency rose from 20 percent to 30 percent. 
Roughly 60 percent of the outstanding stock of currency is now in the 
form of $100 bills.
The suggestion that the average American family of four now holds 
$5,800 in currency, of which $3,480 is in the form of $100 bills, 
appears to be implausible. Moreover, since the average turnover rate of 
currency is estimated to be fifty times per year, the average American 
would have to be making pro rata cash transactions of $72,500 per 
year, a figure which is plainly unbelievable. Federal Reserve surveys 
(Avery et al. 1986, 1987) of currency usage by American households 
determined that adult U.S. residents admit to holding only 12 percent 
of the nation's currency in circulation outside the banking system. 
Allowing for U.S. business holdings of currency, the whereabouts of 
more than 80 percent of the nation's currency supply is presently 
unknown. These anomalous findings give rise to the "currency 
enigma" (Feige 1990b, 1994a), which consists of a stock and a flow 
component. Our inability to identify the holders and location of a large 
fraction of the U.S. currency stock gives rise to a $300 billion problem 
of "missing currency" (Sprenkle 1993). This missing stock of currency 
is used as a means of payment for the purchase of goods and services. 
If all of the missing currency turns over at the same rate as that esti 
mated for U.S. households, it would effect a flow of "missing pay 
ments" amounting to almost $15 trillion.
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Two complementary hypotheses are put forward as possible expla 
nations of the currency enigma. Some fraction of the missing currency 
may in fact be held by U.S. households to conduct unreported transac 
tions in the U.S. underground economy. A considerably larger portion 
of the missing currency is more likely to be held abroad by foreigners 
who conduct transactions with U.S. dollars to effect payments in their 
own countries and as a store of value. This paper examines the extent 
to which the currency enigma can be resolved by appeal to both the 
underground economy hypothesis and the "world dollarization" 
hypothesis.
The first section of the paper presents a taxonomic framework for 
defining different types of underground activities, reviews alternative 
methods of estimation, and updates available estimates of various 
"underground economies" in the United States. 2 The following three 
sections describe alternative methods for estimating the amount of U.S. 
currency held abroad and present preliminary estimates of overseas 
currency holdings. These sections present a monetary demographic 
model (MDM) and a note ratio model (NRM) that can be employed to 
obtain indirect estimates of the proportions of currency held domesti 
cally and overseas, as well as direct estimates of net outflows of U.S. 
currency. To anticipate the results, a factor model composite measure 
of overseas currency flows suggests that foreigners do appear to hold a 
large fraction of U.S. currency, perhaps as much as 40 percent. The 
final section examines the implications of overseas currency holdings 
for the measurement of the domestic underground economy.
Defining and Measuring Underground Economies
The early literature on the underground economy lacked an accepted 
taxonomy for classifying various underground activities. Underground 
activities were variously described as subterranean, irregular or infor 
mal, hidden, grey, shadow, clandestine, parallel, and black, but these 
descriptions were rarely augmented with explicit definitions that aided 
analytic and empirical investigation of the underlying phenomena. It is 
now well understood that there are a variety of underground economies 
spanning both planned and market economies, be they developed or
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developing. Agents engaged in underground activities circumvent, 
escape, or are excluded from the institutional system of rules, rights, 
regulations, and enforcement penalties that govern formal agents 
engaged in production and exchange. Different types of underground 
activities are distinguished according to the particular institutional 
rules they violate. Employing this criterion, we identify four specific 
types of underground economic activities: illegal; unreported; and 
unrecorded; and informal. The metric for measuring the dimensions of 
each underground activity is the aggregate income generated by the 
activity. Figure 1 presents a taxonomy of underground economies.
The illegal economy consists of the income produced by those eco 
nomic activities pursued in violation of legal statutes defining the 
scope of legitimate forms of commerce. The most notable illegal activ 
ities are the production and distribution of prohibited substances (e.g., 
drug traffic) and services such as prostitution, pornography, and black 
market currency exchange. Estimates of income produced from illegal 
activities are typically derived from crime-related statistics and range 
from $70 to $100 billion. In 1982, unreported income from drugs and 
gambling was estimated to be roughly $26 billion (Abt Associates 
1984, pp. 62, 112), and the retail value of drugs sold in the United 
States in 1990 was estimated to be roughly $40 billion (Office of 
National Drug Control Policy 1991, p. 5).
The unreported economy consists of those economic activities that 
circumvent or evade fiscal rules as codified in the tax code. A summary 
measure of the unreported economy is the amount of unreported 
income, namely, the amount of income that should legally be reported 
to the tax authority but is not so reported. Since illegal income is tax 
able, the unreported economy includes both legal and illegal source 
income that is not properly reported to the fiscal authority. A comple 
mentary measure of the unreported economy is the "gross tax gap," 
namely, the difference between the amount of tax revenues legally due 
the fiscal authority and the amount of tax revenue voluntarily paid.
The "net tax gap" represents the difference between the amount of 
revenue due and the amount actually collected. The difference between 
the gross and net measures represents the revenues collected as a direct 
result of enforcement activities. Benefit fraud, comprising false claims 
for benefits (welfare or unemployment payments) or subsidies to
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Figure 1.
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which the individual is not legally entitled, should formally be 
included in "tax gap" measures.
The unrecorded economy consists of those economic activities that 
circumvent the institutional rules that define the reporting requirements 
of government statistical agencies. A summary measure of the unre 
corded economy is the amount of unrecorded income, namely, the 
amount of income that should (under existing rules and conventions) 
be recorded in national accounting systems (e.g., National Income and 
Product Accounts) but is not so recorded. Unrecorded income repre 
sents a discrepancy between total income or output and the actual 
amount of income or output captured or enumerated by the statistical 
accounting system designed to measure economic activity. Since 
national accounting conventions differ with respect to their inclusion of 
illegal incomes, unrecorded income may or may not include compo 
nents of the illegal sector.
The term "informal economy" has been used so frequently, and 
inconsistently, in the development literature that it requires special 
attention. The informal economy comprises those economic activities 
that circumvent the costs and are excluded from the benefits and rights 
incorporated in the laws and administrative rules covering property 
relationships, commercial licensing, labor contracts, torts, financial 
credit, and social security systems. A summary measure of the infor 
mal economy is the income generated by economic agents who operate 
informally.
Estimating the size of various underground economies remains, at 
best, an inexact science. However, more precise definition of alterna 
tive underground economies has reduced the tendency to compare dis 
parate measures, and improvements in tax compliance and monetary 
methodologies is narrowing the range of comparable estimates.
Updated Estimates of Unreported Income in the United States
Since underground economic activity typically subjects the partici 
pant to the risk of some form of sanction if discovered, agents engaged 
in the activity have an incentive to conceal their involvement. This pro 
pensity for secrecy creates special problems for the social science 
observer who attempts to measure underground behavior. A variety of 
direct and indirect measurements of various types of underground
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activity have been proposed and each has well-known limitations 
(Feige 1989). Earlier empirical efforts to measure the size and growth 
of underground activities revealed that underground economies were 
large enough to be of economic significance and had grown consider 
ably during the later half of the 1960s and throughout much of the 
decade of the 1970s. Costly regulation, rising tax rates, and a growing 
distrust of government were cited as the primary causes of increased 
underground activity. The conservative politics of the 1980s sought to 
reverse these trends by reducing government regulations, decreasing 
the burden of taxation, and restoring a greater sense of trust and confi 
dence in the government by reforming the tax system and reducing 
what were perceived to be wasteful government expenditures. One of 
the questions we seek to examine is whether these efforts had any 
effect on reducing the size and growth of the underground economy.
Various macroeconomic measures have been mentioned as possible 
indicators of underground activities. These include the adjusted gross 
income (AGI) gap discrepancy measure produced by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA); the audit-based discrepancy measures of 
unreported taxable income produced by the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS); and estimates of unreported income derived from various speci 
fications of monetary models. These measures are reviewed and 
updated.
Discrepancy Measures
The U.S. government produces two discrepancy measures that are 
often cited as indicators of underground activity. The first of these, 
compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, calculates the discrep 
ancy between adjusted gross income as reported to the Internal Reve 
nue Service and an independent estimate of AGI derived from National 
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) estimates of personal income. 
This AGI gap is not officially acknowledged as a measure of the under 
ground economy; however, with several qualifications (Carson 1984; 
Feige 1989), the AGI gap can be interpreted as a lower bound measure 
of noncompliance in the reporting of taxable income.
Figure 2 displays the AGI gap estimates published by the BEA in 
1985 and the most recently revised estimates. The latest government 
figures reveal that the earlier gap estimates had been much too low,
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requiring upward revision of $115 billion in 1983. By 1992, the AGI 
gap had risen to $500 billion. As a percentage of AGI, the gap reached 
its peak of 16.1 percent in 1987 and then fell to an estimated 14 percent 
of AGI in 1992.
Figure 2. Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) Gap










73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
Year
BEA(85) -•- BEA(95)
An alternative discrepancy measure of unreported income is pre 
pared by the IRS on the basis of their Taxpayer Compliance Measure 
ment Program (TCMP). Responding to reports of a large underground 
economy based on monetary estimation methods, the IRS undertook a 
series of studies (IRS 1979, 1981, 1983) to examine the extent of non- 
compliance with U.S. tax laws. Their first study (IRS 1979) concluded 
that in 1976, between $75 and $100 billion of legal source income was 
not properly reported on individual tax returns. The IRS estimated that 
the resulting revenue loss was between $12 and $17 billion. In addi 
tion, unreported illegal source income was estimated to be between 
$25 and $35 billion, with an added revenue loss of $6 to $8 billion. In 
their 1983 report, the estimate for legal source unreported income in 
1976 was increased by $30 billion and the associated estimated loss of
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tax revenue was more than double the initial estimate. On the other 
hand, the 1983 report slashed the estimate of illegal source income to 
only $13 billion and cut the corresponding revenue loss from the illegal 
sector to roughly $4 billion.
Feige (1989) demonstrated the sensitivity of the results from the 
early TCMP studies to small variations in the questionable set of 
assumptions required to estimate magnitude of noncompliance. The 
admission by the IRS that 1981 total unreported income amounted to 
some $283 billion and a corresponding revenue loss of $90 billion led 
the BEA to undertake a major revision of the NIPA accounts. The 
BEA's 1985 "comprehensive revision" raised estimated personal 
income for 1984 by $100 billion. Although their comprehensive revi 
sion included changes in definitions and statistical methods, the single 
most important element of the revision was the adjustment for income 
previously unrecorded due to understated tax source data. For 1984, 
the personal income adjustment for unrecorded wages, salaries, and 
nonfarm proprietor incomes amounted to $101 billion, demonstrating 
the empirical connection between unreported and unrecorded income.
The latest IRS estimates of unreported income (IRS 1988) are based 
on their TCMP audits of tax returns in the years 1973, 1976, 1979, and 
1982 and include estimates of unreported income and the correspond 
ing losses in tax revenue projected out to 1992. The IRS (1988) esti 
mates of unreported legal source income for the years 1973-1982 are 
presented in figure 3, along with their projected unreported income for 
the years 1983-1992.
In each of the audit years, a sample of roughly 55,000 tax filers was 
subjected to examination by IRS auditors who attempted to determine 
the amounts of income that should have been reported and the amounts 
that were unreported. Final estimates of unreported income of filers 
and nonfilers for those years were obtained by combining information 
from audits, information returns, and special surveys. The IRS projec 
tions for the period 1985-1992 were based on Office of Management 
and Budget forecasts of personal income combined with an assumption 
of constant rates of noncompliance between 1982 and 1992. The pro 
jections also assume that tax payer behavior was unaffected by the tax 
reforms enacted in 1986. Figure 4 depicts the discrepancy between 
projected AGI used in the 1988 IRS report and the actual AGI reported 
on subsequent tax returns.
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Figure 3. Unreported Legal Source Income 
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Figure 4. IRS Projection Error in AGI 










72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92
Year
Overseas Holdings of U.S. Currency and the Underground Economy 15
By 1992, actual reported AGI fell more than $500 billion short of 
the IRS projections. The overestimates of projected reportable income 
and the assumption that compliance rates were unaffected by tax cuts 
and tax reforms suggest that the IRS projections of unreported income 
are overstated.3
Whereas the earlier IRS studies reported estimates of both legal and 
illegal source unreported income, the 1988 study is limited to estimates 
of unreported legal source income. The IRS (1983) study estimated 
that in 1981, illegal source income amounted to $34.2 billion, or 
roughly 15 percent of the revised legal source estimate for 1981. If ille 
gal income remained at roughly the same percentage as legal income, it 
would add an additional $88 billion of unreported illegal source 
income to the estimate of $585 billion of unreported legal source 
income for 1992.4
Figure 5 reports alternative IRS estimates of the "gross tax gap" on 
legal source income of individuals and corporations. The gross tax gap
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overstates the amount of revenue lost to the government due to non- 
compliance to the extent that IRS enforcement activities collect some
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of the amounts due. The yield from these enforcement activities was 
estimated to be $15.4 billion in 1981, $18.9 billion in 1984, and $21.9 
billion in 1987 (IRS 1990, table 2, p. 10). The gross tax gap understates 
the loss of revenue to the government because it excludes revenue lost 
on illegal source income as well as revenue losses from noncompliance 
with other federal taxes including employment, excise, gift, and estate 
taxes and customs duties. For the year 1987, income taxes accounted 
for only 56 percent of federal budget receipts. Another 36 percent came 
from employment taxes and 5 percent from gift, estate, and excise 
taxes. There is virtually no information available on the revenue losses 
from noncompliance with these other important revenue sources, nor 
are there estimates of the amount of government expenditures wasted 
as a result of benefit fraud.
Currency Ratio Models
The most common method for estimating the size of the unreported 
economy relies on some variant of the general currency ratio model 
described in Feige (1989). The most restrictive specification of the cur 
rency ratio model (Cagan 1958; Gutmann 1977) assumes that currency 
is the exclusive medium of exchange for unreported transactions, that 
the ratio of currency to checkable deposits is only affected by the 
growth of unreported transactions, that the income velocities of 
reported and unreported transactions are identical, and that in some 
base period, unreported income was zero so that the observed base 
period currency deposit ratio serves as a proxy for the desired currency 
ratio in the official economy.5
Figure 6 displays estimated unreported income as a percent of 
recorded AGI as obtained from the simple currency ratio model under 
the assumptions that in 1940 there was no unreported income and that 
all currency outside of the banking system was held by the domestic 
public. As has been noted in earlier studies, the ratio of unreported 
income rose sharply during World War II and then declined and 
remained relatively stable until the early 1960s. Unreported income 
then grew from less than 5 percent of AGI in 1960 to 15 percent by 
1980.
The percentage of unreported income reached a plateau during the 
early 1980s and actually declined around the time of the 1986 Tax
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Reform Act. The percent of unreported income then rose steeply 
between 1987 and 1991. Figure 6 also presents the results of a more 
general specification of the currency ratio model. 6 The general cur 
rency ratio model (OCR) employs the IRS estimate of unreported 
income for 1973 as an appropriate benchmark; it assumes that 75 per 
cent of unreported income transactions are effected by currency and 
that the remaining 25 percent are effected by checkable deposits. The 
resulting estimates display a time path similar to that of the more 
restrictive estimates, however the percent of unreported activities is 
considerably higher in all periods.
Figure 7 displays three estimates of total unreported income from 
both legal and illegal sources for the period 1972 through 1993. 7 The 
IRS projections are remarkably similar to those obtained by the simple 
currency ratio model suggesting that by 1991, total unreported income 
amounted to roughly $650 billion or 17 percent of reported AGI.
Assuming that this unreported income had been subject to a mar 
ginal income tax rate of 20 percent, $130 billion of income tax reve 
nues would have escaped government collection, roughly 62 percent of 
the federal budget deficit.
The OCR model results suggest that unreported income grew gradu 
ally during the first half of the 1980s, declined in the mid-1980s and 
then resumed its growth until the early 1990s. Unreported income 
appears to have doubled during the last half of the decade and 
exceeded $1 trillion during the early 1990s. All of these currency ratio 
model estimates are predicated on the assumption that U.S. currency is 
exclusively used to effect domestic transactions in either the official or 
the underground economy. There is, however, a growing body of anec 
dotal evidence suggesting that U.S. currency also circulates as a 
medium of exchange in foreign countries. If a large and perhaps vari 
able fraction of U.S. currency is held outside of the U.S., this would 
tend to overstate the size of the domestic underground economy as esti 
mated by conventional currency ratio models.
Federal Reserve (Avery et al. 1986, 1987) Surveys of Currency and 
Transaction Account Usage (SCTAU) reinforce the notion that a sub 
stantial portion of U.S. currency holdings cannot be accounted for by 
the behavior of U.S. households. In both 1984 and 1986, SCTAU deter 
mined that U.S. households admitted to holding at most 12 percent of 
the nation's currency supply. Since business firms are very concerned
18
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with efficient cash management in order to minimize interest losses 
associated with cash inventories, they are likely to hold considerably 
smaller cash inventories than households. The scant evidence on U.S. 
currency holdings by business firms (Anderson 1977; Sumner 1990) 
suggests that domestic firms hold less than 3 percent of currency in cir 
culation.
A conservative estimate of the stock of currency required to sustain 
the estimated cash payments made in the unreported economy can be 
obtained by employing the IRS projection that total unreported income 
in 1992 amounted to $675 billion. Assuming that roughly 75 percent of 
this unreported income is effected by cash and taking currency turn 
over (the income velocity of currency) to be roughly fifty turnovers per 
year yields a stock of currency used for underground transactions that 
is less than 4 percent of currency in circulation with the public. 8 In 
short, since U.S. households admit to holding only 12 percent of the 
nation's currency in circulation, firms hold roughly 3 percent, and 
underground transactions absorb another 4 percent, the ownership of 
roughly 80 percent of circulating U.S. currency is currently unknown. 
This anomaly of missing currency gives rise to the stock component of 
the "currency enigma" (Feige 1994a). A similar problem arises with 
attempts to allocate the flow of payments sustained by the outstanding 
currency stock to different sectors of the economy. The admitted 
household holdings of 12 percent of U.S. currency circulating outside 
of the banking system give rise to an estimated volume of cash pay 
ments of $1.7 trillion for 1992, roughly 41 percent of recorded per 
sonal consumption expenditures. Estimated cash holdings of business 
firms analogously give rise to some $400 billion of intermediate pay 
ments, amounting to roughly 7 percent of total intermediate payments. 
An additional $675 billion of cash payments can be allocated to under 
ground transactions. If the stock of the remaining "missing" currency 
circulates at roughly the same rate as currency held by U.S. house 
holds, it would give rise to an additional volume of unaccounted cash 
payments in excess of $10 trillion.
Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain these monetary 
anomalies. One explanation is that the U.S. underground economy is 
substantially larger than current estimates suggest, and that domestic 
holdings of U.S. currency are much larger than the amounts of cur 
rency households admit to holding on currency surveys. The more
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plausible "world dollarization" hypothesis suggests that a substantial 
fraction of U.S. currency is held abroad by residents of other nations. 
The complementary "hoarding" hypothesis suggests that overseas 
holdings of U.S. currency are largely held as stores of value rather than 
being used as a medium of exchange. The dollarization hypothesis 
requires independent estimates of the fraction of U.S. currency held 
abroad. The hoarding hypothesis requires evidence confirming that 
overseas holdings of U.S. currency circulate at slower rates than 
domestic currency holdings.
Anecdotal reports of U.S. currency circulating in parts of Latin 
America, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Russia are widespread, 
as are suggestions that foreign demand for U.S. currency can fluctuate 
quite dramatically. Since the size, variability, and velocity of foreign 
holdings of U.S. currency have important implications for the measure 
ment of the domestic underground economy and for the conduct of 
domestic monetary policy, we turn our attention to efforts to locate the 
"missing" U.S. currency.
Indirect Methods for Estimating Foreign Holdings 
of U.S. Currency
Although there is much anecdotal evidence concerning the wide 
spread use of U.S. currency overseas, until very recently there was no 
systematic research undertaken to determine the location of the U.S. 
currency supply. Several different approaches are presently being 
explored to estimate both the stock of foreign holdings of U.S. cur 
rency and the migration of currency into and out of the country. 9
The introduction in 1996 of a newly designed U.S. currency series 
with modern counterfeit protection provides a unique opportunity to 
establish a currency census system (CCS), which while fully preserv 
ing the anonymity of individual currency usage, could monitor key 
characteristics of the currency population. Relevant information on the 
life cycle of a currency note could be electronically captured as notes 
are routinely and anonymously processed by high-speed sorting 
machines when they are issued and returned to the Federal Reserve 
Banks. The proposed CCS would eliminate any burden of human
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reporting. By maintaining automated records of a note's age, quality, 
birthplace, location, and final redemption, a CCS information system 
would provide the data required to construct currency migration matri 
ces and all other demographic characteristics of the note population. 10 
In the absence of a location-specific enumeration of currency holdings, 
it is necessary to rely on direct sources of information concerning 
inflows and outflows of U.S. currency as well as on indirect methods 
for estimating the changing proportion of U.S. notes held overseas.
The Monetary Demography Model
This section develops a model capable of estimating the proportions 
of notes held domestically and overseas. Given estimates of these pro 
portions and knowledge of the total stock of currency outstanding, one 
can estimate the overseas stock of currency and also obtain estimates 
of net currency outflows from the changes in foreign holdings over 
time. The proportion of U.S. currency circulating domestically (P<0 and 
the proportion circulating overseas (P°) can be estimated from a simple 
monetary demography model (MDM) of the currency population.
Consider the general problem of estimating the proportions P\ and 
P2 of members in two subpopulations C\ and C2 which comprise the 
total population C. Let X represent any characteristic of the total popu 
lation C, and Xi and X2 respectively represent the corresponding char 
acteristic of the subpopulations C\ and C2 . The unknown proportions 
PI and P2 can then be derived from the following equation:
(Eq. 1) X = Pl -Xl +P2 -X2 .
Since PI + P2 = 1, it follows that:
(Eq. 2) P 1 = (X-X2)/(X1 -X2) and
A meaningful solution for the parameters PI and P2 exists so long as 
the characteristics of the subpopulations are different (Xj *X2), and the 
calculated proportions lie between 0 and 1. For example, if we know 
that the average weekly income (X) of the entire U.S. population is 
$600 and the average weekly income of the population located east of
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the Mississippi is $800 (Xj) and the average weekly income of the pop 
ulation west of the Mississippi is $500 (X2), it follows that one-third of 
the population lives in the eastern portion of the country and two-thirds 
of the population lives in the western portion.
This simple demographic model can be generalized to find the pro 
portion of members in any exhaustive set of subpopulations so long as 
the characteristics describing the subpopulations are different. In the 
foregoing example, the characteristic measure was simply a scalar rep 
resenting the mean of the income distribution for the entire population 
and for each of the subpopulations. More generally, the characteristics 
(X, Xj, and X2) may be vectors representing univariate or multivariate 
distributions of the total and subpopulation characteristics. Examples 
of measurable characteristics which might be employed to estimate the 
MDM are the age, quality, velocity, denomination, series, or seasonal 
characteristics of the total and subpopulations.
Given estimates of any note population characteristic X, and the cor 
responding domestic (X<0 and overseas (X") note characteristics, the 
proportion of notes circulating domestically ((3d) can be estimated as:
(Eq.3) (p<0 = (X-X°)/(X<'-X<').
The MDM employing age and quality characteristics
Applying general demographic concepts to currency populations 
leads naturally to a consideration of possible differences in the age and 
quality characteristics of denomination-specific notes circulating 
domestically and overseas. Estimates of the age, quality, and quality by 
age distributions of the domestic and overseas subpopulations were 
obtained from a special study conducted by the Federal Reserve. 11 
Based on a sample of some four million individual notes, note quality 
was ascertained by recording light reflectivity measures from an opti 
cal desitometer that scanned individual notes during routine note pro 
cessing by high-speed sorting machines located at Federal Reserve 
Banks in each of the twelve Federal Reserve Districts. Individual note 
serial numbers were recorded for a subsample of approximately 
150,000 notes drawn from domestic and overseas sources in order to 
determine the date on which each note was sent by the Bureau of 
Engraving and Printing to a Federal Reserve Bank. An inventory model 
was then employed to estimate the date the note was actually placed
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into circulation, thereby establishing its date of birth. Each note's age 
was then determined as the difference between the sample date and the 
note's date of birth. Therefore, for each note denomination ($1; $5; 
$10; $20; $50; $100) it was possible to construct the univariate age and 
quality distributions for notes sampled domestically and overseas.
Casual observation suggests that domestic notes are likely to be 
used predominantly as a medium of exchange, whereas overseas notes 
are more likely to be held as a store of value. Thus for any denomina 
tion, it was expected that the univariate age and quality distributions of 
domestic and overseas notes and the corresponding bivariate quality by 
age distributions would differ greatly. Domestic notes, sampled on 
their return to the Federal Reserve, were expected to be relatively 
younger than overseas notes and generally of poorer quality for a given 
age. Given these expected differences in domestic and overseas charac 
teristics, age, quality, and quality by age distributions were thought to 
be promising characteristics for estimating the proportion of notes held 
overseas.
Surprisingly, preliminary analysis of the quality and quality by age 
distributions of the domestic and overseas samples revealed that they 
were not sufficiently different to obtain robust estimates of the propor 
tions of notes held domestically and overseas. Initial efforts to estimate 
the MDM were therefore based on differences in the univariate age dis 
tributions between overseas and domestic notes for each specific note 
denomination population. Denomination-specific age distributions for 
the entire note population were derived from FR-160 data on note 
births and deaths (redemptions) combined with estimates of average 
note lifetimes.
Employing the age characteristics of the relevant populations, the 
problem then is to estimate the proportion of U.S. currency circulating 
domestically ((3*0 and the proportion circulating overseas ((5° = 1 - p<0 
from the MDM(A) specified for each denomination as follows:
(Eq. 4) A = $dAd + (1 - fiW, and 
$d = (A-A°)l(Ad -A°)
where A, Ad and A° represent the denomination-specific age distribu 
tions for the total, domestic, and overseas note populations, respec-
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lively. Estimates of the proportion of notes of different denominations 
circulating abroad in mid-1989 were then obtained from estimates of 
the overall, domestic, and overseas age distribution of the notes. 12
Table 1 presents the resulting denomination-specific estimates of the 
proportion of notes held overseas. The MDM model estimated for the
Table 1. Estimates of the Demographic Model 

























































age distribution characteristics suggests that in 1989, between 45.8 and 
53 percent of the U.S. currency stock was held overseas. Of these over 
seas holdings, 68.3 percent was held in the form of large denomination 
bills ($100 and $50); approximately 28 percent was held in mid-sized 
denomination bills ($20 and $10) and 3,6 percent was held in the form 
of small denomination bills ($5 and $1).
The MDM employing seasonality, series, and coin/bill ratio 
characteristics
Porter and Judson (1995) employ several variants of the MDM to 
estimate the proportion of currency held overseas by exploiting
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assumed differences in the seasonality, series, and coin/bill ratio char 
acteristics of domestic and overseas holdings of U.S. currency.
Since the seasonal component characteristic of the total U.S. cur 
rency population (5) is directly measurable, but the seasonal character 
istics of the domestic (5*0 and foreign (S°) are unobservable, Porter and 
Judson assume that for the period 1947-1994, the seasonal component 
of domestic U.S. currency holdings is identical to the observed sea 
sonal pattern of the Canadian currency supply. 13 They furthermore 
assume that there is no significant seasonal component in the foreign 
demand for U.S. currency, so that the seasonal characteristic of over 
seas holding of U.S. currency (5°) can be assumed to be equal to unity. 
The seasonal variant of the MDM(S) model can then be estimated from 
the equation:
(Eq.5) S=$dSd + (l-$d)S°




From Equation (3), it follows that the domestic share of currency hold 
ings (p<0 is estimated as:
(Eq.6) p'=(S-l)/(S«-l).
Table 2 presents Porter and Judson's reported estimates of the 
denomination-specific share of U.S. currency held overseas for 1989. 
The denomination-specific MDM(S) yields an overall estimated pro 
portion of currency abroad of 62.4 percent for 1989 compared to the 
estimated range of 45.8 to 53.0 percent from the MDM(A) age charac 
teristic model. Concerning the composition of the currency held 
abroad, the MDM(S) results suggest that 67.8 percent of foreign hold 
ings are in the form of large denomination bills, and correspondingly 
29.7 percent and 2.5 percent are held in the form of mid-sized and 
small denomination notes.
A second variant of the MDM estimated by Porter and Judson 
exploits differences between the series composition characteristic (57?) 
of domestic and overseas notes to estimate the proportion of $100 and
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$50 circulating abroad. In 1991, the Federal Reserve introduced a 1990 
series note which was distinguished from the pre-1990 series notes in 
circulation'by a polyester strip and microprinting to deter counterfeit 
ing. Let the series composition characteristic (SR) be the proportion of 
the circulating note population (N) made up of new 1990 series notes 
(A/90) so that (S/0 =
Table 2. Estimates of the Demographic Model 


























































Since the series composition of the total currency population is 
known, Porter and Judson require estimates of (SR) for both the 
domestic and overseas components. They assume that the series com 
position of "overseas" notes is adequately proxied by an estimate of the 
series composition of notes processed by the New York Federal 
Reserve, and that an estimate of the series composition of the notes 
processed by all other Federal Reserve Banks adequately reflects the 
"domestic" composition. 14 The MDM(SR) for series composition can 
then be represented as:
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(Eq. 8) SR = $dSRd + (1 - 
where:
(SR) = A/90 / Nis known and, by assumption,
SR° « SR™. 
The proportion of notes held domestically can be estimated as:
(Eq. 9) = (SR - SR°)/( SR" - SR°) « (SR - SRNY) I (SRNonNY - SRNr).
Porter and Judson employ two different procedures for estimating 
the domestic and overseas series composition characteristics, and table 
3 presents their upper and lower bound estimates for the $50 and $100 
denominations.
Table 3. Estimates of the Demographic Model 
{MDM[Cdenl; Cdenld; Cdenio]:(SR)} 
{MDM[C; C*; C°]:(C/N)} 

















































A third variant of the MDM employs the ratio of coins to notes as 
the characteristic distinguishing domestic and overseas holdings of 
currency. Since the coin/note ratio of the total U.S. currency population
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is directly observable, it remains to identify the coin/note ratio of 
domestic and overseas holdings. Porter and Judson assume that the 
domestic coin ratio can be represented by Canada's coin/note ratio and 
that the overseas ratio is identically zero since virtually no U.S. coin is 
held overseas. Let C/N represent the population ratio of coins to notes, 
(C/N)d represent the domestic coin ratio, and (C/N)° the overseas coin 
ratio. If (3d represents the fraction of U.S. currency held domestically, 
then it follows from equation (3) that the MDM(C/N) can be repre 
sented as:




therefore, (Equation 3) reduces to: 
(Eq. 11) (3* = (C/N) I (C/N)CAN.
As displayed in table 3, Porter and Judson's MDM(C/2V) estimate of 
the share of U.S. currency held abroad in 1989 is 20.9 percent. 15
In order to examine the robustness of the MDM(S) results presented 
by Porter and Judson, the model was reestimated employing the XI1 
ARIMA method for calculating the multiplicative seasonal component 
of notes in circulation for the United States and Canada. 16 Our reesti- 
mation of the MDM(S) confirms the Porter and Judson findings that the 
model is incapable of producing sensible estimates at monthly or quar 
terly frequencies. In particular, monthly and quarterly estimates of the 
overseas share of U.S. currency reveal a strong seasonal component, 
suggesting that the assumption that (S° « 1) may be unsustainable. 
Even annual time series estimates of the overseas shares obtained from 
the annual average of monthly seasonal components is quite different 
from that derived by Porter and Judson, employing a seasonal ampli 
tude metric of the difference between the December and February sea-
Overseas Holdings of U.S. Currency and the Underground Economy 29
sonals. Figure 8 presents the Porter and Judson time series of the 
estimated share overseas [MDM(S):DEC-FEB] and the corresponding 
estimate based on the average of monthly seasonal components 
[MDM(S):Monthly Average]. The figure also includes the range of 
1989 point estimates from the age characteristic model [MDM(Al)] 
and [MDM(A2)], the overseas shares derived from the coin ratio model 
[MDM(C/N)], and the average share of $100 notes derived from the 
series characteristic model [MDM(SR)].
As displayed in figure 8, the monetary demography models produce 
a wide range of estimates of the overseas share of U.S. currency and 
different temporal patterns of the change in overseas holdings. Given 
the diversity of results, and the strong assumptions required to produce 
them, it is difficult to place much confidence in the foregoing findings.
Figure 8. Share of U.S. Currency Overseas

















The age characteristic model required the elimination of sample outli 
ers before convergence could be obtained. The coin ratio model pro 
duces negative overseas shares for the period 1972-82, and the 
seasonal characteristic estimates produce implausible results at 
monthly and quarterly frequencies. Both the seasonal and serial char 
acteristic models require strong assumptions concerning the unob-
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served domestic and overseas characteristic specifications. Given these 
difficulties, we now turn to several alternative approaches for estimat 
ing the share of U.S. currency held abroad.
Note Ratio Models
The Note Ratio Model (NRM) provides an alternative means for 
obtaining indirect estimates of the share of currency held abroad. The 
known amount of U.S. notes in circulation (N) can be decomposed into 
the unknown amount of notes in domestic circulation (Nd) and the 
unknown amount circulating overseas (AP). Let Z denote any variable 
that is assumed to affect the demand for notes. Then,
(Eq. 12) N/Z = Nd/Z + N°/Z.
As with the MDM models, assume that the domestic U.S. ratio can be 
proxied by the same ratio in Canada so that:
Nd/Z~(N/Z)CAN.
Substituting the Canadian ratio [(N/Z)CAN] into Equation (12), multiply 
ing through by Z and dividing both sides by N yields a solution for the 
unknown fraction of notes overseas (p°).
(Eq. 13) (p") = N°/N = [N - (N/Zf™ • Z)]/N.
The simple note ratio model (NRM) is estimated for several variants 
where Z alternatively represents:
(i) Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE)
(ii) Personal Disposable Income (PDI)
(iii) Population (POP) x Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Figure 9 presents the estimated share of U.S. currency held overseas 
from each of the variants of the note ratio model: NRM(PCE), 
NRM(PDI), and NRM(POP, CPI). The results suggest that the share of 
U.S. notes held overseas declined for almost a decade between the 
early 1960s and the early 1970s and then rose significantly over the
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next two decades. The peak in overseas holdings appears to have 
occurred in 1990 when roughly 30 to 35 percent of U.S. notes in circu 
lation are estimated to be held abroad. The time series of estimated 
shares of currency held abroad derived from the note ratio models yield 
markedly lower shares abroad than those estimated by the seasonal 
variant of the MDM and higher shares than those estimated by the 
MDM(ON).













































































62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94
Year
NRM(PCE) -A- NRM(PDI) » NRM(POPCPI)
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix of annual estimates of the 
share of currency overseas obtained from each of the indirect methods. 
The correlation matrix reveals relatively high correlations between all 
of the NRM estimates and the MDM(CYN) estimate of overseas shares. 
Comparing the MDM(S) estimate obtained from annual averages of 
the estimated monthly seasonal components with the MDM(S):Dec.- 
Feb. estimate (employing the difference between December and Febru 
ary seasonal components) reveals that the two alternative methods of 
computing the seasonal estimates yield very different results. The cor-
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relation between the two seasonal model estimates is only .393, sug 
gesting that the model is quite sensitive to the arbitrary choice of a 
metric. The MDM(S) displays low and negative correlations with the 
other estimates, whereas the smoothed MDM(S):Dec.-Feb. series dis 
plays positive correlations with the other estimates.
Indirect Estimates of Net Outflows of U.S. Currency
Given the wide range of estimates of the share of currency abroad 
produced by different models, we turn our attention to estimating the 
net outflows of currency implied by each of the MDM and NRM mod 
els. Given the known total stock of notes in circulation and indirect 
estimates of the share of currency abroad, we obtain year-end estimates 
of the total stock of currency estimated to be held abroad. 17 The differ 
ence in these estimated year-end overseas stocks yields estimates of the 
annual net outflows of currency from the U.S.
Table 5 displays the correlation matrix of the estimated net outflows 
derived from each of the indirect methods, and figure 10 displays the 
estimated net outflows. The net outflow estimates from the different
Figure 10. Annual Net Outflows of U.S. Currency 
NRM and MDM Estimates
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models appear to be more highly correlated with one another than the 
estimated net outflows. The net outflow estimates from the different 
models appear to be more highly correlated with one another than the 
share estimates, suggesting that the indirect methods may produce 
more accurate estimates of outflows than shares abroad. The major dif 
ference between the estimated net outflows is their magnitudes. As dis 
played in table 6, the MDM seasonal estimates yield average annual 
outflows that exceed the highest estimate produced by the other models 
by more than $3.3 billion per year. Given these disparities, we turn our 
attention to direct estimates of net outflows of U.S. currency.
Direct Estimates of Net Outflows of U.S. Currency
Large shipments of U.S. currency into and out of the United States 
are typically handled by a small number of commercial banks that spe 
cialize in the business of bulk currency transport. These large currency 
shipments have been informally reported to the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York cash office since 1988. Although the period spanned by 
these confidential estimates is short, and the data are not comprehen 
sive, being limited to major shippers operating in the New York Federal 
Reserve District, they provide useful information on a portion of bulk 
cash shipments to and from the United States. 18 Interviews with Fed 
eral Reserve officials suggest that much of the currency employed for 
bulk overseas currency shipments by the major transporting banks is 
supplied by the New York Federal Reserve Bank in the form of $100 
denomination notes. Employing FR-160 data, Feige (1994a) observed 
a correlation of .979 between the net value of $100 denomination notes 
(NYNET) injected into circulation by the New York Federal Reserve 
and the net amount of currency shipped overseas as recorded in the 
confidential data series on bulk shipments abroad informally collected 
by the New York Federal Reserve Bank. Feige (1994a) employed 
(NYNET) as a proxy for net outflows of bulk currency shipments for 
the period 1974-1988, and this proxy was subsequently used by Porter 
and Judson (1995) as a proxy measure of total currency flows overseas.
The second direct measure of currency inflows and outflows is col 
lected as part of the regulatory responsibility of the U.S. Customs Ser-
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vice. Enacted in October 1970, the Currency and Foreign Transactions 
Reporting Act (also known as the "Bank Secrecy Act") required per 
sons or institutions importing or exporting currency or other monetary 
instruments in amounts exceeding $5,000, to file a Report of Interna 
tional Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments. These 
reports, commonly known as CMIRs, have been collected by the U.S. 
Customs Service since 1977. In 1980, the required reporting limit was 
raised to $10,000. Although the CMIR data system was established 
with the aim of recording individual instances of cross border inflows 
and outflows of currency and monetary instruments, its micro data 
components can be usefully aggregated to study the size, origin, and 
destination of cross border currency flows. Since its inception, the 
CMIR data system has collected 2.3 million inbound filings and more 
than 300,000 outbound filings. With the cooperation of the U.S. Cus 
toms Service and the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the information contained in the mil 
lions of accumulated confidential individual CMIR forms was com 
bined by a specially designed algorithm that aggregated currency 
inflows and outflows by mode of transport and by origin and destina 
tion.
The CMIR data system represents the most comprehensive source 
of direct information on currency flows. It differs from the informal 
Federal Reserve data system (proxied by NYNET) in several important 
respects. It contains all reported currency inflows and outflows whether 
physically carried by individuals or shipped by financial institutions. 
The only excluded transactions are those that fall below the reporting 
requirements, direct shipments by Federal Reserve Banks, and ship 
ments that circumvent the legal reporting requirements. The CMIR 
data are therefore more inclusive than the Federal Reserve informal 
series, which is limited to bank shipments to and from the New York 
Federal Reserve District by large bulk shippers.
Figure 11 displays the net outflows of U.S. currency as derived from 
the two direct sources of information pertaining to net outflows. The 
figure contains the NYNET proxy for the Federal Reserve informal 
series as well as the total net outflows as reported in the CMIR reports 
(CTNET). Figure 11 also displays two key components of the CMIR 
source data, namely the series of transported net outflows reported by 
financial institutions (CSNET) and the net outflows physically carried
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by individuals (CCNET). The total net outflow series derived from the 
CMIR reports differs markedly from both the NYNET series and the 
net outflow series derived from indirect methods. In particular, CTNET 
suggests a significantly lower volume of net outflows than any of the 
other estimates. The source of the difference is largely due to the indi 
vidual component (CCNET), which suggests that individuals physi 
cally transported larger amounts of currency into the United States than 
out of the United States for all periods except 1990. Since individual 
transactions are not recorded in the informal Federal Reserve data, it is 
necessary to examine more closely the conceptual relationship 
between CMIR direct source information on net outflows and the 
information on net outflows obtained by other direct and indirect 
means.
Figure 11. Direct Estimates of Net Outflows
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Conceptual and Empirical Comparisons 
of Direct Measures of Currency Flows
Table 7 presents a conceptual comparison of the coverage of the 
CMIR reporting system and the Federal Reserve reporting system. The
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table reveals that there are major differences in the conceptual content 
and coverage of the CMIR and FED currency flow data systems. In 
order to derive meaningful comparisons between the information con 
tent of the two reporting systems, it is first necessary to obtain mea 
sures of currency inflows and outflows that are conceptually 
comparable between the two data systems. 19 An algorithm was there 
fore written to aggregate the micro CMIR data records into currency 
flows that would be comparable to FED data in both content and cover 
age.
Table 7. Content Comparison of CMIR and FED Currency Flow 
Reporting Systems















Reported cross border 
currency transport £ 
$5,000 (pre-1980); 
> $10,000 (1980-1994)
Entire U.S. (all Federal 
Reserve Districts)
220 countries
Aggregate transactions of 
large bulk shippers
Approximately 62,000 
records (7 years x 12 
months x 8 banks x 93 
countries)
Monthly— 1988-1994
Major New York banks
New York Federal 
Reserve
Not reported
New York Federal 
Reserve Branch
93 countries
a.The countries reported in the two data systems do not match exactly. Differences reflect tempo 
ral name changes and different levels of country aggregation (i.e., United Kingdom vs. England 
and Scotland). A separate comparison algorithm was written which resolves these difficulties and 
creates two country sets: those included in both the Federal Reserve and CMIR data systems and 
those included in the CMIR system but not in the FED system.
Table 8 (A and B) presents an aggregation scheme for the CMIR 
data system that creates observations on particular currency inflows
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and outflows that are conceptually comparable to the currency inflows 
and outflows believed to be captured in the Federal Reserve data sys 
tem.20 Individual CMIR currency inflow and outflow transaction 
reports are aggregated by mode of cross border transport and by the 
geographic origin and destination of the currency flow. Thus, for cur 
rency inflows, total CMIR inflows (C77) were first disaggregated by 
mode of transport into transactions involving shipment by a financial 
institution (CS7) and transactions involving currency physically carried 
by individuals (CCT). Shipped inflows (C57) were then further disag 
gregated by country of origin and Federal Reserve District of destina 
tion. It was then possible to recombine the shipped inflows into four 
exhaustive categories reflecting:
1. All shipments whose country of origin was contained in the FED 
data system and whose destination was the New York Federal Reserve 
District (CSINYF);
2. All shipments whose country of origin was not in the FED data 
system but whose destination was the New York Federal Reserve Dis 
trict (CSINYO);
3. All shipments whose country of origin was included in the FED 
data system but whose destination district was not New York (CSIOF); 
and
4. All shipments whose country or origin was not in the FED data 
system and whose district of destination was not New York (CSIOO).
Table 9 (A and B) presents the same inflow and outflow matrix for 
the FED data system, indicating that the only conceptually comparable 
currency flows captured by both data systems is CSINYF=FSI and 
CSONYF=FSO. None of the other flows captured by the CMIR data is 
available in the FED data. The Federal Reserve data system excludes 
currency shipments whose origin or destination are the eleven non- 
New York Federal Reserve Districts as well as shipments whose origin 
and destination are countries other than those appearing in the FED 
data system. The FED data also excludes all inflows and outflows of 
currency physically transported by individuals.
In order to gauge the empirical importance of the conceptual infor 
mation content excluded from the FED data system, table 10 (A and B)
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presents a percentage breakdown of the various disaggregated inflows 
and outflows contained in the CMIR data for the period 1988-1994 
which corresponds to the time interval covered by the Federal Reserve 
statistics.
A major finding is immediately apparent from table 10 (A and B) 
concerning the relationship between Federal Reserve data as proxied 
by NYNET and CMIR data. Only 50.9 percent of all recorded CMIR 
inflows are likely to be captured by the FED data system, whereas 82.9 
percent of all CMIR outflows are likely to be recorded by the FED data 
system. Since the CMIR data system includes many inflows of cur 
rency which are not represented in the FED data source, the FED net 
outflow series will overstate the net outflows of currency abroad and 
therefore give the misleading impression that a larger fraction of U.S. 
currency is held abroad.
Table 11 presents the means and standard deviations of various 
direct measures of average quarterly gross currency inflows and out 
flows. Comparing the means of the Federal Reserve and CMIR inflow 
and outflow estimates reveals that the CMIR data are considerably 
more inclusive than the Federal Reserve estimates.21 Recorded average 
quarterly CMIR total currency inflows (CTI) exceed Federal Reserve 
(FSI) recorded bulk receipts of currency by some $2.86 billion. Simi 
larly, recorded average CMIR total currency (CTO) outflows exceed 
Federal Reserve (FSO) bulk currency shipments by $1.39 billion per 
quarter. However, when conceptually comparable magnitudes are com 
pared we find that CMIR estimates of bulk shipments to the New York 
Federal Reserve District from countries included in the FED data sys 
tem (CSINYF) are, as expected, very close to the FED data (FSI). This 
is true to an even greater extent for comparable outflows.
Comparing conceptually comparable magnitudes reduces the inflow 
discrepancy to less than $.2 billion (2,765-2,567) and the outflow dis 
crepancy (6,015-5,869) to $.15 billion. The average quarterly inflows 
of all commercially shipped currency (CSI) recorded by the CMIR 
data still exceed the Federal Reserve's estimated inflows (FSI) by 
roughly $1.13 billion while the average CMIR shipped outflows (CSO) 
exceed the Federal Reserve's estimates of outflows (FSO) by $.67 bil 
lion per quarter. These discrepancies are due to the fact that 16.7 per 
cent of total CMIR currency shipped inflows arrive at banks outside the 
New York district, and 6.2 percent of CMIR outflows originate at banks 
outside of New York. The Federal Reserve's data appear to understate 
gross inflows to a greater degree than they understate gross outflows,
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leading to an overstatement of net shipped currency outflows. This is 
true to an even greater extent for the shipment proxy (NYNET). As dis 
played in table 10, individuals physically transport 31.9 percent of total 
gross inflows but only 10 percent of total gross outflows. 22 Since the 
FED data do not include currency physically transported by individu 
als, the overstatement of net outflows is further accentuated. Any con 
clusions derived from Federal Reserve data or from series closely 
correlated with FED data (such as NYNET), are therefore likely to 
overstate net outflows and therefore lead to the erroneous conclusion 
that foreign holdings of U.S. currency are increasing at a faster rate 
than is in fact the case.
This conclusion is subject to one caveat. It is likely that the CMIR 
filing compliance rate is higher for currency physically carried into the 
United States than for currency physically carried out of the United 
States, since U.S. Customs forms are routinely collected from incom 
ing travelers. During the period 1988-94, there were roughly nine 
inflow filings for every one outflow filing, and the average size of 
reported outflows was almost four times larger than the average size of 
the corresponding reported inflow. The underreporting of physically 
transported outflows and their large average size would induce a down 
ward bias to the carried currency component of CMIR net outflows.
In summary, the CMIR data represent the most comprehensive 
direct measure of currency inflows and outflows. We have shown that 
the one component of the CMIR data that can be directly compared 
with other direct data sources is very reliable. As displayed in table 12, 
the CMIR measure of net shipped New York outflows (CSNYFNET) is 
almost identical to the conceptually comparable figure (FSNET) 
yielded by the FED data system. The total CMIR quarterly net out 
flows (CTNET = CSNET + CCNET) are approximately $.47 billion 
lower than the average of quarterly net outflows estimated from the 
note ratio models (PCE; PDI; POP.CPI) whereas the NYNET and 
SEANET estimates are approximately $2.4 billion higher. The CMIR 
data's lower estimate of net outflows appears to be entirely due to the 
component (CCNET) representing physical transport of currency by 
individuals. This component is negatively correlated or uncorrelated 
with other net outflow measures. The individual component of the 
CMIR either reflects a unique information signal not contained in the 
other series or it may be the result of a compliance bias that differen-
Table 12. Direct and Indirect Measures of Quarterly Net Currency Outflows, 1988-1994
$(Mil.) CCNET CSNET CTNET CSNYFNET PCE PDI POPCPI NYNET SEANET FSNET 
Mean -1,005 2,835 1,830 3,250 2,391 1,839 2,661 4,237 4,201 3,303
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tially effects the incoming and outgoing reporting of individual trans 
port of currency.
Unrecorded Travel and Remittance Flows
The only inflows and outflows not captured by the CMIR direct 
measures are those flows that fall below the reporting requirement and 
those flows that should legally be reported but escape detection due to 
noncompliance. If these flows are relatively large, and outflows sub 
stantially exceeded inflows, they could account for some of the 
observed disparities between the CMIR measure and other estimates of 
net outflows.
Three flows require further investigation. Unrecorded inflows 
include U.S. currency carried into the country by foreign travelers vis 
iting the United States below the filing threshold; unrecorded outflows 
include U.S. currency taken abroad by U.S. travelers and net remit 
tances of currency sent abroad. To estimate the size of these flows we 
examined annual data on total expenditures net of airfares made in the 
United States by foreign travelers to this country and total expenditures 
made by U.S. travelers abroad for the period 1962-1994.23 To simulate 
the net outflows of currency deriving from travelers we assumed that 
prior to the widespread use of credit cards, foreign travelers to the U.S. 
made 20 percent of their purchases of goods and services with U.S. 
currency brought into the country from abroad, whereas U.S. travelers 
carried U.S. currency out of the country to cover 10 percent of their 
expected overseas expenditures. These proportions were reduced over 
time to allow for the growing use of credit cards. Net remittances are 
estimated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, whose economists sug 
gested that, at most, 10 percent of remittances involve transfers of U.S. 
currency. Our simulations over several sets of plausible assumptions 
revealed that annual net outflows of U.S. currency from travel and 
remittance sources rarely exceeded $.5 billion and in most recent 
years, net outflows from these sources were actually negative. We con 
clude that the net currency flows arising from travel and remittance 
transactions that may be excluded from CMIR reports are too small to 
account for the disparities between CMIR net outflows and those esti 
mated by indirect means. If anything, travel flow estimates tend to 
accentuate the observed discrepancies.
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Composite Estimates
Given the diversity of indicators of the unknown net flows of cur 
rency overseas, it is desirable to combine these alternative measures in 
order to obtain a single composite estimate of net currency outflows 
based on all available information. One approach is to use a factor 
analysis model to estimate the common signal or latent variable (L,) 
associated with several alternative indicators of net overseas currency 
flows (M,-r). In the factor model,
each of the Af,- indicators of net outflows is linearly related to the latent 
common factor (L,). The |J,-'s represent the factor loadings and the e,, 
are the temporal measurement errors in each of the i measures of net 
currency outflows.24 Since different estimates of net outflows are avail 
able for different time periods and different frequencies, we estimated 
several factor models for both annual and quarterly frequencies in 
order to examine the stability of the results. The variables employed 
and the periods covered by the various estimates are as follows:
Annual Factor Model 1 (API) - Period 1962-1994
Six variables: Net outflows: MDM(S); NRM(PDI); NRM(PCE); 
NRM(POP,CPI); MDM(C/N); TRAV.25 
Quarterly Factor Model 1 (QF1) - Period 1961:1 - 1994:4
Four variables: Net outflows: NRM(PDI); NRM(PCE); 
NRM(POP,CPI): MDM(ON). 
Quarterly Factor Model 2 (QF2) - Period 1977:1 - 1994:4
Seven variables: Net Outflows: CCNET; CSNET; NYNET; 
NRM(PDI); NRM(PCE); NRM(POP,CPI); MDM(ON).
Figure 12 displays the maximum likelihood estimates of annualized 
net outflows derived from each of the foregoing factor models. The 
temporal pattern of all the estimates is broadly similar, suggesting a 
rising level of net outflows during the decade of the 1980s and a signif 
icant upward shift in net outflows during the early 1990s, largely asso 
ciated with the increased use of U.S. currency as a co-circulating
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medium of exchange in Eastern Europe and the newly independent 
republics of the former Soviet Union. The annual model (AF1), incor 
porating MDM, NRM, and TRAV results produces the highest esti 
mated net outflows during the most recent years, whereas the seven- 
variable quarterly model (QF2) employing direct (CMIR) and proxy 
estimates (NYNET) as well as MDM and NRM estimates produces the 
lower bound net outflow estimates. Given these alternative factor 
model net outflow estimates, it remains to determine what current 
share of overseas holdings is consistent with the net outflow evidence. 
To examine the plausibility of alternative assumptions concerning the 
current share of U.S. notes held abroad, we conducted a series of simu 
lation experiments to determine the implied share of currency held 
domestically, given alternative assumptions concerning the present 
share of U.S. notes abroad.
Figure 12. Estimated Factor Model Net Outflows 
1962-1994 Annual Net Outflows
25000 -
20000
62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94
AF(1)-6Var. -*- QF(1)-4Var. -*- QF(2)7Var.
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Figures 13 and 14, respectively, display the implied shares of cur 
rency held domestically over time assuming that the current share of 
Figures 13 and 14 respectively, display the implied shares of currency 
held domestically over time assuming that the current share of notes 
held overseas is 40 percent and 60 percent. For the 40 percent Figures 
13 and 14 respectively, display the implied shares of currency held 
domestically over time assuming that the current share of notes held 
overseas is 40 percent and 60 percent. For the 40 percent abroad simu 
lation, all of the factor model estimates imply a feasible range of 
domestic holdings between 0 and 100 percent, whereas the 60 percent 
abroad simulations produce infeasible estimates which suggest that 
prior to the mid-1970s no U.S. currency was held domestically. 26
Figure 13. Domestic Share of U.S. Currency
Simulation: 1994=40% of Notes Overseas
120
62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94
AF(1)-6Var. QF(1)-4Var. QF(2) - 7 Var.
On the basis of the foregoing simulations, we conclude that the most 
plausible estimate of the share of U.S. notes presently held abroad is 
roughly 40 percent, which implies that roughly 36 percent of U.S. cur 
rency is held abroad.27 Employing this current value, figure 15 displays 
the implied time series of the share of currency held overseas between 
1973 and 1994 for each of the factor model net outflow estimates. 
Given the considerable range of overseas shares implied by the three 
factor model estimates, we conclude that precise estimates of the 
domestic money supply remain elusive.
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Figure 14. Domestic Share of U.S. Currency
Simulation: 1994=60% of Notes Overseas
100
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Year
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Figure 15. Foreign Holdings of U.S. Currency 
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Implications of Foreign Holdings of U.S. Currency 
for Estimates of the Domestic Unreported Economy
The provisional estimates of overseas holdings suggest that earlier 
currency ratio model estimates of the unreported economy were mis- 
specified insofar as they erroneously assumed that the entire stock of 
U.S. currency was held domestically. It is now possible to reestimate 
the currency ratio models employing the new alternative estimates of 
the domestic stock of U.S. currency.
Figures 16 and 17 display estimates of total unreported income 
obtained from both the simple C/D model and the OCR model employ 
ing alternative factor model estimates of the domestic U.S. currency 
stock. Figure 18 displays the OCR estimates of unreported income as a 
percentage of AGI.
Total unreported income appears to have grown secularly until 
1985, declined briefly around the time of the 1986 tax reform, and then 
peaked in 1991. The temporal pattern of the alternative OCR estimates 
of unreported income as a percent of AGI tells essentially the same 
story. Unreported income appears to have grown rapidly from 1966 
and peaked as a percent of AGI in 1980. The percent of unreported 
income then declined until 1987, rose again until 1991, and fell again 
to a lower level approximating levels last observed in the early 1970s.
Of the three factor model estimates of the domestic currency supply, 
the QF2 estimate may be the most reliable, being based on quarterly 
frequencies and the largest amount of direct and indirect information 
concerning net currency outflows. The QF2 estimates from both the 
simple C/D and GCR models suggest that total unreported income in 
1993 was roughly $700 billion, representing approximately 20 percent 
of AGI.
The main conclusion to be drawn from these revised estimates of 
unreported activity is that once account is taken of foreign holdings of 
U.S. currency, the range of uncertainty concerning the magnitude of 
unreported income is substantially reduced. The difference between 
the unadjusted GCR estimates of unreported income and the IRS esti 
mates for 1992 (figure 7) amounted to more than $400 billion. The 
revised estimates displayed in figure 17 reveal that the difference 
between the IRS estimate and the QF2 estimate is now reduced to 
roughly $100 billion.
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Figure 16. Total Unreported Income
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Figure 17. Total Unreported Income
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Figure 18 reveals that unreported income as a percent of AGI varies 
considerably over time. Whereas earlier studies of the underground 
economy reported its secular growth in both absolute and relative 
terms, the most recent data suggest that since 1980, unreported income 
as a percent of AGI has fluctuated quite dramatically. The two most 
plausible explanations of these fluctuations in unreported income are 
changes in average tax rates and changes in the level of dissatisfaction 
with government.
Figure 19 displays the relationship between the QF2 revised esti 
mates of unreported income as a percent of AGI to the average effec 
tive federal tax rate, and figure 20 displays the relationship between 
unreported income and an index of dissatisfaction with government.28
Figure 19 reveals that tax evasion does appear to rise in response to 
higher average taxes, and conversely falls when the incentives to cheat 
are reduced by lower average tax rates. Similarly, in figure 20 we find 
the expected relationship between tax evasion activity and the level of 
dissatisfaction with government. The dramatic fall in the level of dis 
satisfaction with the government between 1980 and 1984, coincides 
with a fall in the relative level of tax evasion. Conversely, the increases 
in the level of dissatisfaction with government observed between the 
mid-1980s and 1990 are associated with a relative increase in tax eva 
sion activities. It seems that when taxpayers perceive their public rep 
resentatives to be dishonest, and when they perceive a decline in the 
public benefits obtained from their tax dollars, they are more likely to 
engage in tax evasion.
The finding that a substantial portion of U.S. currency is held over 
seas provides a partial resolution of the currency enigma. It will be 
recalled that Federal Reserve surveys suggest that U.S. households 
admit to holding roughly 12 percent of the nation's currency, firms 
account for roughly 3 percent, the unreported economy employs 
roughly 4 percent, and foreign holdings amount to roughly 36 percent. 
These estimates suggest that we have accounted for 55 percent of the 
nation's currency supply, leaving 45 percent still to be explained. Por 
ter and Judson (1995), who place considerable emphasis on their ver 
sion of the MDM(S) and MDM(SR) results, suggest that a much larger 
fraction of U.S. currency is held abroad—between 50 percent and 70 
percent. Our analysis suggests that these estimates of overseas hold-
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Figure 18. Unreported Income as a Percent of AGI 
Adjusted GCR Models: 1973=IRS Base
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ings are too high. We are more inclined to believe that survey respon 
dents may systematically underreport the amounts of currency they 
hold and that surveys of currency usage may understate actual domes 
tic holdings because of self-selection biases. Whether these domestic 
cash hoards are derived from underground activities that we continue 
to underestimate, or from legitimate activities that are simply underre- 
corded in our NIPA accounts, remains to be resolved.
The finding that roughly 36 percent of the stock of U.S. currency is 
currently overseas raises another monetary puzzle. Are foreign hold 
ings of U.S. currency being used solely as a store of value or do they 
function as a co-circulating medium of exchange? Preliminary evi 
dence (Feige 1994) based on an investigation of the age and quality of
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some 200,000 individual notes suggests that the age/quality distribu 
tions of domestically circulating notes and notes returning to the 
United States from abroad are quite similar. These findings suggest that 
the velocity of domestically held currency is on average not that differ-
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ent from the velocity of currency held abroad. If foreigners' holdings 
of U.S. currency circulate at the same rate as that of U.S. household 
holdings, they would generate a flow of annual cash payments 
approaching the size of the GDP of the United States. Thus, the partial 
resolution of the currency enigma for the United States merely creates 
another monetary anomaly for the rest of the world. The world econ 
omy appears to subsume a U.S.-sized unrecorded economy that 
employs U.S. currency as its medium of exchange. The world's cur 
rency enigma deepens when one considers that our revised estimates of 
U.S. per capita currency holdings are still modest compared with the 
per capita currency holdings of other developed European and Asian 
nations. The problem of missing currency is not limited to the U.S. dol 
lar but also extends to other major currencies, most importantly to the 
German mark and the Japanese yen.
NOTES
1. Currency in circulation refers to the amount of currency held outside of the Treasury and 
Federal Reserve. Except for small amounts of currency that may have been inadvertently lost or 
destroyed by the public (Laurent 1974), currency in circulation includes the holdings of financial 
intermediaries and the public. Reliable data on financial intermediary holdings of vault cash are 
readily available, and it is therefore possible to obtain accurate estimates of the total stock of cur 
rency outside the banking system. For a complete description of the cash payments system, see 
Feige (1994).
2. The taxonomy of "underground economies," which identifies the interrelationships between 
the illegal, unreported, unrecorded, and informal economies, is discussed in Feige (1989,1990a).
3. On page A-101 of the IRS (1988) report, the IRS acknowledges the major limitations of its 
projections of unreported income: "Because we essentially hold constant rates of noncompliance 
through 1992, these estimates do not reflect recent trends in noncompliance. Second,we assume 
that tax reform has no impact on individual's behavior in terms of either their propensity for non- 
compliance or the types of incomes individuals will receive in future years. Third, these projec 
tions are sensitive to changes in macroeconomic model projections of incomes in future years."
4. The IRS estimates reported above are based on the recommendations of the tax examiners. 
Since some of these recommendations are challenged by the taxpayer, the IRS also prepared an 
alternative set of estimates on an assessed basis. These are reported in Appendix E (IRS 1988).
5. As described in Feige (1989), the foregoing restrictions imply that the ratio of unreported 
(Yu) to reported (Yo) income can be estimated as follows:
Yw/K? = (C-koD)l(ko+l)D 
where:
C = Currency
D = Checkable Deposits
ko = Co/Do.
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6. The general currency ratio model (OCR) permits a relaxation of several of the assumptions 
employed in the simple currency ratio model. In particular, currency needs no longer to be the 
exclusive medium of exchange in unreported transactions, and any year for which an independent 
estimate of unreported income is available can serve as a benchmark.
The GCR model can be solved to obtain the equation for the ratio of unreported income 
which is:
Yu/Yo = (ku+l)(C-koD)/(ko+l)(kuD-Q 
where:
ku and ko respectively represent the currency-deposit ratios in the unreported and in the 
reported economies.
7. The IRS estimate is the sum of the legal source unreported income estimate displayed in 
figure 3 plus a IS percent imputation for illegal source income. The imputation for illegal source 
income is based on the illegal source income estimates reported in the earlier (IRS 1983) study. 
The currency ratio models yield estimates of total unreported income from all sources.
8. The methodology for estimating the velocity (turnover) of currency is described in Feige 
(1990b). The estimates are based on the Federal Reserve's Survey of Currency Usage, which finds 
that the income velocity of household cash holdings is roughly fifty turnovers per year. Share 
weighted denomination-specific velocities are obtained by estimating the average lifetime of each 
note denomination derived from FR-160 data on currency issues (births) and redemptions 
(deaths).
9. The research reported here is one of several approaches undertaken as part of a broader 
study for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Treasury Depart 
ment Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) on estimating foreign holdings of U.S. 
currency.
10. The application of demographic theory and methods to currency populations is developed 
in Feige (1990b), which includes estimates of age-specific currency mortality and survival rates. 
Feige (1994) presents a full demographic model describing the life cycle of the individual note 
and the dynamics of note populations and cohorts.
11. See the 1990 Federal Reserve Soil Level Impact Task Force (SLITF) study entitled "Com 
prehensive Assessment of U.S. Currency Quality, Age & Cost Relationships."
12. The estimates presented for denominations $1, $5, $50, $100 are averages obtained from 
Baselines 1 and 2 of the SLITF study. The Baseline 1 model for the $10 denomination and the 
Baseline 2 estimates for the $20 denomination failed to converge even after significant outliers 
were deleted from the samples. We therefore report a range of estimates for these two denomina 
tions. The similarity of the age distributions of overseas and domestic notes suggests that the 
reported results are likely to contain a wide margin or error.
13. The assumption is justified by the argument that the U.S. and Canada have identical cur 
rency denomination structures and that the Canadian dollar is rarely used overseas.
14. Porter and Judson claim that almost all currency sent to and received from abroad is pro 
cessed by the New York Federal Reserve Bank. The veracity of this assumption can be tested by 
an examination of CMIR data disaggregated by Federal Reserve District of origin and destination. 
The CMIR data reveal that only 52 percent of all reported currency inflows for the period 1977 
and 1994 had the New York Federal Reserve District as their point of destination. The New York 
District was reported as the point of origin for 85 percent of total outflows during the period.
15. The reported results include an adjustment of the coin/note ratio to take account of the 
introduction of a one dollar coin in Canada in July 1987. The Bank of Canada continued to issue 
one dollar notes until June 30,1989, at which time there were 246 million of the one dollar coins 
in circulation. By the end of 1989, the number of one dollar coins in circulation had risen to 464
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million. The reported results are based on a time series forecast of what the coin/note ratio would 
have been in the absence of the introduction of the one dollar coin.
16. Porter and Judson obtained the seasonal components employing the STL seasonal adjust 
ment procedure applied to the currency component (coin plus notes) of the Canadian and U.S. Ml 
series. In our replication, we employed the XI1 ARIMA procedure on the Canadian and U.S. 
notes in circulation series, since neither Canadian nor U.S. coins are assumed to circulate over 
seas. The results reported by Porter and Judson are not based on the ratio of seasonal components 
as specified by Equation (6), but rather on the ratio of the seasonal amplitudes of the U.S. and 
Canadian series, derived by taking the difference between the December and February seasonals 
(Porter and Judson 1995, pp. 16-17). Our replication efforts suggest that the results are relatively 
insensitive to the use of different seasonal adjustment procedures and the substitution of the note 
series for the currency component series. However, the time series estimates of the share abroad 
are quite sensitive to the use of the seasonal amplitude metric employed by Porter and Judson. In 
particular, when the MDM(S) model is estimated on a monthly or quarterly basis, and the esti 
mated monthly or quarterly overseas share is estimated as the ratio of each of the seasonal compo 
nents minus one as suggested by Equation (6), the estimated monthly and quarterly shares abroad 
fluctuate wildly within a year, often yielding estimates of the share abroad that exceed 100 per 
cent.
17. Throughout the analysis we assume that all U.S. coin is held domestically.
18. During the inter-war period between 1923 and 1941, the Federal Reserve published data 
on net currency shipments to European countries (Banking and Monetary Statistics: 1914-1941, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1943, pp. 417-418). Over the entire period for 
which data are available, cumulative net inflows from Europe amounted to 4.8 percent of the aver 
age outstanding stock of currency during the period. The average annual net inflow of currency 
from Europe amounted to .25 percent of the average outstanding currency stock.
19. In order to maintain strict confidentiality of individual records in the CMIR data system, 
aggregations were performed at the offices of the U.S. Treasury (FINCEN). Subsequent analysis 
was performed on the aggregated data. Since Federal Reserve Banks are not required by law to 
file CMIR statements, the CMIR shipment series were augmented to include direct overseas cur 
rency shipments to and by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
20. The remaining minor incompatibility derives from the fact that CMIR records were cre 
ated by Federal Reserve District whereas the FED data includes only observations for the New 
York Federal Reserve Branch of the New York Federal Reserve District. CMIR observations for 
the New York District therefore include the negligible transactions of the Buffalo Branch.
21. Under current CMIR reporting requirements, direct Federal Reserve Bank overseas cur 
rency shipments are not importable on CMIRs but are included in the FED shipment series. In 
order to make both series comparable, direct Federal Reserve Bank shipments were added to the 
CMIR shipment series.
22. The series on individual inflows and outflows appear to be very different from the bulk 
shipments undertaken by financial institutions. Two explanations are possible for this important 
disparity. The data on physical transport by individuals include travel transport companies such as 
airlines or cruise ships that may generate U.S. currency outside the United States and regularly 
transport it back for deposit in their domestic bank. The discrepancy may also be due to differen 
tial rates of compliance with CMIR reporting. Individuals transporting currency out of the country 
are not monitored as carefully by the U.S. Customs as individuals returning to the United States. It 
is therefore possible that there is a lower rate of reporting compliance with physically transported 
outflows than with physically transported inflows.
23. The data were generously provided by the United States Travel and Tourism Administra 
tion, Washington, D.C.
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24. A general discussion of factor analysis models can be found in Mulaik (1972). Bollen 
(1989) contains a review of factor analysis in the context of latent variables.
25. TRAV is an annual estimate of the net outflow of U.S. currency resulting from travel to 
and from the U.S. and net cash remittances sent abroad.
26. It should be noted that the individual net outflow results are even more sensitive to initial 
starting overseas values. In particular, the MDM(S) net outflow results only produce feasible esti 
mates if we assume that between 65 and 75 percent of currency is presently overseas, whereas at 
the other extreme, the CMIR net outflows only produce feasible estimates in the 15 to 25 percent 
range.
27. Throughout the analysis, we assume that all U.S. coin is held domestically.
28. The average effective federal tax rate is simply the sum of federal government tax receipts 
divided by AGI. The dissatisfaction with government index is constructed as an equally weighted 
average of three normalized indices representing answers to the University of Michigan's Institute 
for Social Research (ISR) surveys concerning whether government officials can be trusted, 
whether they are crooked, and whether the government wastes taxpayers' money. I am indebted to 
the ISR for providing the underlying data.
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The Mismeasurement 
of Illegal Drug Markets
The Implications of Its Irrelevance
Peter Reuter 
University of Maryland
The largest illegal market in the United States currently is that for 
illegal drugs. It may be, in terms of share of Gross National Product, 
the largest ever. Given the poor quality of estimates of income from 
any other illegal market, the statement is hard to challenge but I believe 
that one can make a reasonable case that, compared with the other can 
didates (e.g., prostitution, illegal gambling, counterfeiting), illegal 
drugs are likely to generate much higher total revenues to sellers. Cer 
tainly numbers are presented in a variety of fora, predominantly politi 
cal, suggesting that it is a major economic activity both in the United 
States and globally. Figures such as $500 billion for world sales are 
thrown around quite glibly. 1
Even brief scrutiny of the global numbers suggests that they are 
grossly overstated. Though drug markets are large and involve a sur 
prisingly large number of Americans on a part-time basis, the total 
value of annual sales in the United States is likely to be around $50 bil 
lion, less than 1 percent of Gross Domestic Product and less than 2 per 
cent of personal consumption expenditures.2 The global figure is likely 
to be no more than twice this. One hundred billion dollars represents a 
large market, but in the context of total global trade flows of almost $3 
trillion, it is a very modest share indeed. That share declines to the triv 
ial when account is taken of the fact that most of the value added is 
domestic, so that valuing the trade at import prices reduces it to proba 
bly no more than $20 billion.
In recent years, the federal government has developed systematic 
estimates of domestic expenditures that do indeed provide a reasonable 
basis for scaling the size of these markets. However, these coexist with 
an essentially madcap series of federal figures on international produc 
tion and prices that make a mockery of the whole enterprise. These
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estimates and their components are so inconsistent and erratic that they 
demonstrate what might reasonably be called a "reckless disregard" for 
the truth. Moreover, though it would be surprising if the government 
estimates of domestic expenditures were (say) only half of the true 
value, the year-to-year fluctuations in these estimates may be wrong 
even in direction, let alone scale.
Does this mismeasurement matter? For those interested in the size 
of the underground economy, the answer is clearly yes; estimates of the 
largest illegal market are potentially of considerable significance. 
However, the estimates were not developed for those purposes, but to 
help in the development of drug policy. If policy making with respect 
to drugs were rational, or at least as analytically driven as, say, 
monetary policy, then the exaggeration would be a serious problem. I 
shall argue that the numbers are in fact just decorations on the policy 
process, rhetorical conveniences for official statements without any 
serious consequences. Indeed, the irrelevance of the numbers is itself a 
condemnation of drug policy decision making.
This paper has three sections. The first examines the official esti 
mates of drug production, both in the United States and the rest of the 
world, and sales in the United States, showing how implausible they 
are. The second describes the process that generates the estimates and 
its bureaucratic imperatives. Finally, I consider the policy interpreta 
tion of the mismeasurement.
The Estimates
The U.S. devotes considerable resources to estimation of drug pro 
duction by other nations.3 Those estimates, published each year in the 
"International Narcotics Control Strategy Report" (INCSR), are essen 
tially without competition internationally; certainly they are regarded 
as more authoritative than any other reports, such as the documents of 
the United Nations International Drug Control Program, which them 
selves often cite the INCSR estimates. The failure to include estimates 
of U.S. domestic production, particularly of marijuana is a conspicuous 
omission, explained awkwardly by the specific use to which Congress
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intended to put these numbers, namely, providing incentives to other 
countries to improve their drug control efforts.4
No detail has ever been published on the methodology of these esti 
mates, beyond the fact that they are generated from estimates of grow 
ing area, crop per acre, and refining yield per ton of raw product; the 
information sources, even the technology used to produce them (for 
area estimates) are classified. But while the estimation task is clearly a 
difficult one, the current estimates have unnecessarily low credibility. 
They show inexplicable inconsistency over time and across sectors of 
the industry. Some numbers are simply implausible.
Consider as an example of the unprincipled variation over time, esti 
mates of Burmese opium production, consumption, and export. Burma 
has been estimated to be the largest producer of opium for the illicit 
market since the early 1980s; since 1989 it may have accounted for 
over half of world production. In the 1991INCSR, the opium available 
for refining (primarily into heroin) for 1988 was estimated to be 679 
metric tons; the figure for 1989 was 1600 metric tons, an increase of 
more than 140 percent. 5 The difference reflected two factors: (1) A rise 
in total production, generated by a 25 percent increase in cultivation 
and an unexplained increase in yield per acre; and (2) a dramatic 
reduction in exports of opium (as opposed to heroin). The result was 
that estimated heroin production increased from 68 tons to 128 tons.
Then in the following year, the 1992 INCSR revised the figure for 
domestic consumption in 1988 downward from 400 tons to 150 tons, 
reflecting a downward revision in the number of Burmese opium users 
from 400,000 to 34,000. Yet this did not lead to any change in the esti 
mate of the amount available for refining in 1988. Also odd is that a 25 
percent increase in the estimated number of Burmese heroin users from 
12,000 in 1988 to 15,000 in 1989 led to a more than doubling of the 
estimate in Burmese domestic heroin consumption from 2.0 tons to 4.5 
tons.6
These are figures that do not bear close scrutiny, either individually 
or collectively. The number of opium users in Burma is unlikely to fall 
by 90 percent in one year; clearly some analyst in 1992 decided that 
previous assumptions about the number of opium users in Burma were 
overstated. Given that the United States has had the thinnest diplomatic 
relations with Burma since about 1989, it is highly unlikely that this 
change resulted from acquisition of any substantial new data. Simi-
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larly, the decision to increase the estimated average consumption of 
Burmese heroin addicts in 1989 was probably no more than some ana 
lyst's distant judgment. The reasonable stability of the total in recent 
years hides implausible variation in the components of the estimates. 
The totals have little credibility.
The problems are illustrated even more graphically by the published 
estimates for Mexican marijuana production in the late 1980s. 7 
Whereas Burma is distant and hostile, with a government that has little 
control in many of the major opium producing areas, Mexico is close, 
an ally for most purposes, and (except for Chiappas since 1994) firmly 
in control of its drug producing territory. Yet the Mexican estimates 
have relied on often inconsistent and inadequately described methodol 
ogies, leading some analysts, including one at the Bureau of Interna 
tional Narcotics Matters (INM), to conclude that actual production is 
"unknowable" and that the agency's estimates are at best rather unsci 
entific guesswork.8
The preface to the 1988 annual report of the National Narcotics 
Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC, an interagency group 
chaired by the Drug Enforcement Administration) warns that "there is 
little reliable data upon which to base estimates of the quantities of 
drugs involved" (NNICC 1988). Yet, notwithstanding the lack of first 
hand evidence of illicit activity that limits accurate production mea 
sures, it is often claimed that "the general trends portrayed can be con 
sidered reliable" (NNICC 1984). In the 1980s, this was belied by 
discrepancies in the trends for the two official series for these esti 
mates, provided by NNICC and the INCSR. For example, the NNICC 
estimate of net production (after eradication) rose in 1986 to 5,460 
metric tons from 4,125 the year before; the INCSR estimates for the 
same years were 2,800 in 1986 and 2,700 in 1985. Note that they differ 
substantially both in absolute value and in the trend; the NNICC fig 
ures were higher and rising while the INCSR figures were lower and 
essentially flat. In 1987 INM showed a slight decrease (about 5 per 
cent) while the NNICC showed an increase of about one-third. INM 
officials explained the discrepancy in the mid-1980s as follows: "The 
Department of State considers its country estimates more reliable 
because the data were derived principally from aerial surveys. There 
are, however, no survey data on marijuana cultivation in Mexico; the 
State Department relied on random reports from Mexico that were
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higher than the NNICC figure, which is an extrapolation of seizure 
data" (General Accounting Office 1988, p. 53). This is less an explana 
tion than an evenhanded condemnation of both estimates!
The fundamental unsoundness of the whole series of estimates was 
demonstrated vividly at the end of the decade. The U.S. estimate of 
Mexican marijuana production was dramatically increased in the 1990 
INCSR, from a total of 5,700 tons in 1988 to 47,000 tons in 1989, as 
the result of changes in estimation techniques.9 No details of those 
changes were provided in the published document. Yet it was possible 
to determine, with no great technical skill, that these figures were 
implausibly high and should never have been published.
Consider the various ways that Mexican marijuana might have been 
disposed of: seizures, domestic Mexican consumption, exports to 
Europe, and exports to the United States. Mexican domestic consump 
tion is thought to be quite low, notwithstanding the important historical 
association of marijuana in the United States with Mexican immigrant 
groups in the 1930s, a major factor in the passage of the Marijuana 
Stamp Act in 1937. The State Department estimated the total in the late 
1980s to be 100 tons. There are no reports of Mexican exports to Euro 
pean markets, probably because Mexico is not well located to compete 
with North African, Middle Eastern and domestic production in 
Europe, which is primarily a hashish rather than marijuana market any 
way. Seizures are usually estimated at a few hundred tons. Nonethe 
less, assume that all these figures are major underestimates and that the 
total for seizures, Mexican consumption, and European exports was 
12,000 tons.
This would leave 35,000 tons for consumption in the U.S. markets. 
How many marijuana users would have to purchase the Mexican prod 
uct to dispose of this? Rhodes et al. (1995, p. 20) estimated that a joint 
in 1993 had an average of 0.136 ounces (0.39 grams) of marijuana. 
However, Mexican origin marijuana is believed to be of lower potency, 
so let us assume that each joint contains 1 gram; this will bias the cal 
culation in favor of finding large figures plausible.
A very heavy user of marijuana consumes about three joints per 
day. Giving the user time off for colds and work-related drug tests, 
assume that he or she consumes this amount 333 days a year; this (con 
veniently) gives a total of 1 kilogram of marijuana annually. That 
implies that we need 35 million very heavy marijuana smokers to con-
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sume 35,000 tons; that would be about half of all persons aged 15-35, 
the heavy user ages (Chen and Kandel 1995). And this does not take 
into account consumption of domestic U.S. production or what is 
imported from Jamaica, Colombia, etc. Yet reasonable estimates of the 
total number of heavy users (at least one joint per day) are only about 
one-tenth of the 35 million needed to dispose of the imports from Mex 
ico. Moreover, other estimates of total U.S. consumption have been far 
lower; e.g., Kleiman (1989) came up with figures for 1985 of only 
about 5,000 tons and prevalence was still declining in the late 1980s.
Perhaps as the result of this critique, the 1991 INCSR announced a 
further revision in estimation methodology. The estimate of area har 
vested was increased, reflecting a dramatic downward revision in the 
estimate of acreage eradicated. However, a new distinction was intro 
duced between "usable plant yield" and "whole plant yield"; the 
former, more relevant to consumption estimates, was put at only half 
the latter. The new 1989 estimate of usable plant available for export 
after domestic consumption and Mexican seizures was 29,700 tons. 
Though an improvement over the previous figure, it was still utterly 
implausible, requiring U.S. consumers to account for far more than is 
consistent with current estimates of prevalence. Only in 1991 did the 
official figures start to approach even remotely plausible levels, though 
still being far higher than other estimates of total U.S. consumption.
Though I will not describe all the twists and turns since then, it is 
worth noting the current state of estimates. The 1994 INCSR lists the 
following series for usable plant yield:




SOURCE: 'International Narcotics Control Strategy Report" (1994).
Only for the 1990 figure is any footnote explanation offered suggesting 
a change in methodology; yet no one seriously maintains that 1993 
Mexican cannabis production is 20 percent of its 1989 level. The 
wholly implausible 1989 figure remains in the series, though the 
INCSR makes numerous later year revisions.
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Another means of establishing the implausibility of the 1989 and 
1990 figures is to consider their implications for Mexican export earn 
ings. The farmgate price of marijuana in Mexico was estimated to be 
$50 to $100 per pound; the border price, after distribution within Mex 
ico, was estimated at $136 to $455 per pound. Even taking the lower 
bound of the border price (which seems very low, given other price 
estimates for wholesale prices in the United States), the 35,000 tons of 
marijuana exports generates earnings of $11 billion for 1989, com 
pared to recorded export earnings of $40 billion; surely this would be 
enough to make nonsense of analyses of Mexican currency fluctua 
tions.
These figures should never have survived a review process. As the 
above analysis suggests, it is easy to establish that they are far outside 
the plausible range. Yet the estimation process is so detached from 
analysis of domestic indicators that these figures have been able to sur 
vive for many years. Colleagues of mine at RAND have recently devel 
oped elementary "mass conservation" models that impose consistency 
checks on estimates; 10 the Mexican figures do not survive in that kind 
of framework. The discipline is simple enough that one may reason 
ably ask why it has not been done before.
International Price Series
The federal government also publishes "The Illicit Drug Wholesale/ 
Retail Price Report," which contains price data for foreign production 
covering both intermediate and final product. Though prices are in 
principle easier to observe than quantities, these series show obvious 
inconsistencies. This is not the place for a lengthy description of all the 
anomalies of these series. Instead let me just provide two illustrations:
1. In every year for which the data are published, the price for 
refined cocaine is lower in Colombia than the other two major produc 
ing countries (Bolivia and Peru). Yet it is also asserted that most 
exports of Bolivian and Peruvian cocaine go through Colombia. It is 
difficult to tell an economically plausible story in which Colombian 
exporters prefer to buy the more expensive product in foreign coun 
tries, and then incur the cost and risk of shipping it into Colombia for 
re-export. If there is some constraint on expanding production in
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Colombia, the price for that cocaine should be higher, representing its 
transportation cost advantage. 11
2. The relative prices of the intermediate product, base, and the final 
product (HCL) move erratically for both Bolivia and Peru. In 1990 the 
difference between HCL and base prices in Peru is reported to be 
$3,480; in Bolivia in the same year the difference is $1,525. In 1992 
the Peruvian margin has increased to $4,950, while the Bolivian mar 
gin has slipped to $1,150. Given the low transportation cost for base 
and the ease of processing, the large and growing difference between 
processing costs in the two countries seem quite implausible.
The heroin series are no better. The price of morphine, an intermedi 
ate product in the refining of illicit heroin, is sometimes recorded as 
higher than the final product. The export price of heroin from South 
east Asia is stable in the late 1980s, notwithstanding large increases in 
estimated product and falling prices elsewhere.
Expenditure Estimates
Only recently have domestic counterparts to the foreign production 
estimates become available from the government. Though estimates of 
the number of persons using illicit drugs are produced annually 12 and 
attract a great deal of attention, there has never been a similar interest 
in quantities and expenditures; the sources and implications of this lack 
of interest are discussed in the final section. The Office of National 
Drug Control Policy has been sponsoring such estimates since 1991 
but they have attracted little attention or scrutiny. 13 The most recent 
available figures are given in tables 2 and 3.
In contrast to the international figures, these estimates are thor 
oughly documented and have their origins in very diverse types of cal 
culations. The cocaine and marijuana estimates are derived from the 
household survey data, supplemented by various other surveys that 
cover populations (e.g., prisoners and college dormitory students) not 
included in the household survey, or which provide more data about 
the average amounts consumed by particular groups of users. Given 
that a small share of all users account for a large share of total cocaine 
consumption, particular attention is given to ethnographic studies that 
include consumption figures for heavy users. 14
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SOURCE: Rhodes et al. (1995, tables 5 and 6).
NOTE: The manjuana consumption totals are estimated from figures provided in table 6 on the
number of users, number of joints per months per user, and the weight of marijuana per joint.
Table 3. Total U.S. Expenditures on Illicit Drugs, 1988-1993 










































SOURCE: Rhodes et al. (1995, table 8).
Heroin estimates are generated by a different process, since The 
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse is thought to miss most of 
the population of frequent heroin users, who tend to be transient if not 
homeless and difficult to track down for interviews. The estimates are 
generated by a complex procedure from the number seeking admission 
to treatment and interviews with intravenous drug users in a large scale 
ethnographic study. 15
Note first that the marijuana consumption estimates in table 2 are 
almost an order of magnitude smaller than implied by the Mexican 
production estimates, though most of that production is destined for
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the U.S. market. Even the recent INCSR estimates for Mexico are at 
least eight times those for total U.S. consumption. That seven hundred 
tons in 1993 generated almost $10 billion in retail sales; assuming 
prices are measured with reasonable accuracy, certainly much more so 
than quantities, then the notion that the United States imports 6,000 
tons, with domestic sales value of $70 billion seems particularly 
implausible.
Though the heroin and cocaine expenditure series are carefully pro 
duced and show no internal anomalies, it is useful to also examine their 
relationship to official price series and another international production 
series produced by the federal government. The price data (table 4) 
come from a series maintained by the Drug Enforcement Administra 
tion called STRIDE (System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evi 
dence). 16
Table 4. Retail Prices for Cocaine and Heroin, 1988-1993 





































SOURCE: Rhodes et al. (1995, taWe 4).
Note the odd relationship between the heroin price and quantity 
series in tables 2 and 4. Though prices fall by somewhere between one- 
sixth and one-half (depending on whether one uses the high or low 
price figures) between 1988 and 1993, total consumption (as reported 
in table 2) is essentially flat over this period. Moreover, the consump 
tion totals are very low, given estimates of the total number of depen 
dent users (ca. 500,000) and recent estimates of how much users 
purchase weekly, now that heroin is both purer and cheaper than it was 
in the early 1980s. One recent study estimated that in New York and 
Chicago, median weekly consumption was about 700 milligrams,
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yielding an annual total of about 35 grams (Boyum and Rocheleau 
1994); taken nationally that would generate a total consumption of 
about 18 tons.
The cocaine price and quantity series also produce some implausi 
ble relations. In 1990 it is believed that the Colombian government's 
crackdown on the Medellin traffickers led to a sharp, temporary, 
decline in total exports, perhaps partly compensated for by a run-down 
in inventories of traffickers. Prices rise by between 20 and 50 percent 
from 1989 to 1990 and consumption falls by between 25 and 40 per 
cent, suggesting a rather higher elasticity of demand than might have 
been expected but otherwise not an implausible set of figures. In 1991, 
when the crackdown had ended, prices fell to the 1989 levels but con 
sumption was much closer to the 1990 figure, rising only between 7 
and 26 percent.
A review of the official supply side figures in table 5 points to a 
much more substantial problem of consistency. Separately from the 
cocaine consumption figures, the same research group also produces a 
series labeled "Cocaine available for consumption in the United States 
(after discounting [sic] for Federal seizures)." These are supply side 
estimates, produced by taking estimates of total production in the 
source countries (Bolivia, Colombia,and Peru) and then subtracting 
estimates of what is seized along the way, consumed elsewhere 
(including Western Europe) and seized by U.S. federal government 
agencies. The estimates for 1989 to 1993 are produced in table 5. Note 
that these figures are substantially higher than the domestic consump 
tion estimates reported in table 2; indeed, in 1990 the high end of the 
range is twice the high end for domestic consumption.
Table 5. Trends in the Cocaine Supply, 1989-1993
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Cocaine available for
consumption in the U.S. 
(metric tons) 361-473
Retail value of cocaine in the









SOURCE: Rhodes et al (1955, table B).
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Some of the difference may be explained by seizures made by state 
and local agencies; in 1987 these agencies were estimated to have 
seized about half as much as their federal counterparts (Godshaw, Kop- 
pell, and Pancoast 1987). Over the period considered here, federal sei 
zures were between about 100 and 120 tons. However, even subtracting 
50 or 60 tons from the supply side series, the supply side estimate in 
most years is substantially higher than the domestic estimate.
But of more immediate concern to us is the lack of any notable 
change in the supply available to the United States in 1990; the drop 
from 1989 is about 3 percent. This of course is inconsistent with the 
observed increase in U.S. retail price in 1990 and the reduction in esti 
mated consumption, as well as with the official (and plausible view) 
that the Colombian crackdown had a substantial effect. Reference to 
the European market or local seizures does not help explain this incon 
sistency, since these series are unlikely to exhibit year-to-year changes 
large enough to explain much of this. To make this lack of change in 
1990 even more dramatic, note that the only year of substantial change 
is 1993, when the estimated supply dropped by about one-third. Yet 
this decline is not reflected, as one might have expected, in either the 
domestic consumption or retail price figures; indeed, prices dropped by 
about 5 percent!
The supply side series undermines the credibility of the domestic 
estimates. Or it may simply be that any figures generated from distant 
lands by unknown processes should be viewed as worthless.
Estimates of world consumption or expenditure have no known 
provenance. Five hundred billion dollars is the standard figure cited in 
official and unofficial publications. The U.S. State Department, despite 
its imperialistic estimation of production and (often) consumption in 
individual foreign countries, does not attempt a global estimate. I 
believe it unlikely that the global figure is much more than twice the 
U.S. total. Though the United States accounts for only 5 percent of 
world opium production (through its heroin consumption), most opium 
and heroin are sold in Asia at prices that are a minuscule proportion of 
the U.S. street price. The United States still consumes most of the 
world's cocaine production. For marijuana, again most of the world 
production is consumed in countries with much lower retail prices.
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The Production Process
I will assume the reader is convinced from the above that the official 
numbers (prices, quantities, expenditures) are seriously flawed, though 
the domestic expenditure estimates may be exempt from that judg 
ment. While I might claim to have expertise in this area, having spent 
ten years in empirical research related to drug policy, clearly none of 
the flaws exposed here require any special technical skill or insight to 
discover; all that is required is a willingness to subject the series, indi 
vidually and as a group, to some modestly serious analytic scrutiny. 
This section offers some observations as to why the numbers persist in 
such disarray.
The current drug production estimates are generally detached from 
the policy process. Though it is worth noting that it would be hard 
under any circumstance to produce estimates with the authority and 
precision of the standard indicators of economic activity, one reason 
they are of low quality is that they simply have no consequence for any 
senior decision makers. This is an example of a principle called GOGI 
(garbage out, garbage in), the converse of the usual GIGO (garbage in, 
garbage out); since no one uses the estimates for any important pur 
pose, they are produced without care or scrutiny. The State Department 
is required by statute to produce the international production figures 
annually. It cannot simply claim an incapacity to meet the statutory 
requirement. Nor, I suspect, is there any justification for large invest 
ments in improving the available data. There is still no excuse for pro 
ducing implausible figures or inconsistent series but, given the lack of 
political or external analytic scrutiny, not much incentive to do other 
wise.
The Mexican marijuana production figures illustrate dramatically 
the detachment of the estimates from the policy process. The increases 
and declines in the INCSR estimates have no apparent consequence for 
U.S. policy decisions. Congress did not feel the need to take new mea 
sures against Mexico when suddenly the State Department produced 
figures suggesting that the U.S. marijuana market was completely 
dominated by Mexico; nor did the administration make any noticeable 
change in policy. There was no cry for increased domestic efforts 
against marijuana because of the sudden discovery that American users
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were consuming vastly more than had previously been estimated. The 
1989 figure was initially explained simply as the result of changes in 
estimating techniques, not in the underlying realities. Nonetheless, the 
implication of the new figures was that Mexico was swamping the 
United States, and indeed the world, since its 30,000 tons accounted 
for five-sixths of the officially estimated global total. Surely this would 
be reason for alarm, for a call to Mexico to deal with a problem that 
must be much more serious than previously realized. Yet, the harshness 
of U.S. political rhetoric about Mexico's drug control efforts was much 
diminished at the end of the 1980s, precisely when these estimates 
were at their highest levels.
The price series are even more separated from the policy process 
they are supposed to inform. They serve no bureaucratic purpose that I 
have been able to discern and are almost never cited politically or in 
the media. One can reasonably ask why they are produced at all. Per 
haps the need of U.S. officials to appear authoritative in public discus 
sions is sufficient motivation to produce the numbers, without 
providing a good reason for doing the job well.
With no audience for these estimates, agencies are motivated to give 
them little attention. My impression is that no one of any prominence 
at the Drug Enforcement Administration or the Department of State 
ever spent time as an analyst or producer of these estimates. Both agen 
cies, with very different organizational cultures, share a marked lack of 
interest in numeracy.
These problems are exacerbated by the fact that the National Insti 
tute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), the principal federal research agency con 
cerned with illicit drugs, and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration, which produces the major indicator series 
such as the NHSDA and Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) sys 
tem, play peripheral roles in the estimation process described here. 
They are much more data- and analysis-oriented agencies than DEA or 
the Department of State, but as public health bureaus have never been 
much interested in markets per se, seen as principally the concern of 
law enforcement agencies. Though the NHSDA does provide critical 
information for the consumption estimates sponsored by Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), NIDA itself has only recently 
started to give attention to questions about expenditures and consump 
tion in the survey.
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The Potential Uses of Quantity, Price, and Revenue Estimates
What is needed by way of measurement? Clearly this is entirely a 
policy-driven enterprise, without any scientific goals. In this respect it 
differs from the collection of data on domestic use and abuse, which 
serves a variety of scientific purposes (for example, understanding the 
etiology of the drug use) as well as programmatic planning. So the cen 
tral question, putting aside the detail of the statutory requirements 
imposed on the executive branch by the boundlessly ambitious and 
imperialistic Congress, is what decisions these figures could usefully 
inform. At the moment only the certification process makes even a pre 
tense of being connected to these estimates, and a pretense is all that it 
is. Certification decisions are driven by politics rather than numbers; 
i.e., the administration forgives U.S. friends even when they are 
deemed noncooperative (for example, Colombia in 1995), and con 
demns those with whom it is not on good terms (e.g., Burma, Iran, and 
Syria). 17 Without a specification of policy needs, the estimates will 
continue to flounder.
Sensible estimates of quantities, prices, and revenues could, in prin 
ciple, serve a number of important functions. For example, the efficacy 
of interdiction may be crudely estimated by comparing seizures with 
estimated shipments or by estimating the margin between import and 
export prices, which represents the smugglers' margin. 18 Export prices 
from individual producing countries could be a useful measure of how 
stringently that nation enforces laws against growers and refiners. The 
revenue estimates provide a basis for estimating the impact of asset 
forfeitures; for example, if total revenues are $50 billion, then $2 bil 
lion in asset forfeitures constitutes a 4 percent tax, stochastically 
applied. These kinds of calculations are helpful in developing and 
understanding the promise and limits of these kinds of programs.
In 1971 Max Singer published an oft-cited article arguing that if one 
believed the official numbers with respect to the prevalence of heroin 
addiction, the dependence of addicts on theft, and the price of a heroin 
habit, then New York City did not exist anymore; it had been stolen by 
junkies. My first published article on drug policy was an extension of 
that critique, pointing out that though the measurement enterprise had 
become more elaborate, it still produced striking inconsistencies (Reu-
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ter 1984). Another ten years on, the process has become yet more elab 
orate. There is coherence and good documentation for the revenue 
estimates, but the process is still capable of producing much nonsense. 
Until these series and estimates are integrated into the policy process, 
they are unlikely to get much better.
NOTES
1. For a scholarly claim citing $500 billion, see Tullis (1991). For the United Nations use of 
this figure, see United Nations Drug Control Program (1994, p. 1). A respected journalist, Jessica 
Mathews (1995), recently retailed this figure, citing federal enforcement agencies.
2. The most systematic estimate, using the household survey described below (note 12), is 1.8 
million persons selling in 1991 (Caulkins and McCaffrey 1993). It is likely that most of them sell 
on a very occasional basis (see Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy 1990).
3.1 infer this from the publications and contacts over the years with participants in the estima 
tion process. No cost figures have ever, to my knowledge, been published.
4. If a nation is not certified as making maximum efforts to control production and export, 
then the United States will not provide certain aid and will vote against loans from multilateral 
financial institutions such as the World Bank.
5. Ten tons of opium yield one ton of heroin.
6. The implied annual heroin consumption per addict is 300 grams, 10 to 20 times the figure 
for the United States. For a recent estimate of weekly heroin consumption per addict of about 700 
milligrams, about 35 grams per annum, see Rocheleau and Boyum (1994). No doubt heroin is 
vastly cheaper in Burma, but incomes are also on the order of 1 percent of U.S. levels.
7. This section draws extensively on Reuter and Ronfeldt (1992).
8. See Kleiman (1989).
9. "New analytic methodologies have enabled the U.S. government to assess more accurately 
the extent of marijuana cultivation during the past several years" (INCSR 1990, p. 13). The report 
included no revision of previous years' estimates.
10. Separate models are available for cocaine, heroin, and marijuana (Resetar and Dombey- 
Moore 1994; Childress I994a; Childress 1994b).
11. In theory it is possible that the Colombian cocaine prices are not really market prices but 
instead internal prices for an integrated producer, set low for some intrafirm bargaining. This 
seems implausible, given that there are some independent cocaine producers in Colombia.
12. The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA), with sample sizes between 
20,000 and 32,000 in recent years, produces these estimates.
13. The latest of three published versions is What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs: 
1988-1993 (Rhodes et al. 1995).
14. For example, Everingham and Rydell (1994) estimate that 22 percent of cocaine users 
account for 70 percent of total consumption.
15. Details are provided in Rhodes et al. (1995, appendix 1).
16. On using STRIDE systematically, see Caulkins (1994).
17. In 1995, much to the chagrin of Colombian leaders, the president offered only a qualified 
certification, invoking a "national interest" waiver clause that allows for certification even if the 
nation is not meeting the criterion of making maximum effort to suppress the trade.
18. For a price-oriented analysis of interdiction effectiveness, see Reuter, Crawford, and Cave 
(1988).
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National Bureau of Economic Research
Crime is a major problem for the United States, creating misery for 
its victims, costing the country substantial resources on the criminal 
justice system and private crime-prevention activities, and turning 
many inner-city neighborhoods into social disasters for residents and 
the rest of the society. Young men, usually out of school young men 
with limited skills and employment or earnings prospects, commit a 
disproportionate number of crimes. Inner-city black youths are the 
most crime-prone group in the society, with other inner-city blacks as 
victims.
From the 1980s through the early 1990s, the number of persons 
incarcerated increased massively, incapacitating many criminals and 
increasing the risks of being caught and penalized for crimes. These 
factors should have greatly reduced the crime rate. Yet the standard 
administrative measure of crime, the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports 
(UCR), stabilized in the 1980s. It fell from 1980 to 1984, then rose 
through 1991, then fell modestly through 1993. The standard survey 
measure of victimizations, the National Crime Victimization Survey, 
which typically shows two to four times as much crime as the UCR 
due to crimes not reported to the police, recorded a sizable drop in 
crime, but the declines was far below what could be expected on the 
basis of the incapacitation of so many criminals and the increased risk 
of apprehension and incarceration. Crimes that are best measured— 
murder and auto thefts—showed no sign of falling: murders stabilized, 
while auto thefts increased.
Why has crime remained high? If, in 1976, a political leader had 
announced a tough anti-crime program that would triple the number 
incarcerated and increase the risk of imprisonment for crime, we would 
all have expected drastic reductions in crime rates. But no such drastic 
reductions occurred. The economist naturally seeks an explanation in
81
82 The Supply of Youths to Crime
terms of the labor market determinants of the supply of young men to 
crime. For crime to persist at high levels despite massive incarcera 
tions, there must be offsetting increases in the returns to crime or an 
outward shift in the supply schedule of young men due to other factors, 
such as increased drug use, family breakdown, social disorder, etc.
In this paper I explore whether changes in labor market factors may 
explain some of the persistence of high crime in the United States. 
First, I show that participation in crime among American men has 
become so large that crime is an integral part of the lives of many men. 
Then I examine the argument that the 1980s-1990s job market was an 
important factor maintaining the crime rate. I present evidence that 
youths often combine crime and legitimate work and sketch out a "for 
aging" model of the supply of youth to crime that helps explain this 
pattern of behavior. There is a brief conclusion.
Dimensions of Criminal Participation
How many Americans are involved in serious crime? 
A useful identity for examining criminal involvement decomposes 
the number of crimes per capita as follows:
(1) # crimes/population = (# in crime-prone group/population) 
x(# who commit crimes/# in crime-prone group) 
x (# crimes/# who commit crimes).
The first term on the right-hand side of (1) measures the share of the 
population typically involved in crime. For simplicity, I take the crime- 
prone group as consisting of men, disproportionately those aged 
between 18 and 34 years. Despite considerable attention given to the 
effect of the age distribution on crime, changes in this share have had 
only modest effects on the crime rate (Phillips and Votey 1990), so I 
will not focus on demographic developments in this paper.
The remaining terms in (1) reflect the behavior of the crime-prone 
group. The second term is the criminal participation rate—the propor 
tion of the group who commit crimes. The third term is the average 
intensity of criminal activity—the number of crimes committed per 
criminal.
The Supply of Youths to Crime 83
There are four ways to estimate the criminal participation rate. First, 
administrative records on the number apprehended and convicted of 
crime (and thus "under the supervision of the criminal justice system") 
provide one estimate of the number involved in crime in the recent 
past. The number is a lower bound because it excludes criminals who 
have not been apprehended or who have "beaten the rap." In 1993 
roughly 1 man was incarcerated in the United States for every 50 men 
in the workforce. For every person incarcerated, an additional 2.1 were 
on probation and 0.5 were on parole. This gives a figure of 1 man 
"under the supervision of the criminal justice system" per 15 men in 
the workforce. One in 15 involved in such serious crime as to be under 
supervision? My immediate reaction when I did this calculation was to 
say, I must have made a numerical mistake. The number seems out- 
landishly large. But here are the estimates for 1993: 1
859,400 men in state or federal prison 
428,800 in jail 
1,288,200 total incarcerated
2,690,400 probated after conviction for crime
600,700 on parole 
3,291,100 probated or paroled 
4,579,300 under supervision of criminal-justice system 
69,600,000 male workforce
Since most crimes are committed by younger men (aged 18-34), the 
estimate of the criminal participation rate of young men is even larger: 
1 out of every 9 men aged 18-34 in the United States is under supervi 
sion of the criminal justice system. The figures for blacks are: 1 black 
man in prison for every 11 men in the workforce; 1 black man under 
supervision of the criminal justice system for every 4 men in the work 
force. Combine race and age, and you find the remarkable fact that 37 
percent as many black men aged 18-34 are under supervision of the 
criminal justice system as in the labor force.
These numbers are a decimal place beyond comparable statistics in 
other advanced countries. Since many of the incarcerated are recidi 
vists in crime—studies show percentage re-arrested are on the order of 
50 percent to 70 percent depending on the number of years covered 
(Needels 1993) and have poor employment records years into the
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future (Freeman 1992)—this population can be viewed as a relatively 
permanent part of U.S. society—our equivalent of Europe's long-term 
unemployed. Leaving prison is not like leaving long-term unemploy 
ment—a step back toward a relatively permanent legitimate job. It is 
often simply a return to criminal life until the police apprehend the ex- 
offender again.
The second source of data on criminal behavior is the self-reported 
criminal activity of individuals. These data are possible contaminated 
by reporting bias. If people don't admit to criminal activity, self- 
reported crime would understate criminal participation. If, on the other 
hand, young men think it "cool" to claim to commit crimes, self- 
reported numbers would overstate criminal participation. Criminolo- 
gists have explored these biases through studies that ask people 
whether they had been arrested and then comparing their responses to 
police records. The evidence shows that young white males report 
criminal activity roughly accurately, but that young black males under- 
report criminal participation (Hindelang and Hirschi 1981), possibly 
because criminal involvement among blacks extends beyond "hard 
core" youths. The proportion of young men who admit to committing 
crimes on major surveys ranges from 20 percent to 40 percent (Free 
man 1992).
The third source of data is the number of arrests. To be sure, not 
everyone arrested is guilty of crime, but the number of arrestees does 
indicate the number of persons whom police believe have committed 
crimes—X might be wrongfully arrested but somewhere there is Y 
who in fact committed that crime. The number of arrests in the United 
States is immense. In 1992 there were 9.9 million arrests of men 
(including those under 18) and 2.2 million arrests of men for the 
crimes judged most serious by the FBI index of crimes (U.S. Depart 
ment of Justice, Sourcebook, 1994, table 33). Most of those arrested 
were between the ages of 16 and 44 (85 percent), but a surprising 13.3 
percent of those arrested for serious crimes were aged 13-15. Taking as 
the base population the male civilian labor force in 1992 (69.2 million) 
gives a ratio of arrests per man in the labor force of .14 overall and of 
arrests for index crimes of .032 per man. Since 30 percent of the male 
workforce is 45 or over, the ratio of arrests per labor force participant 
below that age is substantially higher. Using the crime module of the 
National Longitudinal Survey, I calculate that there are 2.3 arrests per
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young man arrested in a given year. Dividing the ratio of arrests per 
man by 2.3 suggests that the number arrested was about 6 percent of 
the male workforce in 1992, and the number arrested for index crimes 
was 1.4 percent of the male workforce.
The fourth source of data on criminal behavior is number of crimes 
committed. From (1), it is apparent that given an estimate of the aver 
age number of crimes per criminal, we could use the number of crimes 
on the UCR or victimization surveys to determine the criminal partici 
pation rate. There are two sources of data on the number of crimes per 
criminal. Some surveys of prisoners ask inmates for detailed histories 
of crimes, arrests, and so on—which can be used to estimate crimes per 
period of time. These surveys yield estimates on the order of 12 to 15 
crimes per year (Piehl and Dilulio 1995). Some surveys of youths, 
including the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), ask sim 
ilar questions of those who are not incarcerated. Using the NLSY, I cal 
culate that the average number of crimes per young man who admitted 
to crime was 6.6. Given the number of crimes presumptively commit 
ted by men, this implies that 2.6 percent as many men committed 
crimes as were in the workforce in 1992.2
Whichever of these estimates one prefers, it is clear that a large pro 
portion of American men, particularly young men, are involved in 
criminal activity.
The Trend in Incarceration and Criminal Propensity
Exhibit 1 shows that from the mid-1970s or so through 1993 the 
number of persons in prison or jail in the United States increased mas 
sively. The rate of increase in the 1980s averaged 8.5 percent per year, 
so that in 1993 there were over three times as many persons in prison 
or jail as in 1976! The combination of an increasing number of crimi 
nals incarcerated and unable to commit crimes and a roughly constant 
UCR crime rate implies that the number of crimes committed by the 
noninstitutional population rose; either criminal participation among 
nonincarcerated men went up, or the number of crimes per criminal 
went up to compensate for the incarceration of so many criminals. The 
falling rate of victimization in the victimization survey could yield a
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contrary conclusion, but in fact the predicted drop in victimizations 
due to incapacitation exceeds the actual drop by so much as to imply a 
large increase in the rate of criminal participation (Freeman 1994).










SOURCE: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1992. Sourcebook of Crimi 
nal Justice Statistics 1991, pp. 611,636 and U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statis 
tics Bulletin by Darrell K. Gilliard and Alien J. Beck. 1994. Prisoners in 1993, June, NCJ- 
147036. 
NOTE: Estimates of jail population before 1983 based on pnson population.
For the period 1977 (prior to the large increase in the jail and prison 
population) to 1992,1 have estimated the trend in criminal activity by 
the noninstitutional population. I calculated the reduction in the number 
of crimes that the increased number of prisoners should have produced 
under hypotheses about the number of crimes the newly incarcerated 
would have committed on the street. Then I compared this expected 
number of crimes to the actual number of crimes in the UCR or victim 
ization survey. The ratio of crimes committed to the predicted number 
gives an index of the Propensity to Commit Crime—a mixture of crim 
inal participation and intensity of criminal activity that reflects the over 
all involvement in crime by the noninstitutionalized population.
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The following example shows precisely how I calculated the index. 
Assume a population of 100, in which there are 40 crimes committed 
per year, giving a crime per person of .40. If each criminal commits 10 
crimes, there are 4 criminals in the population. When the government 
apprehends and imprisons 2 criminals, the number of crimes should, 
all else the same, fall to 20, and crimes per person would fall roughly 
in half, to .204 (= 20/98). Any crime rate beyond .204 implies an 
increase in the index of crime propensity. If 30 crimes were committed, 
the propensity would have risen 50 percent; if 40 crimes were commit 
ted, the propensity would have risen 100 percent. If the number of 
crimes committed per criminal was constant, the criminal participation 
rate must have risen by those amounts. Incapacitation "created oppor 
tunity" for new entrants into crime.
Exhibit 2 gives my estimates of criminal propensity from 1977 to 
1992. Based on UCR data, I assume 10 crimes committed per person 
incarcerated. The calculations indicate that the increase in the prison/ 
jail population should have more than halved the crimes committed per 
male. But between 1977 and 1992 crimes per male rose, albeit mod 
estly. Reconciling these trends, I estimate that the propensity for crimi 
nal activity by noninstitutionalized men increased by 163 percent! My 
suspicion is that most of this rise is due to an increase in the criminal 
participation rate. Also reported in exhibit 2 are similar calculations 
using the victimization data. Because there are more victimizations 
than UCR crimes, I assume the number of victimizations per criminal 
to be 30. In this case, I estimate that criminal propensity increased by 
80 percent from 1977 to 1992. Alternative estimates of crimes per 
incarcerated person would affect the extent of the rise in propensity but 
not its direction.
Exhibit 3 uses supply-demand schedules to show alternative ways to 
account for the upward trend in criminal propensity. The "demand 
curve" in the diagram is not citizens' demand for being mugged, 
robbed, or murdered (though for some crimes, such as drug purchases, 
it could be so interpreted) but a schedule of criminal earnings opportu 
nities. The schedule slopes downward because more criminals presum 
ably reduce the potential rewards from an additional criminal act. The 
supply curve is depicted as a response to criminal earnings; it will shift 
outward if legitimate earnings fall and inward if they increase. In panel 
A, the supply curve of crime is upward sloping. When more criminals
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are imprisoned, the supply shifts inward, which raises the wages of 
criminals. Assuming unchanged criminal opportunities, the only way 
to maintain a given number of crimes is for the noninstitutionalized to 
commit more crimes, shifting the curve back to its original position. 
Panel B shows that an increase in the criminal opportunities curve— 
due, say, to an increased consumer demand for drugs, for instance— 
could have a similar effect, maintaining the number of crimes at higher 
rewards, despite huge incarceration. Panel C gives a qualitatively dif 
ferent picture: the elasticity of supply to crime in this case is infinite 
(presumably because crime pays off much more than legitimate work). 
This means that there is no incapacitation effect on crime: the police 
arrest Joe for dealing drugs on main street and presto! Harry takes 
Joe's old place on the street. Given that economists rarely find infinite 
elasticities, I regard this as an unlikely situation, but it highlights the 
point that the more elastic the labor supply curve the less effect will 
incarceration have on the crime rate.
Exhibit 2. Index of Propensity for Crime, 1977-1992 (1977=1.0)
25
15
77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92
years
• Uniform Crime Report Index • victimization Index
SOURCE: Calculated by dividing the actual number of crimes by the expected number of crimes, 
where the expected number is estimated by taking the 1977 number of crimes minus the increased 
number of male inmates from 1977 to the given year times the postulated number of crimes that 
inmates would have committed: 10 in the UCR and 30 in the victimisation survey. The graph in 
Freeman (1994) using these data divides the crimes by the male population 16 and over.
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Exhibit 3. Supply of Crime, Criminal Opportunities, and Incapacitation








# in jail or prison # crimes
B. Increased criminal opportunities
Supply
Crime opportunities 2 
Crime opportunities 1
# crimes




90 The Supply of Youths to Crime
In short, economics suggests that we look for an explanation of the 
persistent high level of crime despite mass incarceration in potential 
increases in the rewards to crime and a highly elastic supply curve of 
youths to crime.
Changes in Relative Rewards to Crime
As a first approximation, consider the crime decision as a dichoto- 
mous choice between legitimate and criminal work. The person con 
sidering crime compares the present value of earnings from crime, net 
the loss of earnings due to being apprehended and imprisoned, with the 
present value of earnings from legitimate work; weighs the riskiness of 
crime; and makes his decision. Assuming that the marginal criminal is 
risk-averse, there will be a compensating differential premium from 
crime. The three factors that enter the calculus are legal earnings, risks 
and extent of penalties, and illegal earnings.
From 1973 through the 1990s, the real earnings of the less-skilled 
young men who constitute the bulk of the crime-prone population fell 
sharply. In the 1980s, the position of these men in the earnings distri 
bution also fell as overall income inequality skyrocketed. Moreover, 
despite the putative job-creating effects of pay reductions, their hours 
worked also fell and their employment/population rate fell relative to 
that of the more skilled. The magnitude of the worsened job market 
opportunities for less-skilled young men was sufficiently large—drops 
in real earnings of 20-30 percent, accelerating in the 1990s (Mishel and 
Bernstein 1994)—to have at least potentially raised their propensity to 
choose crime.3
Working in the opposite direction is the increased likelihood that an 
individual involved in crime would be incarcerated in the 1980s. Jus 
tice Department data suggest that the clearance rate for crimes known 
to the police has been relatively constant at about 20 percent (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Sourcebook, 1994, table 4.24). The combination 
of a rising rate of imprisonment, constant clearance rate, and stable 
crime rate implies that those apprehended for crimes were incarcerated 
more frequently or longer. As time in prison has trended-down ward, the 
data imply a greater probability of incarceration upon apprehension for
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crime. Indeed, Langan (1991) estimates that the chance that someone 
who commits a crime would be imprisoned rose for individual crimes 
from 1974 to 1986: for robbery, it increased by 47 percent (from .19 in 
1974 to .28 in 1986); for burglary, by 61 percent (.095 to .153); for lar 
ceny, by 59 percent (.017 to .027); for drugs by 108 percent (table 4). 
Mendel (1995) reports that between 1975 and 1989 the expected prison 
time for a violent crime nearly tripled (p. ii). The increased probability 
of incarceration should, all else the same, lower the present value of 
crime.
What is the net effect on the returns to crime versus legitimate work 
from the increased probability of incarceration upon arrest and the 
reduction in legitimate earnings for crime-prone youths? This is a diffi 
cult question, whose answer depends on the crime, whether or not it 
involves violence as well as property crime, and so on. My back-of- 
the-envelope calculations suggest that the 30 or so percent drop in 
legitimate earnings dominates the increased probability of incarcera 
tion. The largest increase in imprisonment rates shown by Langan is 
.091 for robbery. If the person imprisoned is locked up for 1.25 years 
(median time served before release from prison in 1986 was 15 months 
according to Langan 1991, table 1), the loss in lifetime earnings from 
increased chance of incarceration for robbery would be, roughly, 11 
percent (1.25 x .091). This falls short of the 30 percent drop in real 
earnings from legitimate work. Since time locked up will differ 
depending on repeat offenses, however, and since imprisonment 
reduces future legal employment opportunities and possibly increases 
future illegal opportunities, this is an exceedingly crude calculation. At 
the minimum, however, it suggests that the increased chance of incar 
ceration did not "dominate" the reduction in legitimate earnings in the 
returns to crime calculation.
Although criminal earnings are—for various reasons—difficult to 
estimate, it is difficult to argue that they have fallen in real terms since 
the 1970s.4 The limited evidence that I have examined suggests the 
opposite, at least for youth. This information consists of responses to 
survey questions on perceived criminal and legitimate earnings and 
employment opportunities at the outset of the 1980s and at the end of 
the decade. In 1980 the NBER Inner City Youth Survey asked youths in 
Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia whether they thought they could 
make more "on the street" than in a legitimate job. It also asked them
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about their perceptions of the availability of criminal opportunities. 
The 1989 Boston Youth Survey, conducted at the peak of the booming 
"Massachusetts Miracle" job market, asked the same questions. 
Between these dates, the proportion of youths who reported that they 
could earn more on the street went up, from 31 percent in the three cit 
ies and 41 percent in Boston in 1980 to 63 percent in Boston in 1989. 
Similarly, the proportion who said they had "chances to make illegal 
income several times a day" roughly doubles over the period, to reach 
nearly 50 percent in 1989 (Freeman 1992).
Consistent with this, youths who made money from crime in the 
1980 NBER Survey of Inner City Youth reported average annual crimi 
nal earnings of $1,807 per year, whereas in the 1989 Boston Youth Sur 
vey youths reported average criminal earnings of $3,008—which, 
deflated, implies a real increase of some 5 percent. 5 These annual crim 
inal earnings are, the reader will note, hardly large numbers. Even 
those who said they committed crimes weekly in 1989 reported earn 
ings of $5,376 over the year—hardly the stuff of riches. Still, trans 
formed into "hourly pay," these figures imply hourly earnings from 
crime of around $10.00 for criminal activity in Boston in 1989. This 
exceeds the $7.50 youths reported from legitimate work and substan 
tially exceeds take-home pay from legitimate work, after social secu 
rity and tax deductions. Estimates of earnings for adult criminals tell a 
similar story. Reuter surveyed drug dealers in Washington, D.C. and 
found that they earned $2,000 per month net of expenses, which he 
translated into $30.00 per hour, making drug selling "much more prof 
itable on an hourly basis than are legitimate jobs available to the same 
person" (Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy 1990, p. viii). He further esti 
mated that the illegitimate earnings of drug dealers exceeded their 
legitimate earnings by enough to make it financially worth their while 
to spend one year in jail for every two years they sold drugs. In the 
1986 Inmate Survey I found that criminals who said all of their earn 
ings came from crime made $24,775 per year (Freeman 1993), a figure 
comparable to Reuter's $2,000 a month; but so few criminals reported 
that all their earnings were from crime, this is an unrepresentative sta 
tistic. Wilson and Abrahamse (1992) stress that criminal earnings from 
burglary/theft, robbery, and swindling are not that high and may fall 
short of the legitimate earnings available to those criminals (though not 
necessarily on an hourly basis).
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My bottom-line assessment is that the returns to crime increased rel 
ative to those from the job market for crime-prone less skilled men in 
the 1980s, and that the hourly rewards to crime exceeded the hourly 
rewards from work. Assuming this to be the case, the next question is 
whether the magnitude of supply response to the change in returns is 
large enough to have contributed significantly to the observed trends.
Supply Responses
There are five pieces of evidence that suggest that supply responses 
may be sufficiently large to play a role in the rise in criminal propen 
sity.
1. The demographics of the criminal population
Those who commit crimes consist disproportionately of persons 
with low legitimate earnings prospects—the young, the less-educated, 
persons with low test scores, etc. As long as these people do not have 
commensurately lower criminal earnings prospects and as long as they 
respond to differential legal/illegal incentives, this distribution is quali 
tatively what virtually any labor supply model would predict. In fact, 
evidence from the NLSY suggests that greater schooling, age, and test 
scores pay off more in the normal job market than in crime, so that the 
observed demographics of the criminal population is consistent with 
differing rewards for characteristics and responses by individuals to 
those characteristics.6
2. The estimated effect ofjoblessness on crime
Literature reviews (Chiricos 1987; Freeman 1983, 1994) find that 
higher unemployment is associated with greater crime. Most studies 
comparing crime rates and unemployment rates across areas find that 
high unemployment areas have high crime rates, though coefficients of 
response are not large, and an occasional study finds little relation. 
Most time series studies also find that unemployment or related mea 
sures of aggregate labor market activity are associated with rises in 
crime, but cyclical changes in labor market tightness cannot explain 
secular changes in criminal propensity. Perhaps most striking, compar 
isons of individuals show that those who commit crimes are more 
likely to do so when they are unemployed. This is consistent with a
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joblessness effect on crime though it could simply reflect the timing of 
criminal behavior. Finally, longitudinal evidence on the correlates of 
violent criminal behavior over time shows that persons who have 
engaged in "serious violent behavior" are more likely to terminate this 
if they are employed than if they are unemployed (Elliot 1994, table 1).
3. Estimates of the effect of inequality on crime
Some studies have explored the relation between inequality in a 
geographic area and the rate of crime. Given that criminals are low- 
skilled, greater inequality is a plausible indicator of the rewards to 
crime (robbing the wealthier) compared to low-skill work. Most stud 
ies find that more inequality is associated with more crime (see the 
reviews by Chiricos 1987; Freeman 1983, 1994). Land, McCall and 
Cohen (1990) even report that homicide rates are correlated with mea 
sures of inequality across cities. In the most comprehensive work to 
date, Lee (1993) found a substantive positive relation between inequal 
ity and crime rates across SMSAs in 1970 and 1980. His estimated 
effect of inequality on crime suggests that the increased inequality in 
the 1980s induced a 10 percent increase in the UCR, which falls far 
short of the observed rise in the propensity to commit crime in figure 2. 
When Lee compared changes in inequality and crime among SMSAs, 
however, he found no relation, possibly because of the decreased sig 
nal-to-noise ratio in changes in inequality, but also possibly because 
the cross-area relation reflects an omitted area variable rather than a 
true inequality-crime link.
4. Estimates of the crime behavior of individuals
Studies that examine the effects of incentives on the criminal behav 
ior of individuals are potentially the most compelling. In the first such 
major study in economics, using the NBER Inner City Youth Survey, 
Viscusi (1986) found that perceptions of risk combined with earnings 
opportunities influence the supply of young blacks to crime. Using the 
same data, I found a significant positive relation between criminal par 
ticipation and whether individuals perceived that they could earn more 
on the street than in the job market (1987). More recently, Grogger 
(1994) estimated an econometric model of the crime behavior of young 
men in the NLSY that makes extensive use of the fact (to be examined 
shortly) that many youths who engage in crime also work. His esti 
mated supply elasticity to crime is roughly unity: a 10 percent decrease 
in the real wages of youths would increase their crime rate by nearly 10
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percent. Applying this elasticity to the observed drop in real earnings 
of less-skilled young men, he predicts a 23 percent increase in crimes 
committed by these youths from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, 
which he points out is of comparable magnitude to the 18 percent 
increase in the index arrest rate for the young over the period.
These studies, particularly Grogger's, should move priors toward the 
job market explanation of the rise in criminal propensity. But none of 
the studies are smoking guns. Viscusi and Grogger used sophisticated 
structural models—economists' lenses as it were—for viewing the evi 
dence. My analysis used self-reported incentives and could simply be a 
consistency check: yes, people involved in crime thought it paid off 
better than those who did not. Is it possible to provide something 
more?
The NLSY asked one question in its 1980 crime module that can be 
used to examine supply responsiveness to the relative rewards to crime. 
The question asked respondents the proportion of their income that 
came from illegal activity. Holding fixed time worked at legitimate 
jobs, and the number of crimes committed, persons whose income con 
sists disproportionately of illegal earnings will have higher criminal 
pay relative to legitimate pay. They should thus be more deeply 
involved in crime than others, and all else the same, end up incarcer 
ated in the future.7
In the NLSY the proportion of income from illegal sources in 1980 
does in fact help explain incarceration years into the future. Exhibit 4 
documents this claim with a simple linear probability analysis in which 
the dependent variable is being interviewed in jail in 1983, 1986, and 
1989 for a sample of young men who reported some criminal earnings 
in 1980. For simplicity of presentation, I include only two regression 
controls: the numbers of crimes committed and weeks worked in the 
past year. Calculations that include persons who report no criminal 
income or that add additional controls tell the same basic story: the 
higher the relative pay from crime in 1980, the greater the chance a 
young man is incarcerated in ensuing years. The magnitude of the rela 
tive criminal earnings effect varies among the years, seeming to rise 
over time: it averages around 0.10, which given the proportion who go 
to jail (.03) and the mean proportion of income from crime (.20), 
implies an elasticity of supply to relative rewards on the order of 1.5. 
This is in the same ballpark as Grogger's estimate, and implies that the
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decline in the legitimate wages of youths might account for roughly 
one-third of the increased criminal propensity
Exhibit 4. Linear Probability Estimates of the Effect of Illegal Income on 
Future Incarceration
Jail 1983
Mean of dependent variable
Percentage of income that is illegal, 
1980
Control variables
Number of crimes committed (7100)




































SOURCE: Calculated for sample of out of school youths in NLSY who reported some illegal 
income in 1980.
5. The labor supply behavior of men with falling real earnings Topel 
(1993) and Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) have shown that time 
worked by men in the lower deciles of the earnings distribution fell in 
the 1980s as their real earnings fell. This relation has the flavor of a 
labor supply response to falling real earnings. Interpreted in this way, 
they estimate that the elasticity of labor supply on young men in the 
lower deciles of the earnings distribution is on the order of 0.20 to 0.30 
(table 9). While, as I shall shortly document, many youths commit 
crimes while working, and while the supply of time to crime is not the 
simple complement of the supply of time to work, the finding that low- 
paid men worked less as their real wages fell is consistent with the 
claim that as real wages fell these men were more involved in crime.
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Work and Crime: A Foraging Model
Treating the decision to engage in crime as a dichotomous choice 
between legal and illegal work misses an important aspect of criminal 
activity. Because most criminals are self-employed, and because the 
U.S. job market is characterized by considerable mobility and flexibil 
ity, it is easy to combine work with crime at a point in time or to move 
between the two activities over time. Joe holds a job, and mugs and 
robs someone he meets on a dark empty street, sells some drugs on the 
weekend, or steals from his employer. Maybe he sells drugs for a 
while, decides the street is too dangerous, gets a legitimate job for a 
while, loses that job, and goes back to selling drugs. Ethnographic 
research by Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy (1990), Pagan (1991), and 
Hageborn (1994) shows that legal and illegal work often overlap 
among young drug sellers.8
To see how much overlap exists between legal and illegal work, I 
have examined the work activity of persons involved in property crime 
in the NLSY. My analysis supports the view that crime and work are 
not exclusive activities, save possibly for those sufficiently involved in 
crime that they end up in jail or prison in the near future. Exhibit 5 
records the employment status of young men according to four mea 
sures of criminal activity: admitted committing a crime, earning illegal 
income, being charged with a crime, and ending up incarcerated in the 
following year. The sample is limited to out-of-school youths not 
involved in military service. There are differences in employment 
between those involved in crime and those not involved in crime: a 3- 
point difference between those who committed and those who did not 
commit crime; a 7-point difference between those with positive 
incomes from crime and those without such income; a 13-point differ 
ence between those charged with crime and those not charged. But 
these differences are far below the magnitudes that would support a 
crime-employment dichotomy. The only grouping that yields some 
thing close to that is between youths who end up incarcerated a year 
later and the rest of the sample—a 35-point difference in employment.
Ecology models of foraging behavior (Stephens and Krebs 1986) 
offer an insightful way to analyze the tendency for youths to engage in 
both illegal and legal work activities, either simultaneously or by mov 
ing back and forth between them. These models apply economic opti-
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mizing analysis to the problems faced by animals that forage for food. 
The animal must make several decisions in a short period of time: 
whether to "prey" on a particular food source it encounters or turn that 
prey down to search for better prey; whether to exploit opportunities in 
a given patch or search for new opportunities; and so forth. The paral 
lels with youths "foraging" for earnings, legal or illegal, are striking. 
Youths must decide whether to mug someone they meet on the street; 
take a short-term job when they encounter an offer; burgle in the local 
community or try some adjoining area; sell drugs to employees, if 
working, or to customers in a street market.
Exhibit 5. Employment in Survey Week by Criminal Behavior of Out of 
School Non-Military Youth
Employed at survey week 
Criminal group (#of observations)_________1980______
Admitted committing property crime in 1980 survey
Yes (2,369) 70.3 
No (1,847) 73.3
Reported positive illegal income
Yes (952) 66.0 
No (3,265) 73.2
Charged with crime
Yes (744) 58.6 
No (3,279) 71.5
Jail in following year
Yes (46) 30.4
No (4,223)__________________________65.5_____
SOURCE: Tabulated from NLSY, with youths in school coded as missing. In these tabulations I 
have also excluded those in the military. Inclusion of youths in the military reduces the employ 
ment difference between those who reported crime and those who did not (strengthening the argu 
ment in the text) but does not noticeably affect the difference in employment rates for those in jail 
the following year. The admitted crimes figures are based on people who said they committed any 
of the following crimes in the past year: shoplifting, stealing, using force to obtain things, selling 
drugs, conning someone, stealing automobile, breaking into building, aiding gambling operation. 
This leaves out some violent nonproperty crimes. Their inclusion increases the numbers commit 
ting crime without changing the results.
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The foraging models direct attention to differing "reservation 
wages" to various money-making activities and the determinants 
thereof. When returns fall below the reservation wage, the youth will 
reject an opportunity and go on to something different. According to 
the NBER Inner City and Boston Youth surveys, young men in inner- 
city poverty areas encounter many illegal and legal opportunities in a 
relevant time period: McDonald's may be hiring this week; Jones Con 
struction may need a laborer; robbers may need someone to fence sto 
len goods; an elderly woman may wander along the wrong street; a car 
with an expensive stereo system may be parked in an alley. In a world 
where short-run legal and illegal earnings opportunities arrive more or 
less randomly, it is natural for individuals to move between them, com 
mit crimes while working, or take a legitimate job if one happens to be 
available even when engaged in criminal activities. If this hypothesis is 
correct, and the behavior of crime-prone youths is similar to that of for 
aging animals as opposed to that of adults with permanent careers, the 
supply of youths to crime will be quite elastic, consistent with the 
observed failure of incapacitation to reduce crime.
Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that increased incarceration of criminals 
has failed to arrest the nation's massive crime problem because of an 
offsetting increase in the crime propensity of noninstitutionalized men. 
I presented evidence that part of the problem seems to lie with the dete 
rioration of the job market for less-skilled young men. It would be fit 
ting to conclude by offering a program or policy that would improve 
the job prospect of the less skilled, and thus deter crime. While some 
programs for reducing juvenile delinquency have modest beneficial 
effects and some crime prevention programs may work (Mendel 1995), 
I do not believe at this time we have a blueprint for successful job-cre 
ating or job-enhancing programs that would offset the fall in the mar 
ket for the less-skilled and thus reduce crime. What we do have is 
evidence that incarceration, which is highly costly (a year in prison 
costs as much as a year at Harvard, as they say), has not reduced the 
rate of crime (UCR) or has reduced it less than we would have
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expected (victimization survey). The expense of incarceration is such 
that it behooves the nation to experiment with, and study carefully, pro 
grams to enhance the legal earnings opportunities of crime-prone 
young men and to try other modes of crime prevention. Even a mod 
estly successful employment program that induced some to forego 
crime is likely to meet any plausible benefit-cost test, from the savings 
in the cost of incarceration as well as in the lower crime rate.
NOTES
1. The 1993 jail figures are estimated from 1992 data; the numbers probated and paroled are 
estimated from 1990 data. The estimates simply assume that the ratios of the missing data to the 
number in prisons remained constant over time.
2.1 assume that 80 percent of crimes are committed by men, since approximately 80 percent 
of arrests are of males. The number of crimes in 1992 was roughly IS million. Dividing 15 million 
by 69 million men in the labor force and multiplying by 80 percent yields an estimated crime per 
man in the workforce of 0.17. Dividing this by 6.6 gives the figure in the text.
3. The exact magnitude of the decline in real/relative earnings depends on the specific measure 
of earnings chosen, the deflator, years picked, the age and skill group chosen, etc., but it is invari 
ably large.
4. One reason is that most criminals are self-employed, and thus do not face a market wage but 
rather an earnings opportunity schedule in which hourly pay depends on the hours of work they 
choose. In the Boston Youth Survey, those who committed a single crime in the past year earned 
$752, whereas those who reported committing crimes once a week or more earned $5,376, or 
$100 or so per week—considerably less per crime. A second reason is that self-reported criminal 
earnings may be inaccurately reported: Wilson and Abrahamse (1992) suggest that the incomes 
that inmates claim to have earned from various crimes are far higher than those crimes could plau 
sibly yield.
5. Here, I take an average of the 1979 and 1980 deflators for the earnings in the Inner City Sur 
vey, since the survey covered both years. Using the 1979 deflator gives an estimated 3 percent 
drop in earnings, which is far short of the drop in legitimate earnings.
6. Since criminal earnings are poorly measured, it is not easy to document this claim. In the 
NLSY I regressed the share of income from illegal sources on number of crimes reported, weeks 
worked in the year and three human capital measures: years of schooling, age, and AFQT score. 
The coefficients on all three human capital measures were negative and significant, implying that 
schooling, age, and AFQT lowered illegal income relative to legal income.
7. Because the NLSY has never repeated the crime module, evidence on future crime behavior 
is limited to whether or not the respondent was interviewed in jail or prison.
8. The "doubling up" of legal work and cocaine sales in the Pagan and Reuter, MacCoun and 
Murphy studies indicates that for many young men, illegal work may be temporary or transitional 
work that supplements difficult low-wage or otherwise unsatisfactory work. For others, legal work 
provides options to riskier illegal work, or perhaps broadens markets for sellers of illegal goods or
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Explaining Tax Compliance
James Aim
University of Colorado at Boulder
"Always try to be honest. It will gratify some, and astonish all the rest."
Mark Twain
The Puzzle of Tax Compliance
Tax evasion is an economic crime, perhaps the most common eco 
nomic crime, and it appears to be a large and growing problem, both in 
the United States and elsewhere. Despite obvious difficulties in mea 
surement, the Internal Revenue Service (1990) estimates for the United 
States that the tax gap, or the amount of unpaid federal income taxes, 
was between $83 billion and $93 billion in 1987 and had grown at an 
average annual rate of over 10 percent over the last two decades; more 
recent estimates by the Internal Revenue Service (1993) put the tax gap 
in 1991 at over $111 billion. Similar work for other countries suggests 
that tax evasion is an even more severe problem elsewhere (Tanzi 
1982; Feige 1989). Such underreporting has a variety of harmful 
effects: it reduces the tax revenues of the government, it affects public 
provision of goods and services, it creates misallocations in resource 
use, it alters the distribution of income in unpredictable ways, it 
increases feelings of unfair treatment by government, and it generates 
disrespect for the law.
Still the puzzle of tax compliance (at least for economists) is not so 
much "Why is there so much cheating?" Instead, the real puzzle is "Why 
is there so little cheating?" This may seem surprising. However, most 
people pay most of their taxes most of the time, even though the chances 
of detection are quite small and the penalties on evasion are also 
extremely light. For example, in the United States in recent years less 
than 1 percent of all individual income tax returns are audited by the 
Internal Revenue Service, and the penalty on even fraudulent evasion is 
only 75 percent of unpaid taxes. Most economic models of taxpayer 
behavior conclude that there should be much more tax evasion than is
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actually observed. The puzzle of tax compliance—and the challenge 
facing people working in this area—is to explain why people pay taxes.
The study of tax compliance has grown enormously in the last 
twenty years. Still, there is much about compliance that is not under 
stood. My purpose in this lecture is to discuss some work my col 
leagues and I have done that attempts to explain the factors underlying 
tax compliance behavior. My basic conclusion is that the explanation 
of compliance requires us to recognize the myriad range of factors that 
motivate individual behavior, factors that go much beyond the standard 
economics-of-crime approach that economists typically invoke, to 
include theories of behavior suggested by psychologists, sociologists, 
and other social scientists. Admittedly, such a broadening in the scope 
of analysis is a difficult one for economists to make. However, unless 
this approach is taken—and experimental economics can help here— 
we will not be able to explain the levels of compliance actually 
observed or to devise policies to increase compliance.
The next section discusses the major elements that I believe must be 
included in any theory of tax compliance. It is followed by a section 
explaining one of the methods that many people have found useful in 
explaining compliance: experimental economics. The section after that 
presents some of the results of experimental studies performed by my 
colleagues and me. The last section discusses some conclusions and 
observations.
Theories of Tax Compliance
This section outlines the major elements that, I believe, enter the tax 
compliance decision of individuals. These factors include the standard 
elements of audit and penalty rates. However, they also include several 
factors suggested by alternative theories of behavior under uncertainty. 
They are summarized in table 1.
Table 1. Main Factors in Tax Compliance Behavior
• Detection and Punishment
• Overweighting of Low Probabilities
• Burden of Taxation
• Government Services
• Social Norms
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Detection and Punishment
The dominant economics approach to the analysis of tax compliance 
follows the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker 
(1968) and first applied to tax compliance by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972). In its simplest form, this approach assumes that an individual 
receives a fixed amount of income /, and must choose how much of this 
income to declare to the tax authorities and how much to underreport. 
The individual pays taxes at rate t on every dollar D of income that is 
declared, but pays no taxes on underreported income. However, the 
individual may be audited with some fixed probability p; if audited, 
then all underreported income is discovered, and the individual must 
pay a penalty at rate/on each dollar of deficient taxes, where/includes 
the unpaid taxes. If underreporting is detected, the individual's dispos 
able income equals
D), (1) 
while if underreporting is not detected income is 
IN = I-tD. (2)
Expected utility theory then suggests that the individual will choose 
declared income to maximize the expected utility EU(I) of the evasion 
gamble
EU(I) = PU(1C) + (1 - />)£/(/„), (3)
where E is the expectation operator and utility U(I) is assumed to be a 
function only of income.
It is straightforward to show that an increase in the probability of 
detection p and the penalty rate /unambiguously increase declared 
income D. Surprisingly, an increase in the tax rate / generally has an 
ambiguous effect on declared income; however, under standard 
assumptions about an individual's attitudes toward risk, a higher tax 
rate actually increases declared income.
This basic model has been extended in a variety of dimensions 
(Cowell 1990). In particular, the assumption that the probability of
106 Explaining Tax Compliance
detection is fixed for an individual (a random audit strategy) can be 
relaxed by allowing the audit agency to use information from the tax 
payers' returns in determining whom to select for audit and by examin 
ing the interaction of the taxpayers and the government collection 
agency in a game theory setting. Such "endogenous audit selection 
rules" are a central part of the enforcement strategies of many coun 
tries. Nevertheless, the essential features of this economics-of-crime 
model have largely remained the same.
Now this approach gives the sensible result that compliance depends 
upon enforcement. It is essential to recognize, however, that this 
approach also concludes that an individual pays taxes because—and 
only because—of the fear of detection and punishment. Again, this is a 
plausible and productive insight, with the obvious policy implication 
that the government can encourage greater tax compliance by increas 
ing the audit and penalty rates. However, I know of no serious student 
of tax compliance who believes that tax compliance can be explained 
entirely by the level of enforcement. As noted earlier, the levels of 
audit and penalty rates are set at such low levels in most all countries 
that a purely economic analysis of the tax evasion gamble implies that 
most individuals would evade if they are "rational" because it is 
unlikely that cheaters will be caught and penalized. However, such 
behavior is simply not observed, even in the most evasion-ridden econ 
omy.
Put differently, the standard economics approach to the analysis of 
tax compliance has some serious flaws as an explanation for observed 
compliance choices of individuals because it concludes that individuals 
should pay far less in taxes than they in fact do. It is clear that the indi 
vidual compliance decision either must be affected by other factors not 
mentioned by expected utility theory or must be affected in ways not 
captured by the theory.
Overweighting of Low Probabilities
Another factor is suggested by recent theoretical work by Kahne- 
man and Tversky (1979) and others, who argue that many individuals 
can overweight low probabilities, such as those relevant for tax compli 
ance. Suppose, for example, that the true probability of an audit is 1 
percent. In making their decision, however, many individuals, even 
when fully informed, will systematically behave as if they think the
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probability exceeds 1 percent, at least when their behavior is viewed 
from an expected utility perspective. Overweighting of low probabili 
ties may therefore provide an additional explanation for tax compli 
ance. If taxpayers give more weight to the probability of an audit than 
they ought to relative to an expected utility model, then compliance 
will be greater than the level suggested by the standard economics 
approach.
In fact, there is overwhelming empirical and experimental evidence 
that many (though not all) individuals overweight low-probability 
events: in their purchase of flood and earthquake insurance, in their 
willingness to pay to avoid exposure to hazardous substances, in their 
purchase of lottery tickets, and so on (Machina 1987; Davis and Holt 
1993). It can be shown that such overweighting leads to greater com 
pliance than predicted by expected utility theory.
The Burden of Taxation
A standard explanation for the rise of the underground economy is 
the general increase in the burden of taxation that has characterized 
most modern economies (Tanzi 1982; Feige 1989). In the face of 
higher burdens on reported income, it is argued that individuals will 
respond by reporting less income.
Now it must be remembered that the economics-of-crime approach 
does in fact conclude that tax compliance is affected by the level of tax 
rates. However, the theoretical and empirical strands of literature give 
different answers about the response of declared income to tax rates. 
As noted earlier, the typical theoretical result is that compliance actu 
ally rises as the tax rate rises. On the other hand, most empirical work 
finds that a higher tax rate discourages tax compliance (Clotfelter 
1983; Aim, Bahl, and Murray 1990). Although there is no doubt that 
compliance depends in some way on the burden of taxation, the precise 
way in which compliance responds to changes in the burden of taxa 
tion needs further analysis.
Government Services
Another factor in the compliance decision is the use of the taxes. 
However, the role of government expenditures in the tax compliance 
decision has until recently been neglected. As emphasized by Cowell
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and Gordon (1988, p. 305), "this seems a curious oversight, since 
while the government taketh away, it also giveth back, and the latter 
activity surely exerts some influence on evasion." The compliance 
decision of an individual therefore seems likely to depend in some way 
on the individual's receipt of government expenditures.
There is some work that is relevant here. A standard argument in 
public economics is that voluntary private provision of public goods 
will be inefficiently low because each individual will have an incentive 
to "free ride" on the private purchase of others (Samuelson 1954). In 
the context of tax compliance, this result suggests that most people will 
cheat. However, casual observation suggests that the likelihood of 
complete free riding is greatly overstated because instances of volun 
tary provision of public goods are widespread. Perhaps based upon 
these examples, there is now a large and growing literature (Axelrod 
1984; Bagnoli and McKee 1991) that argues that voluntary provision 
of public goods may not always play as a "prisoners' dilemma" game; 
that is, in many instances, individuals will in fact voluntarily contribute 
to a public good, or pay their taxes. This generally occurs when provi 
sion is both repeated and interdependent. In such a setting, one individ 
ual's decision to contribute—or to comply—depends upon his or her 
perception of what others will contribute, both now and in the future. If 
the individual believes that his or her contribution is in some sense 
essential (or "pivotal") to the provision of the public good, then free 
riding is no longer the unique dominant strategy for the individual. 
Instead, cooperation may become optimal.
This approach suggests that individuals may voluntarily pay taxes in 
part because they recognize that payment is necessary to get others to 
contribute and so to get government services that are valued.
Social Norms
A last factor is "social norms," which I believe may well be the most 
important factor. It is clearly difficult to be very precise on the exact 
meaning of social norms (Roth, Scholz, and Witte 1989). However, 
there is overwhelming evidence that many countries with roughly the 
same fiscal system also have far different compliance experiences. The 
only possible explanation that I can suggest is that these countries have 
different notions of what is socially acceptable behavior; that is, they 
exhibit different social norms.
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To illustrate, there is much survey evidence (Westat 1980; Yankel- 
ovich, Skelly, and White 1984) that suggests that compliance is 
strongly affected by the strength of and commitment to the social norm 
of compliance. These surveys conclude that:
• those who comply tend to view tax evasion as "immoral"
• compliance is higher if a "moral appeal" to taxpayers is made
• the low social standing of tax evaders may be a more effective 
deterrent than formal sanctions
• individuals with tax evaders as friends are more likely to be evad 
ers themselves
• compliance decreases with perceptions of unfair treatment
• evasion is associated with feelings of distrust and alienation
•compliance is greater in societies with a strong sense of social 
cohesion.
Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that some people won't pay their 
taxes if they dislike the way their taxes are spent, if they feel they have 
no say in the decision process, or if they feel that government is unre 
sponsive to their wishes. Some quotes from taxpayers illustrate these 
feelings (Yankelovich, Skelly, and White 1984):
• "I wouldn't mind it so much if I could designate where my tax dol 
lars went to. I resent having to find out why frogs in South America 
croak and things like that."
• "When we pay taxes, we like to know what it's going for."
• "Allow people to earmark a portion of their tax payments. Give 
them choices."
It seems clear to me that such sentiments pay an important, perhaps a 
dominant, role in tax compliance.
Social norms can be affected by a variety of government institutions 
and policies. There is much behavioral science evidence that implies 
that greater individual participation in the decision process will foster 
an increased level of compliance, in part because participation implies 
some commitment to the institution and such commitment in turn
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requires behavior that is consistent with words and actions. This notion 
implies that one dimension by which social norms can be affected is 
via individual participation in the decision process, say, by voting. 
Compliance seems likely to be higher when the use of tax revenues is 
decided by majority rule than when the (same) use is imposed on the 
group; further, knowing the outcome of the vote reveals information to 
each taxpayer about the level of group support for the collective deci 
sion, and this information may be useful to individuals in projecting 
the group behavior. Government decisions that are imposed are 
unlikely to generate such feelings of participation or to provide such 
information. Consequently, if taxpayers feel that they have voice in the 
way their taxes will be spent, then they are likely to feel more inclined 
to pay their taxes.
Another dimension by which social norms may be affected is the 
level of popular support for the government program. Widespread sup 
port tends to legitimize the public sector, and so imposes some social 
norm to pay taxes. This support may be obviously revealed through the 
voting process. However, the level of support seems likely to affect 
compliance even when the choice of the public good is imposed on 
members of the group. Consequently, it seems likely that there will be 
more tax compliance when the public good imposed on a community is 
popular, even if individuals are unable to articulate directly their sup 
port via voting.
Still another dimension by which social norms can be changed is the 
community commitment to enforcing the tax laws. If the perception 
becomes widespread that the government is not willing to detect and 
penalize evaders, then such a perception legitimizes tax evasion. The 
rejection of sanctions sends a signal to each individual that others do 
not wish to enforce the tax laws and that tax evasion is in some sense 
socially acceptable. The social norm of compliance disappears. Such 
an outcome is common in many countries, such as the Philippines and 
Italy where it seems to be accepted that tax evasion is the norm.
Summary
These factors are clearly only some of the elements in the individual 
compliance decision, and there are numerous other factors that affect 
this decision: uncertainty about the fiscal system, the use of paid pre-
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parers and advisors, the withholding of taxes, rewards for honest decla 
rations, the potential for tax amnesties, the joint choice of tax 
avoidance and tax evasion, and so on. Nevertheless, I believe that these 
factors together play dominant roles in tax compliance. Methods to 
investigate the importance of their roles are discussed next.
Experimental Methods and Experimental Design
There are essentially two broad methodological alternatives to the 
use of experimental methods in the study of tax compliance: theoreti 
cal and empirical methods. Each has generated insights, but each is 
also subject to some serious problems. Before discussing the experi 
mental approach to compliance, it is useful to begin by outlining the 
strengths and, more important, the limitations of theoretical and empir 
ical analyses as a way of justifying the use of experimental methods as 
an additional tool in the study of tax compliance.
Theoretical Approaches
Virtually all theoretical work on tax compliance relies in some form 
on the expected utility model. This approach has generated many 
insights, especially regarding how an individual responds to greater 
enforcement activities and how government can optimally choose its 
enforcement strategy. However, this literature is in a sense too com 
plex. It is only in the simpler models that clear-cut analytical results 
can be generated on the compliance impact of basic policy parameters. 
When more complex dimensions of individual behavior are introduced, 
the theoretical results generally become ambiguous. It is doubtful that 
theoretical analysis will yield more meaningful results in the future.
Paradoxically, the theoretical models of individual choice are also 
too simple. There are numerous factors that affect the reporting deci 
sions of individuals, but theoretical models are capable of including 
only a few.
Most important, and as emphasized above, the limited ability to 
incorporate many relevant factors or to incorporate them in a meaning 
ful way has meant that theories based upon expected utility theory are 
unable to explain the level of tax reporting. In particular, these models
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generally imply that rational individuals should pay far less in taxes 
than they actually do. This is not a mere quibble. It goes to the heart of 
the standard approach to explaining compliance.
Empirical Literature
The obvious difficulty in applied work is the absence of reliable 
information on individual reporting behavior. This information is hard 
to come by, either for the Untied States or for other countries: it is dif 
ficult to measure something that by its very nature people want to con 
ceal. This difficulty has not stopped researchers. However, there are 
obvious problems with the data that make much of this empirical work 
somewhat suspect.
For example, most empirical work for the United States has utilized 
data provided by the IRS through its Taxpayer Compliance Measure 
ment Program (TCMP), which contains a detailed line-by-line audit of 
a stratified random sample of roughly 50,000 individual tax returns 
conducted on a three-year cycle. These audits yield an IRS estimate of 
the taxpayer's "true" income so that a measure of individual tax eva 
sion can be calculated. However, until recently most researchers have 
not had access to the individual data, and instead have been forced to 
use TCMP data aggregated to the three-digit zip code level, an aggre 
gate measure likely to comprise disparate elements of underreporting 
that reflect very different motivational factors. TCMP data also have 
some well-recognized deficiencies: the audits do not detect all underre- 
ported income, nonfilers are not captured, honest errors are not identi 
fied, final audit adjustments are not included, and there are few 
noneconomic factors to which the data can be linked. The use of 
TCMP data for empirical estimation of the determinants of compliance 
behavior is therefore problematic. Data for other countries are even 
more flawed.
To avoid the problems with the TCMP data, some researchers have 
used aggregate measures of evasion, such as the gap between income 
reported on tax returns and income in the national income accounts. By 
necessity, these studies focus on the aggregate, not the individual, 
response. Other researchers have used surveys of taxpayers, in part to 
assess factors such as perceptions of the probability of detection, the 
fairness of taxation, and the responsiveness of government in the
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respondent's reporting decision. Unfortunately, these surveys are also 
subject to a number of methodological problems. Individuals may not 
remember their reporting decisions, they may not respond at all, or 
they may not respond truthfully. Surveys are also unable to control for 
many relevant determinants of compliance, and, given their response 
rates, surveys may not be representative of the population at large. 
Finally, they cannot determine the direction of causality between com 
pliance and its determinants; that is, statements regarding the unfair 
ness of a tax may result from a rationalization of noncompliance rather 
than be the cause of noncompliance.
Experimental Economics
Difficulties with the existing theoretical and empirical literatures 
have led to the use of experimental economics in compliance research, 
not so much as the only approach but as an additional approach. The 
use of laboratory experiments in economics began in the early 1960s 
with the work of Smith (1962, 1964) on resource allocation under 
alternative forms of market organization. Growth in its applications 
came with the establishment of a well-defined framework for experi 
mental work by Smith (1976, 1982) and Wilde (1980), and it is now 
widely accepted as a methodological approach in the analysis of theory 
and policy. Davis and Holt (1993) survey much of the experimental lit 
erature.
As discussed by Aim (1991), laboratory experiments seem particu 
larly well suited for the study of some aspects of the taxpayer reporting 
decision. Unlike theoretical work, experiments are not as constrained 
by the same degree of simplification required in analytical studies of 
reporting, which allows the impact of numerous factors not amenable 
to theoretical work to be examined. Unlike empirical work, experi 
ments generate data under different settings in which there is control 
over extraneous influences. As discussed below, there are some obvi 
ous limitations of experimental methods. However, given the weak 
nesses of other methodologies, there are compelling reasons for the use 
of experiments.
Creating a microeconomic system: induced value theory
Experimental economics involves the creation of a real microeco 
nomic system in the laboratory, one that parallels the naturally occur-
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ring world that is the subject of investigation. The essence of such a 
system is control over the environment, the institutions, and the prefer 
ences that subjects face. Of these, control over preferences is particu 
larly crucial. As stated by Smith (1976, p. 275), "such control can be 
achieved by using a reward structure to induce prescribed monetary 
value on actions."
Smith (1982) identifies several (sufficient) conditions that must be 
satisfied for control over preferences to be established: (1) "nonsatia- 
tion"—subjects must prefer more to less; (2) "saliency"—the rewards 
received by subjects must be related to their decisions, so that subjects 
recognize that their actions affect their outcomes; (3) "reward domi 
nance"—rewards must be large enough to offset any subjective costs or 
benefits that subjects place on participation in the experiment, which 
requires the payment to subjects of an amount comparable to what they 
could earn outside the laboratory; and (4) "privacy"—each subject 
must know only his or her own payoffs so that they do not receive any 
subjective value from the payoffs of other subjects.
Several procedures should also be followed in experimental eco 
nomics. For example, the experiment should be administered in a uni 
form and consistent manner to allow replicability. The experiment 
should not be excessively long or complicated, since subjects may 
become bored or confused. Subjects must believe that the procedures 
described to them are the procedures actually followed. The instruc 
tions provided to subjects should be understandable, should avoid the 
use of examples that lead subjects to anchor on certain choices that are 
the subject of the experiment, and should be phrased in "neutral" rather 
than "loaded" terms, to mask the context of the experiment and to 
avoid direct reference to the real-world phenomena under investiga 
tion. Neutrality increases the experimenter's control over subject pref 
erences and avoids leading subjects to invoke different "mental 
scripts," which may enable them to fill in (potentially) missing infor 
mation in the instructions but which also may unpredictably influence 
their choices. It is sometimes claimed that the use of neutral instruc 
tions limits the ability to generalize from the experimental to the natu 
rally occurring setting. In fact, however, it is not possible to generalize 
beyond the laboratory unless one uses neutral instructions, since the 
experimenter cannot control (or induce) the values that subjects associ 
ate with loaded terms.
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Experimental work on taxpayer compliance
The basic design of most compliance experiments is similar, and is 
summarized in table 2. Human subjects in a controlled laboratory are 
told that they should feel free to make as much income as possible. At 
the beginning of each round of the experiment, each subject is given 
income and must decide how much income to report. Taxes are paid at 
some rate on all reported, but not on underreported, income. However, 
underreporting is discovered with some probability, and the subject 
must then pay a fine on unpaid taxes. This process is repeated for a 
given number of rounds. At the completion of the experiment, each 
subject is paid an amount (the accumulated earnings) that depends on 
his or her performance during the experiment. Into this microeconomic 
system, various policy changes can be introduced: changes in audit 
probabilities or audit rules, in penalty rates, in tax rates, in public good 
provision, and in institutions that affect social norms. Some results 
from experiments run by my colleagues and me are discussed in the 
next section.
Table 2. Basic Design of Tax Compliance Experiments
• Student subjects are used.
• Subjects are fully informed.
• Subjects are organized into groups that stay together throughout the 
experiment.
• The known number of rounds is predetermined but unannounced.
• Subjects receive income in each round.
• Subjects must choose in each round how much income to declare.
• Declared income is taxed; in those experiments with a public good, all 
taxes finance the public good.
• Undeclared income is not taxed, but subjects face some chance of audit 
and penalty.
• Subjects are paid their accumulated earnings at the end of the experiment, 
generally $10 to $30 depending upon their performance.
• Parameters are set at their "real-world" levels.
• Experiments are fully computerized, and last one hour.
• Variations include changes in audit rates and rules, in fine rates, in tax 
rates, in public good provision, and in subject participation via voting on 
the fiscal system.
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Limitations of experimental economics
There are sound reasons for caution in interpreting and generalizing 
experimental results. Some early compliance experiments did not fol 
low now widely accepted procedures of the experimental paradigm, 
such as the use of repeated experiments and neutral instructions. Much 
early work also lacked realism because values of the various policy 
parameters did not approximate real-world values.
Although more recent experimental research has generally 
addressed these problems, some concerns remain, some of which are 
more real than others. A common criticism of experimental economics 
is that the student subjects typically used may not be representative of 
taxpayers. However, there is now much evidence that the experimental 
responses of students are no different from the responses of other sub 
ject pools (Plott 1987); there is also no reason to believe that the cogni 
tive processes of students are different from "real" people. Another 
common criticism is that it is not possible to control for many relevant 
factors in the laboratory. However, if one cannot control for such fac 
tors in the laboratory where the experimenter establishes the institu 
tions, the rules, and the reward structure, then one cannot hope to 
control for these factors in the "naturally occurring world."
Of more legitimate concern, the results may well be sensitive to the 
specific experimental design, so that replication is crucial. It is also 
possible that subjects may modify their behavior simply because they 
know that they are participating in an experiment. Most important, 
there is a certain artificiality in a laboratory setting. A decision to 
report $2 in an experiment is clearly different from a decision to report 
actual income on an annual tax return, even if the laboratory incentives 
are salient. In particular, the laboratory setting cannot capture a cata 
strophic loss such as jail, and it cannot capture the social stigma that 
some surveys suggest is an important factor in taxpayer reporting. In 
short, one must use the results from laboratory experiments with some 
care. However, such use depends largely upon the purpose of the 
experiment. According to Roth (1987), experiments can be classified 
into three broad categories that depend upon the dialogue in which 
they are meant to participate. "Speaking to Theorists" includes those 
experiments designed to test well-articulated theories. "Searching for 
Facts" involves experiments that examine the effects of variable about
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which existing theory has little to say. "Whispering in the Ears of 
Princes" identifies those experiments motivated by specific policy 
issues. To date, most experiments on taxpayer reporting fall into the 
first two categories. Although this now seems to be changing some 
what, it is likely to be some time before a serious and ongoing dialogue 
with the princes of the IRS is established.
Experimental Evidence on Tax Compliance
There are a number of excellent experimental analyses of tax com 
pliance, such as Beck, Davis, and Jung (1991), Collins and Plumlee 
(1991), and Webley et al. (1991). However, I will limit my discussion 
to some experimental results from papers by my colleagues and 
myself. It is somewhat difficult to compare these results because the 
specific experimental design often differs for the papers. For example, 
the number of periods subject to audit varies over the studies, the pen 
alty rates also varies, and tax payments are sometimes used to provide 
a public good. Nevertheless, in their entirety these papers give, I 
believe, a good indication of the importance of the various factors dis 
cussed above in the tax compliance behavior of individuals. The exper 
imental results are summarized in table 3.
The Impact of Detection and Punishment
Audit rates and rules
Several papers have varied the probability of detection p, in which 
the probability is assumed to be random and independent of any tax 
payer decisions (Aim, McClelland, and Schulze 1992; Aim, Jackson, 
and McKee 1992b; Aim, Cronshaw, and McKee 1993). In general, the 
results for these "random audit rules" clearly indicate that compliance 
increases with a greater audit rate, with an estimated declared income- 
audit rate elasticity of 0.17. However, the increase in compliance 
appears to be small and nonlinear. This suggests the important result 
that there are limits to how much government can increase compliance 
by increasing the probability of detection.




Table 3. Experimental Results: Average Compliance Rate
Audit rates and rules
Paper-design
A: Public good/single period audits// = 15// = .40
Paper-design
B: No public good/back audits//= 2/t = .30
Paper-design
C: No public good/single period audits#"= 2/t = .30
Paper-design
















B: No public good/back audits/p = .04/f = .30
Overweighting
There is substantially greater compliance at low probabilities than is predicted by 
risk-neutral behavior in papers A, B, C, D, E, and F.
Tax rates
Paper-design

















A: Single period audits//= l5/p = .02//= .40
Reward Paper-design
44.8% B: Back audits//= 2/p = .04// = .03
Social norms
MRD MRS JFC INC NPG Paper-design
45.2 41.1 33.7 8.1 33.7 E/back audits// = 2/p = .04/t = .30
Voter rejection of greater enforcement via majority rule is followed by near-zero 
compliance, while voter acceptance of greater enforcement via majority rule with 
"cheap talk" is followed by near-complete compliance, in paper F. ________
Paper A: Aim, McClelland, and Schulze ( 1 992).
Paper B : Aim, Jackson, and McKee ( 1 992b).
Paper C: Aim, Cronshaw, and McKee ( 1 993).
Paper D: Aim, Jackson, and McKee ( 1 992a).
Paper E: Aim, Jackson, and McKee ( 1 993).
Paper F: Aim, McClelland, and Schulze ( 1 993).
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Another paper has varied the nature of the audit rule (Aim, Cron- 
shaw, and McKee 1993). A central and obvious feature of the compli 
ance process in most countries is that the government tax agency uses 
information from the tax returns to determine strategically whom to 
audit. Such a policy means that the probability of audit is not fixed and 
random but instead is variable and endogenous, dependent in part on 
the behavior of the taxpayer (and the tax agency).
Different "endogenous audit rules" are examined in experiments in 
this paper. One rule assumes that an audited individual found to be 
noncompliant in the current period will be audited with certainty for a 
number of future periods ("Conditional Future Audit" rule, or CFA). 
Another rule requires that an audited individual will face some back 
audits if found to be noncompliant in the current period ("Conditional 
Back Audit" rule, or CBA). A third rule imposes a cutoff ("Cutoff 
rule, or CO); a taxpayer who reports less than some cutoff level of 
income will be audited with certainty.
Experimental results indicate that endogenous audit rules are able to 
generate compliance significantly greater than random audit rules, 
even when the random audit rate is 30 or 50 percent. The cutoff rule 
CO is the most effective in increasing compliance, although it requires 
a large number of audits. Making back audits conditional on current 
declarations (or CBA) is also able to increase compliance significantly, 
and the audit rate is far lower than the cutoff rule. A conditional future 
audit rule CFA appears to be the least effective of the endogenous 
rules, although compliance still exceeds that under all random audit 
rules.
These results suggest that:
In the relevant range of audit rate changes, compliance increases 
marginally and nonlinearly with increases in the probability of 
detection. Also, compliance is significantly greater with endoge 
nous audit selection rules than with random audit rules.
Work by other experimentalists generally gives similar results.
Penalty rates
Variations in the penalty rate/are also examined in Aim, Jackson, 
and McKee (1992b). Experimental results indicate that individuals pay
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slightly more in taxes when the penalty on detected evasion increases. 
Therefore:
In the relevant range of penalty rate changes, compliance 
increases marginally with increases in the fine rate on unpaid 
taxes.
However, the impact is quite small, with a reported income-fine rate 
elasticity of only 0.04.
The Impact of Overweighting
Several experiments across all studies are designed explicitly to test 
for the presence of overweighting of low probabilities. In these experi 
ments the parameters—especially the probability of detection—are 
sometimes chosen such that the optimal strategy for a risk-neutral indi 
vidual is to report zero income. Nevertheless, the experimental results 
clearly indicate that there is far more compliance than is predicted by 
expected utility theory, a result consistent with overweighting.
These results suggest that:
Many individuals substantially overweight low probabilities.
Although greater compliance may well be implied by other factors as 
well, these results are similar to much other experimental work on 
behavior at low probability events.
The Impact of Taxation
Another set of experiments varies the tax rate t on declared income, 
from 10 to 30 to 50 percent, and the level of compliance falls signifi 
cantly with tax rate increases (Aim, Jackson, and McKee 1992a). The 
declared income-tax rate elasticity is estimated to equal -0.52. There 
fore:
Compliance decreases with increases in the tax rate.
These results are consistent with most empirical evidence, even though 
much theoretical work concludes that compliance should rise with 
greater tax rates.
Explaining Tax Compliance 121
The Impact of Government Services
In several papers a public good is present whose magnitude depends 
upon the tax payments of all subjects (Aim, McClelland, and Schulze 
1992; Aim, Jackson, and McKee 1992b). These tax payments are 
summed across the subjects, this sum is increased by some multiple m 
to reflect the (potential) consumers' surplus that individuals derive 
from government provision of a public good, and the resulting amount 
is then divided equally among the subjects. Note that a multiplier 
greater than 1 implies that individuals as a group receive more than 
they pay in taxes.
All experiments clearly indicate that compliance is greater in the 
presence of the public good than in its absence; also, compliance 
increases in a nonlinear way with the multiplier m.
Some additional experiments also vary the nature of the positive 
inducement given to taxpayers: by making audited and fully compliant 
taxpayers eligible for a "Lottery" whose expected value equals the 
average subject per round income, or by giving audited and fully com 
pliant taxpayers an immediate "Reward" of comparable value. In both 
cases the presence of a positive inducement leads to greater compli 
ance.
These results suggest that:
Compliance increases when individuals receive something for 
their tax payments.
There is some evidence that tax agencies around the world are starting 
to pursue such a "kinder, gentler" strategy.
The-Impact of Social Norms
Manipulating social norms is perhaps the most difficult task facing 
experimentalists, and there are few studies in which such control has 
been achieved. Nevertheless, some of my work has, I believe for the 
first time, been able to induce predictable changes in social norms, 
with resulting impacts on tax compliance.
One study examines the effects on compliance of the uses of tax rev 
enues and the decision process by which these uses are chosen (Aim, 
Jackson, and McKee 1993). In some experiments subjects must choose 
between using their tax payments on one of two alternative public
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goods; the level of support for the public good alternatives also varies 
between strong and weak support for the public good. These experi 
ments are denoted MRD (for "Majority Rule over Diverse" choices, in 
which the level of support for the preferred outcome is known to be 
quite strong) and MRS (for "Majority Rule over Similar" choices, in 
which the level of support for the preferred outcome is known to be 
quite weak). In other experiments subjects are not allowed to vote on 
public good provision, and a public good of variable popularity is 
instead imposed on the group. These experiments are denoted IFC (for 
"Imposed Favored Choice," in which the imposed public good is 
known to be popular) and INC (for "Imposed Nonfavored Choice," in 
which the imposed public good is known to be unpopular). Finally, in 
one experiment there is no public good (or NPG, for "No Public 
Good"). The experiments are structured so that the same use of tax rev 
enues occurs in all experiments except INC and NPG.
These experimental results indicate that compliance is significantly 
greater when subjects choose via voting the use of their taxes than 
when the identical use is imposed upon them; compare MRD versus 
IFC and MRS versus IFC. Further, compliance is somewhat greater 
when the vote is decisive than when the vote is close (MRD versus 
MRS). Finally, compliance is significantly lowered by the imposition 
of an unpopular program (IFC versus INC); in fact, compliance is 
lower with an imposed, unpopular public good than in the complete 
absence of any public good (INC versus NPG). These results clearly 
show that government can change the social norm of compliance by 
ensuring that individuals have a say in the decision process and by 
spending taxes in ways consistent with citizen preferences. Such poli 
cies have seldom been thought to be part of general strategy for tax 
compliance, but nonetheless they appear to be effective tools.
A second study allows subjects to vote via majority rule on the 
enforcement regime that they face, such as the tax, audit, and penalty 
rate (Aim, McClelland, and Schulze 1993). These results are still 
somewhat tentative. However, I believe that this voting allows the sub 
jects to alter the social norm of compliance. In particular, in all cases 
(except one, as discussed in a moment) subjects vote against greater 
enforcement such as higher audit or penalty rates, even when it is indi 
vidually and socially optimal to increase enforcement. Following these 
votes tax compliance falls virtually to zero, even though compliance
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prior to the vote is quite substantial. Rejection by the group of greater 
enforcement sends a clear signal to each individual that tax evasion 
will be tolerated and accepted; that is, rejection changes the social 
norm of compliance, and individuals respond accordingly.
Social norms can also be affected by communication among mem 
bers of the group, however. In an additional experiment in this paper, 
subjects are allowed to talk with one another before the vote on 
enforcement is taken (or "cheap talk")- In these discussions subjects 
quickly discover that it is in their interests to impose strict sanctions on 
free-riders, in order to increase their share of the public good. They 
then vote overwhelmingly in favor of greater enforcement, and tax 
compliance following the vote approaches 100 percent. Again, I 
believe that the cheap talk in combination with the vote allows individ 
uals to change the social norm, in this case to demonstrate that evasion 
will not be accepted.
These conclusions are striking:
Social norms can be changed by fiscal institutions. Compliance is 
increased when individuals participate via voting in the process by 
which the use of tax revenues is decided, when the outcome of the 
vote reveals widespread support for the program, and when the 
use of tax revenues is popular even if imposed. Also, compliance 
is decreased when there is a social expression via voting of a will 
ingness to tolerate tax evasion, and compliance is increased when 
there is a social expression via voting of an unwillingness to toler 
ate tax evasion.
There is also some experimental evidence that tax amnesties may 
change social norms (Aim, McKee, and Beck 1990).
These conclusions suggest a variety of alternative government poli 
cies toward tax compliance that are only now beginning to be used.
Summary and Conclusions
People exhibit much diversity in their behavior, and they are moti 
vated by a variety of factors. There are individuals who always cheat 
and those who always comply, some who maximize the expected util 
ity of the tax evasion gamble, others who seem to overweight low
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probabilities, individuals who respond in different ways to changes in 
their tax burden, some who are at times cooperative and at other times 
free-riders, and many who are guided by social norms.
These findings in total suggest that a government compliance strat 
egy based only on detection and punishment may well be a reasonable 
starting point but not a good ending point. Instead, what is needed is a 
multifaceted approach that emphasizes enforcement, but that also 
emphasizes such things as positive rewards from greater tax compli 
ance, the wise use of taxpayer dollars, and individual participation in 
the decision process. What is also needed, however, is a theory of tax 
compliance that incorporates the remarkable diversity in individual 
behavior exhibited by these experimental analyses of taxpayer compli 
ance. Whether any such theory can be developed that explains the 
behavior of all individuals at all times, or even one that explains the 
actions of the same person at all times, is hard to determine. However, 
until this effort is made, I think it unlikely that we will come much 
closer to explaining the puzzle of tax compliance.
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What is the Underground Economy?
The underground economy is a pervasive entity. It will always be 
with us. The formal or recorded economy is the new kid on the block. 
The formal economy only came into existence as we began to try to 
measure, broadly tax, and regulate economic activity. It is a creature by 
and large of the post-World War II period. We began to have broad- 
based taxes and benefits systems (during the 1930s and World War II), 
extensive regulations (mainly a post-World War II phenomenon) and 
national statistical systems (beginning in the late 1920s and picking up 
speed after World War II) mainly during the 1930s and 1940s.
It is the formal economy, the recorded, taxed, and regulated econ 
omy, that is the recent arrival—not the unrecorded or underground 
economy. This said, why are we concerned about this economy?
When and Why Did We Become Concerned 
with the Underground Economy?
There have been two periods of concern about the underground 
economy. The first period of concern occurred during and shortly after 
World War II and was largely confined to the United States and Can 
ada. The large increases in taxes and regulations needed for the war 
effort drove much activity underground.
The second period of concern began in the late 1970s and spread 
from the United States to most of the developed world. By and large 
the underground economy has been of little concern in Third World 
countries (other than to the taxing authorities). Many developing coun 
tries (e.g., Brazil) even make government loans to enterprises that 
operate largely underground. As a source of employment and entrepre-
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neurial activity, the underground economy is more often cultivated 
than criticized in Third World countries.
The most recent period of concern about the underground economy 
in the developed world began with a series of articles in the popular 
press during the late 1970s claiming that there was a large and rapidly 
growing underground economy. Politicians quickly picked up on this 
because it appeared to provide a "painless" method of dealing with the 
deficit (annual deficits in the United States averaging over $50 billion a 
year began in 1975 and deficits of over $100 billion began in 1982). 
The existence and claimed rapid growth of the underground economy 
provided support for deregulation and lowering of marginal tax rates— 
politically popular policies during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
My own saga with the underground economy illustrates the source 
and nature of concern. In 1978,1 was sitting quietly in my office at the 
University of North Carolina when I received a call from the Chief 
Economist of the Joint Economic Committee. He requested that I write 
a monograph on the "underground economy" for the Committee's Spe 
cial Study on Economic Change. I replied that I would have to know 
what this economy was before I could respond. His description sug 
gested a diverse and complicated set of activities that appeared to have 
little in common other than that they were somehow hidden from gov 
ernmental agencies. The task seemed overwhelming and he wanted a 
first draft in six months. It was a hot topic and the monograph needed 
to be completed yesterday if not sooner. I asked for time to consider his 
request. I was strongly inclined to say no, since it sounded like a topic 
that would require a couple of years to deal with adequately.
As it happened, I was meeting with a mathematical economist, Carl 
Simon (Department of Economics, University of Michigan), for lunch 
to discuss a saddle point problem. Since I was late, I provided a 
detailed description of the phone call by way of apology. To my amaze 
ment, Carl indicated that he would love to undertake such a project 
with me. He solved my saddle point problem and I agreed to do the 
monograph jointly with him.
Substantial Interest by Other Agencies
At the same time that the Joint Economic Committee was commis 
sioning our study, other congressional committees (e.g., the House
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Committee on Ways and Means) asked for a study of nonfiling by the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) and pressured the Internal Revenue 
Service (BRS) into providing an estimate of unreported taxable income. 
The IRS did not wish to undertake estimates but was required to do so 
by Congress. These reports resulted in numerous congressional hear 
ings during the early 1980s which provided valuable support for the 
deregulation and detaxation movements that accompanied the Reagan 
presidency.
A Dispassionate Look at the Underground Economy Today
It has now been over fifteen years since the rediscovery of the under 
ground economy. There has been much research on the topic. The 
political passions that originally inspired renewed interest in the under 
ground economy have cooled, at least somewhat. We are now at a point 
to step back and consider the nature and importance of this economy. 
In 1982, Carl Simon and I published a book, an expanded and updated 
version of our study for the Joint Economic Committee, on the under 
ground economy (Simon and Witte 1982). The editor gave the book the 
title Beating the System. With the advantage of hind sight and an addi 
tional fifteen years of research, I would like to consider whether those 
in the underground economy are beating the system. I will discuss the 
impact of the underground economy on those who participate little, if 
at all, in its activities, as well as on those who are members of this 
underground.
What Kind of Activity Occurs in the Underground Economy?
Activities in the underground economy can usefully be divided into 
three categories: (1) "pure" tax evasion, (2) the irregular economy, and 
(3) illegal activities. The nature of these activities and the reasons for 
our concern are quite different for the three types of activity, and so I 
will discuss each type of activity separately before trying to reach gen 
eral conclusions concerning the underground economy.
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Pure Tax Evasion
Pure tax evasion, which is far from pure, occurs when individuals 
and businesses fail to fully report earnings from perfectly legal activi 
ties carried out in businesses that are properly registered and recorded 
in our national statistics. It also occurs when individuals and busi 
nesses overstate the deductions to which they are entitled.
Perhaps half of all Americans engage in "pure" tax evasion. How 
ever, most evasion is rather small scale. We are a nation of tax-evasion 
nibblers, although some individuals do take large gulps.
The level of evasion is very unequally spread throughout the popula 
tion. The amount varies with type of income, amount of income, and 
with attitudes toward laws and government.
Type of income
Wage and salary income is reported most accurately. We don't know 
whether this stems from the law-abidingness of the middle class or 
from the extensive system of withholding and information reporting. 
"Paper trailed" income and income from which taxes are withheld are 
far more fully reported than income that generates no information for 
the IRS. Small businesses report a smaller proportion of their income 
than do large corporations. Rent and royalty income is less fully 
reported than dividend and interest income. (See U.S. Department of 
the Treasury 1990 or U.S. General Accounting Office 1990 for details.)
Amount of income
The relationship between the proportion of true tax liability reported 
and income is U-shaped. Tax compliance is highest for the middle 
class and lower for both poorer and richer individuals. We do not know 
the reason for the U-shaped relationship. People with high and low 
incomes have more opportunities to underreport income than do the 
vast middle class of wage and salary workers. For example, the poor 
are often involved in the irregular economy which keeps few written 
records. The better-off often have complex transactions which make 
overstating deductions and understating income more difficult to 
detect. The poor and the rich are often less accepting of mainstream 
morals and ethics. This may make tax evasion more acceptable, at least 
for some members of these groups.
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Attitudes toward laws and the government
There are large geographic differences in tax compliance, with the 
Southwest and Southeast being least compliant and the Midwest and 
Northeast most compliant. It is not clear why these geographic differ 
ences exist. However, audit rates have traditionally been lower in the 
Southwest, particularly southern California, so the tax gamble has a 
larger expected return in this area. Research indicates that areas of 
rapid growth are more noncompliant than stable areas. For example, 
see Beron, Tauchen, and Witte (1992).
A consistent finding in the tax compliance literature is that women 
are more compliant than men. We do not know whether this stems from 
greater socialization of women, their greater aversion to risk, or the 
nature of their incomes.
Why are we concerned with pure tax evasion?
The most obvious answer is that we want everyone to "pay their fair 
share." When some members of society pay less than their full tax lia 
bility, the rest of us suffer. Government can respond to decreased tax 
revenue in one of three ways. First, it can increase taxes so the rest of 
us pay more. Second, it can cut expenditures so that everyone has 
fewer publicly provided goods and services. Finally, it can finance gov 
ernment expenditures by running large deficits. All of these potential 
responses to tax evasion hurt those of us who are struggling to survive 
in the formal economy.
The Irregular Economy
The irregular economy generally encompasses the production of 
legal goods and services in unregistered and, hence, largely untaxed 
and unrecorded, small businesses. Activities in the irregular economy 
are an important form of underground activity.
What goods and services are produced in the irregular economy?
Production in the irregular economy consists mostly of personal and 
household services. Typical personal services produced in the irregular 
economy are child care, nursing services, legal, and accounting ser 
vices. Household services such as gardening, remodeling, and auto
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repair also are frequently provided in the irregular economy rather than 
by registered and licensed individuals.
Some goods and services are also produced in the irregular econ 
omy. Examples include food, clothing, jewelry, recreation, and tour 
ism. Evasion of taxes on petroleum products is quite large. Organized 
crime, particularly the "Russian mafia," is heavily involved in tax eva 
sion on gasoline and other fuels.
Firms producing in the irregular economy tend to be small. Hence, 
production tends to occur in areas where economies of scale are lim 
ited. The irregular economy also provides a gateway for some new 
immigrants, legal and illegal, and for some new entrepreneurs.
While tales of sweatshops employing hundreds of illegal aliens 
appear in the press, the more typical employment setting is an individ 
ual moonlighting in the irregular economy. 1 The labor force for the 
irregular economy comes largely from people who work full time in 
the formal economy.
Costs and benefits of the irregular economy
To those in the formal economy. The confirmation hearings of early 
Clinton nominees point up the prevalence of purchases from the irregu 
lar economy by all strata of U.S. society. We would be hard-pressed to 
run our households and provide for our personal needs without the. 
irregular economy. This economy provides us with more convenient 
and often less expensive (both in terms of time and money) goods than 
the formal economy. The quality of goods and services provided by the 
irregular economy tends to be highly variable, since the only quality 
controls are word-of-mouth reports. Regulation and government infor 
mation provide important quality control that is missing from the irreg 
ular economy.
Irregular economic activity pays little if any tax. This means that 
governments must tax the rest of us more, provide fewer services or 
run large deficits—a privilege only allowed the federal government and 
selected state and local governments.
To those working in the irregular economy. Jobs in the irregular 
economy have advantages and disadvantages. For those moonlighting 
in the irregular economy (the majority of this economy's labor force), 
the economy has primarily benefits. Income is free of taxation, and
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work methods are left to the individual's discretion. Work may be more 
informal and better integrated with the family and communal elements 
of the individual's life than is possible with much formal employment.
Individuals working exclusively in the irregular economy are of two 
basic types—those there by choice (e.g., retirees, welfare recipients, 
mothers with small children, "free spirits") and those there for lack of 
alternatives (e.g., illegal aliens, the unemployed without unemploy 
ment benefits, new entrants to the labor force).
For individuals working exclusively in the irregular economy by 
choice, the irregular economy provides an entrepot or a more agreeable 
combination of work conditions and wages. Take for example the indi 
vidual with small children. She may choose to work at home because 
of an ability to combine child care with her work activities. Similarly, 
the handicapped individual may find the home environment with its 
familiarity or convenience more congenial than the more rigid and 
structured work environments typical of the formal economy.
For those working in the irregular economy for lack of known alter 
native, the irregular economy provides sustenance, but at a cost. The 
cost is the foregone benefits available in the formal economy such as 
health benefits. Work conditions can be harsh and benefits nonexistent.
Illegal Activities
To this point, we have considered mainly activities that run afoul of 
our regulatory and tax laws, but not our criminal law. To close on what 
might be considered a low note, I will now turn to activities that violate 
our criminal laws. In spite of declining crime rates, crime is still one of 
the topic of most serious current concern to the U.S. public. It also pro 
vides the titillation of the forbidden.
In terms of economic activity, crime comes in two forms—illegal 
transfers of goods and income, and production of illegal goods and ser 
vices.
Illegal transfers of goods and services
The illegal sector has developed complex ways of transferring 
income and goods among individuals just as our legal economy has. 
Lacking the power to tax, the illegal economy transfers by means of
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force (e.g., "your money or your life"), or subterfuge (e.g., fraud, coun 
terfeiting).
Like the irregular economy, the illegal transfer economy seems to 
provide mainly part-time employment. Further, illegal transfers of the 
"blue-collar" variety provide surprisingly low returns (see Reuter, 
MacCoun, and Murphy 1990). Illegal transfers by subterfuge, such as 
the notorious financial dealings of the 1980s, provide far larger returns 
but to very few individuals. Economists are split on whether or not 
activities such as "insider trading" increase or decrease market effi 
ciency.
Production and distribution of illegal goods and services
The major goods produced and distributed illegally in our country 
are illegal drugs. Illegal drugs run the gamut from substances believed 
to have large-scale debilitating effects (e.g., heroin, crack) to those 
considered by many to have relatively minor effects (e.g., marijuana). 
As Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy (1990) have recently documented, 
illegal drug sales provide good income for mainly part-time work. 
However, drug dealing is a very risky endeavor with substantial 
chances of arrests (over 1 in 5 per year) and death or injury (1 in 10 per 
year).
As Reuter and his colleagues have described it, selling illegal drugs 
is the preferred illegal form of "moonlighting" for many urban males, 
particularly minority males. Drug dealing provides sporadic (mainly 
nights and weekends), high-paying, part-time employment. Individuals 
selling drugs daily in Washington, D.C. in the late 1980s typically 
earned about $2,000 per month while individuals selling one day a 
week or less had income supplements of $50 or less. The typical dealer 
in Washington, D.C. is a black male between 18 and 29 years of age. 
(See Pozo (1996) for a further discussion of drug markets.)
Our attitude toward drugs tends to be both emotional and schizo 
phrenic. We have a spectrum of rules governing the sale and use of var 
ious drugs. Some drugs (e.g., generic drugs) are sold in mainly 
unregulated spot markets (i.e., you can buy them freely at your local 
supermarket or drugstore). Others, such as tobacco and alcohol, are 
singled out for special taxation (i.e., excise taxation) and purchase is 
restricted to individuals who have reached a specified age. Prescription 
drugs require that a medical doctor authorize use. Finally, there are a
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whole series of drugs (e.g., marijuana, cocaine, heroin) that we gener 
ally make illegal either to sell or use.
Consider the two spectrums—one spectrum of regulation possibili 
ties and one spectrum of taxation possibilities. Generic drugs would 
fall at one end of the regulation spectrum and illegal drugs at the other. 
Oddly, generic and illegal drugs both fall on the untaxed end of the tax 
spectrum and alcohol and tobacco at the high end of this spectrum. If 
one considers the placement of various drugs on these two spectrums, 
it is very difficult to see a consistent set of priorities.
The debate about illegal drugs has mainly centered on the two 
extremes of the regulation spectrum—legalization versus criminaliza- 
tion. This seems to narrow our options unnecessarily. For various drugs 
that we currently make illegal, we may want to consider a number of 
different positionings on the regulatory and tax spectrums. For exam 
ple, one could imagine making marijuana a prescription drug and plac 
ing an excise tax on use. For a compilation of recent papers on drug 
laws, see Krauss and Lazear (1991).
Perhaps we need to think more carefully about the use of drugs and 
the benefits that they provide users. Some drugs are designed purely to 
treat disease. It is hard to imagine someone taking an antibiotic for the 
fun of it. Others serve both treatment and sensory needs (e.g., pain 
relief, relaxation). Valium is used by some as a tranquilizer, by some as 
a muscle relaxant, and by some to produce a euphoric state. Still other 
drugs seem to have mainly recreational or psychological benefits (e.g., 
alcohol, tobacco).
We also need to consider the external effect that drug use entails. 
Consumption of some drugs imposes costs on society as a whole in the 
form of higher medical expenditures, increased crime, or decreased 
productivity. Consumption of others provides external benefits by low 
ering medical costs, making people more psychologically healthy (e.g., 
less depressed, less aggressive), and more productive. Economists 
would suggest that you encourage use of the drugs with positive exter 
nal effects and discourage use of those with negative external effects. 
Encouragement can come in the form of subsidies (e.g., government- 
financed medical research or subsidized prescriptions such as under 
Medicaid or Medicare). Discouragement can come in the form of taxa 
tion, information campaigns (very effective for tobacco), restrictive
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access (e.g., age restrictions on purchase, requiring prescriptions), or 
making the substance illegal either under the civil or criminal code.
If we placed all drugs on the regulatory and tax spectrums described 
above and considered how the net benefits of each drug relates to its 
position on the spectrums, we might find some surprising locations. 
Such an exercise might also suggest innovative policies in an area 
where thinking has been impacted for some time.
The major services produced in the illegal economy are gambling 
(increasingly preempted by legal forms), prostitution, and loan shark 
ing. While these industries are still quite large, all are believed to have 
declined in recent years. Prostitution has been hard hit by AIDS and 
more liberal social mores regarding premarital sex. The estimated 
number of individuals working as prostitutes is believed to have 
declined since 1980. Legalization of gambling and low interest rates 
have taken a similar toll on the gambling and loan sharking industries. 
(See Carlson 1990 for details.)
Costs and Benefits of the Illegal Economy
It is not hard to make the argument that the illegal economy as a 
whole has costs that substantially outweigh the benefits that flow from 
this economy. There is even a debate in economics regarding whether 
or not we should count any benefits that result from infringement of 
our criminal law. The issue is whether, when breaking the social con 
tract, the individual has lost his or her right to be counted in the "social 
welfare function." For a discussion of whose benefits should be 
included in the social welfare function, see Trumbull (1990).
Even if we assume that the gains of individuals who break the social 
contract are to be counted, it is hard to justify the illegal economy on 
economic grounds. The transfer payments of the illegal economy are 
quixotic at best and worsen the income distribution in many cases. Fur 
ther, these transfers, on balance, lower productivity in the formal econ 
omy.
The costs and benefits of the production of illegal goods and ser 
vices are more difficult to assess. If we accept the proposition that our 
criminal laws reflect strongly held moral beliefs, then the costs to soci 
ety of illegal markets are substantial. However, it may be that at least 
some current laws reflect the moral beliefs of previous generations. If
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so, these laws may no longer be justified on efficiency grounds. For 
example, it may be that many citizens no longer support the sodomy 
laws or adultery laws that remain on the books in many states.
From an economist's perspective, the relevant question might be: Do 
the total costs of the activity outweigh the total benefits? This is, of 
course, the traditional criterion of benefit-cost analysis. In some cases 
the benefit/cost ratio seems clear. Most citizens would agree that child 
prostitution imposes more costs than benefits on society and that it has 
a high moral cost as well. Transactions between consenting adults are 
more difficult to evaluate. When an adult prostitute makes a deal with 
an adult client, the deal is clearly utility-enhancing for the parties to the 
transaction. Most negative externalities from this transaction flow from 
the fact that prostitution is illegal, not from the transaction per se.
There are clearly transactions between adults that yield sufficient 
negative externalities that we wish to outlaw them. For example, it is 
hard to justify legalizing without severely taxing or requiring prescrip 
tions for such drugs as heroin. However, it seems wise to carefully con 
sider the full spectrum of options (i.e., regulations and taxation) before 
deciding that making something illegal is a reasonable thing to do. It is 
also wise to consider the degree to which criminal prohibitions can be 
enforced. Activities between consenting adults are notoriously difficult 
to enforce. Making laws that are unenforceable may make us feel bet 
ter. However, they have substantial hidden costs. They tend to decrease 
respect for law and, hence, make other laws more difficult to enforce.
Beating the System?
Returning to the question with which we began the paper: Is the 
underground economy beating the system?
Benefits and Costs to the Nibblers and Nonparticipants
Those of us who are only peripherally touched by the underground 
economy are, I would contend, harmed more than we are benefited by 
it.
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Pure Tax Evasion
We all bitch and moan about taxes, but pay a substantial amount of 
what we owe. Some tax revenue is wasted or spent on things we would 
rather not have, but much tax revenue is spent for things we value very 
highly—e.g., law enforcement, water and sewers, education. Tax evad 
ers lower the amount of tax revenue that our tax system would other 
wise be able to produce. The public sector can respond in one of three 
ways: (1) lower the level of goods and services provided, (2) raise 
taxes on the rest of us, (3) in the case of the federal government, 
increase the deficit.
Tax increases enacted to raise revenue lost to evasion tend to fall dis 
proportionately on the wage and salary earnings of the middle class. 
Tax evasion tends to redistribute income to low-income and high- 
income groups willing to falsify tax returns. This is an odd and rather 
unpalatable form of redistribution. Tax evasion imposes an implicit tax 
on honesty, a characteristic we would be better off subsidizing than 
taxing.
Many tax evaders do truly beat the system, but their gain is at our 
cost. While audit rates have fallen dramatically during the last two 
decades from 10 percent in the late 1960s to under 1 percent today, the 
amount of information-matching has gone up considerably and will 
increase further with the IRS systems-modernization effort. The level 
of penalties for evasion and the frequency of their imposition has gone 
up dramatically as well.
Decreasing the current level of tax evasion appears to be a socially 
desirable goal. How can we most cost-effectively achieve this goal? 
Tax simplification and increased information-reporting coupled with 
systems modernization seem most promising at this point. The Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) simplified our tax laws at least in some 
ways. Tax laws passed since 1986 have, on balance, made our tax code 
more complicated. They have also raised nominal tax rates on better- 
off individuals. The last time this happened, both evasion and avoid 
ance increased. Nominal tax rates were progressive, but the tax burden 
did not fall disproportionately on the rich.
We need to have realistic expectations regarding the amount of tax 
evasion that can be cost-beneficially combated, given our present tax 
code. The amount is probably less than 20 percent. It would never be
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cost beneficial to uncover and punish most tax evasion. As with taxes 
and death, we need to learn to live with a certain level of tax evasion.
The Irregular Economy
The irregular economy appears to be the least virulent or relevantly 
most beneficial sector of the underground economy. This economy 
provides goods and services as well as jobs that might not otherwise be 
available. However, both the goods and services and the jobs tend to be 
of highly variable quality.
This economy may be most successfully attacked by providing 
alternative entrepot for new immigrants and new labor market entrants. 
It may also be combated by providing lower levels of regulation and 
increased benefits for participating in the formal economy. For exam 
ple, the extensive reference and referral system of Massachusetts, 
which provides customers, training, and services (e.g., accounting ser 
vices) to child care providers, has led most child care providers, includ 
ing providers of child care in their home, to obtain state licenses as 
required by state law. Only approximately 5 percent of family day care 
providers are unlicensed in Massachusetts. Other states that require 
family day care providers to be licensed but don't provide benefits to 
licensees have as much as 50 percent of providers failing to comply 
with the law.
Some workers in the irregular economy beat the system. Others are 
beaten by it. The general public may, on balance, benefit from the 
existence of this economy, but the balance is a delicate one.
The Illegal Economy
This is largely an economy employing young males. It provides an 
exciting alternative to the low-wage jobs currently available to young 
males with high school educations or less. However, these jobs come at 
high cost to the rest of us. The transfers of the illegal economy are very 
costly in terms of lifestyle, antitheft devices, and fear. Goods generally 
lose, not gain, value as a result of illegal transfers. This is reflected in 
the low prices available from fences.
While illegal goods and services often provide net benefits to those 
who purchase, the benefits may be short-lived and may come at sub-
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stantial cost to the general public. Effective policy to combat the illegal 
economy may combine legalization of some goods and services (e.g., 
gambling, prostitution, marijuana) with stricter enforcement of others.
Conclusions
Everyone wants a fast buck. It is the American way. We are a nation 
that began its existence with a revolt against government. We didn't 
like taxation when the British imposed it upon us and we don't like it 
much better now that we impose it upon ourselves.
We are a society of individualists who resent government interfer 
ence in either our work or consumption choices. However, it has been a 
long while since we have been a frontier society. We have come to rely 
on government to provide goods and services, to regulate behavior, and 
to enforce a commonly agreed upon social code. The underground 
economy points up gaps in government enforcement and shows us the 
limits of government.
Through our representatives, we make decisions regarding the 
goods and services we wish our federal, state, and local governments to 
provide. To finance these expenditures, we agree to a set of user 
charges and taxes. Evasion of taxes is often in the individual's narrow 
self-interest. He or she can enjoy publicly provided goods and services 
without paying for them. In the jargon of economics, the individual can 
be a "free rider." The tax evader is beating the system, but at the 
expense of the rest of us.
As citizens, we require licenses to undertake certain types of busi 
nesses (e.g., medicine, plumbing) and we regulate the way in which 
businesses are allowed to operate (e.g., through environmental and 
health and safety regulations). We do this to enforce minimum stan 
dards. Individuals and firms operating in the irregular economy avoid 
both licensing and regulatory requirements. In some cases this evasion 
of regulatory requirements has no external costs. For some goods and 
services, consumers may obtain adequate information regarding the 
quality of products informally. In other cases, irregular activity has 
high external costs and information regarding quality may be both hard 
to obtain and unreliable. Unregulated firms may dispose of hazardous
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materials in ways that cause substantial social harm. Sweatshops may 
provide hazardous and unhealthy work environments. Some unregis 
tered child care providers may damage young children in ways that 
have serious social consequences.
Some producers and consumers of the goods and services of the 
irregular economy are beating the system and at little or no cost to the 
rest of us. Others are beating the system, but imposing substantial costs 
on the rest of us. We need to think carefully about what we license and 
what we regulate. We should impose mandatory licensing only in areas 
where informal information regarding quality is either likely to be 
unreliable or costly to obtain. In other areas we may be better served by 
allowing consumers to choose whether they purchase from licensed or 
unlicensed providers. We should only regulate in areas where external 
effects are large or where there are substantial asymmetries in power 
(e.g., the sweatshop situation) or information (e.g., pharmaceuticals).
Our criminal laws reflect our society's generally held beliefs about 
what behaviors are acceptable. We condemn certain types of transfers 
(e.g., theft, fraud) because they offend our sense of fairness and 
because they lower the productivity of our formal economy. We outlaw 
the sale and consumption of certain goods and services because they 
offend our moral sensibilities and/or because they have substantial neg 
ative externalities.
The mores of our society have changed quite rapidly since the 
1960s, with each generation developing its own sense of what is 
socially acceptable. Our criminal laws change much more slowly. It is 
hard to say if the rigidity of what Bagehot called the "cake of custom" 
is, on balance, good or bad. Most violations of most of our criminal 
laws, on balance, hurt us as a society. It is not even clear that many of 
the participants in illegal activities (e.g., the young drug dealer or pros 
titute) are in the long run beating the system.
Are those who participate in the underground economy beating the 
system? From a short-run, narrowly individual perspective, they by and 
large are. However, the system they are beating is a system that we set 
up because we believed that it was by and large beneficial to society. 
The tax laws, regulations, and criminal code evolve slowly and can be 
affected by special interests. The underground economy will grow in 
those areas where existing laws and regulations are inefficient or most 
at odds with current mores. The underground provides an escape valve.
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It can also provide valuable information regarding rules and regula 
tions that need to be reassessed.
Tax evasion peaked in the early 1980s because our tax laws had 
rates and provisions that made evasion both relatively easy and very 
beneficial. Since TRA86, levels of evasion have declined. TRA86 
broadened the base of taxation by limiting loopholes. It also lowered 
tax rates. The growth of the tax evasion component of the underground 
economy during the late 1970s and early 1980s warned us that some 
thing was wrong with our tax laws. Our response was to alter the tax 
code, not to increase enforcement.
As a society, we would be wise to look closely at areas of rapid 
growth in the underground economy. These growth areas may need to 
be attacked by increased enforcement. For example, the growth of 
crack use during the 1980s was effectively dealt with by a combination 
of enforcement and education. However, rapid growth may warn us 
that it is time to revise outdated and inefficient rules. For example, the 
failure of many upper middle income nominees for federal posts to pay 
nanny taxes did not lead to greater enforcement. It led to changes in tax 
laws and regulations.
NOTE
1. A Michigan study found that SO percent of illegal vendors of goods and services had regular 
jobs, and that only 5 percent were working off-the-books full time. It is estimated that over half of 
all illegal aliens had income tax withheld and, hence, were working in the regular as opposed to 
the irregular economy.
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Perspectives from Latin America
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The topic of this chapter is the informal economy, a diversified set of 
economic activities that are vast and growing in many settings. 1 In the 
industrialized countries, there appears to be growing consensus among 
researchers who describe the informal sector as encompassing "those 
actions of economic agents that fail to adhere to the established institu 
tional rules or are denied their protection" (Feige 1990, p. 990). Or, 
alternatively, the informal sector includes "all income-earning activi 
ties that are not regulated by the state in social environments where 
similar activities are regulated" (Castells and Fortes 1989, p. 12). 
These definitions do not advance an a priori judgment of whether such 
activities are good or bad, leaving the matter to the investigator.
In the case of the developing economies, however, the "informal 
economy" concept is less precise. This imprecision may originate from 
the more diverse nature of these economies, and from the various theo 
ries that purport to explain the existence and proliferation of these 
alternative "centers" of production in developing economies.
This paper reviews and explores the various concepts of informal 
production used to describe what many are observing in the less-devel 
oped world. Alternative measures that have been employed to quantify 
and characterize these sectors for the Latin American economies will 
be presented and discussed.
Defining the Informal Economy in the Less-Developed World
The concept of the informal economy was born in the Third World, 
out of a series of studies on urban labor markets in Africa by Keith 
Hart. Popular entrepreneurship in Accra and other African capitals was
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clearly at odds with received wisdom from "the western discourse on 
economic development" (Hart 1990, p. 158).
In a report to the International Labour Office (ILO), Hart outlined a 
dualist model of income opportunities of the urban labor force by dis 
tinguishing between wage employment and self-employment. Hart 
emphasized the notable dynamism and diversity of the self-employed 
and their activities which went well beyond "shoeshine boys and sell 
ers of matches" (Hart 1973, p. 68). However, Hart's dynamic charac 
terization of the informal sector was subsequently lost as the concept 
became redefined and institutionalized within the ILO bureaucracy as 
synonymous with poverty. The informal economy was taken to refer to 
an urban "way of doing things" characterized by:
• low entry barriers in terms of skill, capital, and organization
• family ownership of enterprises
• small scale of operations
• labor-intensive production with outdated technology
• unregulated and competitive markets (Peattie 1980)
• low levels of productivity and a low capacity for accumulation 
(Tokman 1982).
In later publications of the ILO's Regional Employment Programme 
for Latin America (PREALC), employment in the informal sector was 
consistently referred to as "underemployment" affecting those workers 
who could not gain entry into the modern economy (PREALC 1985; 
Garcia 1991). Eventually the informal sector became known as the 
"excluded" sector in less-developed economies in numerous ILO, 
PREALC, and World Bank studies of urban poverty and labor markets 
(Sethuraman 1981; Gerry 1978; Tokman 1978).
The ILO's negative characterization of the informal sector has been 
challenged by other students of the subject who see the informal sector 
in precisely the opposite light. The alternative view is that informal 
activities are a sign of the popular entrepreneurial dynamism, 
described by Hart (1990, p. 158) as "people taking back in their own 
hands some of the economic power that centralized agents sought to 
deny them." The Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto reformulated 
Hart's original theme in The Other Path (1989). De Soto defines infor-
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mality as the popular response to the rigid "mercantilist" state, found 
dominant in Peru and other Latin American countries, that survive by 
granting the privilege of legal participation in the economy to a small 
elite. Hence, unlike its portrayal by ILO and PREALC as a survival 
mechanism in response to insufficient modern job creation, informal 
enterprise represents the irruption of "real" market forces in an econ 
omy straitjacketed by favoritism and state regulation.
The massive population shifts from the countryside to the cities in 
the decades before 1980 provided the demographic base for De Soto's 
informal economy. The urban elites who were already in place were 
hostile to the migrants because "each person who migrates to the capi 
tal is in some way a potential competitor and it is a natural inclination 
to try to avoid competition" (1989, p. 11). Rural migrants to Peru's cit 
ies became informal workers due to the legal barriers that prevented 
them from participating in the mainstream economy. Informal eco 
nomic activity was originally a survival mechanism, but gradually it 
expanded in response to the rigidities and limitations of the economy. 
The provision of goods and services by the informal economy proved 
to be cheap and efficient, leading to the conversion of unregulated 
enterprise into the real economic core of many industrial and service 
activities.
De Soto's call to dismantle state regulatory barriers so that popular 
entrepreneurship could flourish found a receptive audience in a number 
of international development agencies, some of which made his views 
their own (Bromley 1990). However, this optimistic portrayal also gave 
rise to empirical and theoretical contradictions. Whereas PREALC's 
analysis overemphasized the marginal character of urban informal 
activities and the associated poverty, De Soto's analysis leaned in the 
opposite direction.
A third perspective, which we will refer to as structural articulation, 
evolved in dialogue with the earlier work by Keith Hart and ILO 
experts, as well as subsequent analysis of the phenomenon by PRE 
ALC. In agreement with definitions of informality in other world 
regions, structural articulation characterizes the phenomenon as 
income-earning activities unregulated by the state in contexts where 
similar activities are so regulated (Castells and Portes 1989; Feige 
1990). This approach is similar to that of De Soto in that it emphasizes 
the role of the state in the emergence and growth of the informal econ-
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omy. However, it departs from De Solo's view by viewing this sector as 
linked to the formal economy, and it does not subscribe to the notion 
that this sector is composed exclusively of survival activities. In place 
of the dualistic images of Latin American urban economies, this third 
approach describes unified systems that involve many connections 
between formal and informal enterprises (Roberts 1993; Beneria 1989; 
Fortes and Benton 1984).
The specific nature of these markets is not uniform across countries, 
but varies with the degree and specifics of state regulations, the 
requirements of modern firms, and the size and characteristics of the 
labor force. This approach is labeled "structuralist" because it focuses 
on the structure of formal-informal relationship in the economic sys 
tem. The approach recognizes that the condition of excess labor supply 
created by rural-urban migration has had more complex consequences 
than the simple survival of the poor at the margins of the urban econ 
omy. Two such consequences are particularly important: the functions 
that informal enterprise plays in support of modern capitalist accumu 
lation; and the creation of new niches in the labor market, correspond 
ing to new positions in the class structure.
A first linkage of the informal and formal sectors is the supply of 
low-cost goods and services for workers in formal enterprises. Unregu 
lated small artisans and merchants engage in the provision of every 
thing from cheap clothing and footwear to auto and residential repairs. 
Foodstands, urban transport, gardening and landscaping, house clean 
ing, and the sale of second-hand appliances are services supplied by 
informal entrepreneurs. The consumption of basic goods by workers in 
the formal sector seldom occurs through regulated market channels but 
is generally supplied by informal sources. Cheaper informal goods and 
services increase the consumption "yield" of wages earned in the for 
mal sector of the economy (Peattie 1974; Roberts 1976).
From the standpoint of the economic system as a whole, the infor 
mal market represents a subsidy to formal enterprises as it makes labor 
costs lower than they would be if these sources of supply did not exist. 
Informal enterprises increase the profitability of their formal counter 
parts by allowing the latter to maintain lower wage levels. The urban 
upper and middle class also avail themselves of informally provided 
services like cheap domestic help, gardening, and personal services to 
maintain enviable lifestyles (Fortes and Walton 1981, pp. 91-94).
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A still closer interface between the formal and informal sectors is 
the common practice in large firms of using the informal labor pool to 
allocate a variety of production and marketing tasks. Firms may hire 
workers off-the-books or subcontract production, input supplies, or 
final sales to informal entrepreneurs. The firm can thereby avoid legal 
regulations that increase labor costs and decrease managerial flexibil 
ity. To the extent that the costly workforce of formal enterprises can be 
reduced by off-the-books hiring and subcontracting, final profits can be 
significantly improved.
Because these arrangements are not in compliance with legal regula 
tions, managers of firms are careful to conceal them from the authori 
ties. For this reason, they do not appear in the official statistics, leading 
users of official data to the erroneous conclusion that these informal- 
formal linkages do not exist.
The structuralist view also stresses that the informal sector is inter 
nally heterogeneous. The coexistence and interactions of the regulated 
and unregulated activities opens opportunities for a number of people 
to insert themselves as intermediaries. Informal entrepreneurs who per 
form these intermediary roles commonly earn more than workers in 
regulated firms. This results in an informal economy that is more than 
the simple translation of surplus labor into survival activities.
Demographic Trends in Latin America
The demographic events that help give rise to the informal economy 
in Latin America took place in the second half of the twentieth century. 
In the 1950s, Latin America was a continent of rural dwellers with 
more than half the population living in the countryside and the major 
ity of the workforce consisting of peasants and farm workers. By 1990, 
three out of four Latin Americans lived in cities, with the majority in 
large urban centers. This extraordinary transformation is evident in 
table 1, where the Latin American urban population distribution is 
compared with that of all less-developed regions and that of the devel 
oped countries. Overall, the table suggests that Latin America has 
achieved levels of urbanization equal to those of the developed world 
despite much lower per capita incomes.
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SOURCE: United Nations (1991b, tables A.I, A.5).
NOTE: Less-developed regions comprise all regions of Africa, Latin America, Asia (excluding 
Japan), Melonesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. More-developed regions comprise North America, 
Japan, all regions of Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and the former USSR.
Significant country-by-country differences exist around these 
regional averages, however. Table 2 illustrates these differences by 
showing average annual rates of growth for the total population and the 
urban population of 14 countries in Latin America in the 1950s and in 
the 1980s. Also shown are the average annual rates of growth for the 
potential economically active population (EAP) defined as those aged 
15-64. At the beginning of this period, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay 
were already highly urbanized and their population growth rates were 
relatively low. Urban growth continued in these countries at a rate sim 
ilar to that of the developed world and, by 1990, more than 85 percent 
of their inhabitants were living in cities. Demographic transformation 
in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru were dramatic by contrast, with 
the share of the urban population growing from one-half or less in 
1950 to about three-fourths by 1990.
The migrants who gave rise to such rapid rates of urban growth 
throughout the post-World War II period did not encounter in the cities 
anything commensurate with their economic aspirations. New indus 
tries in that period did generate significant labor demand (Garcia 
1982), but the size of that demand was swamped by the number of new 
migrants. In 1950, modern nonagricultural employment absorbed 26.3 
percent of the Latin American labor force. In the. next thirty years, 
employment in that sector grew by an average of 4.1 percent per year, 
about the same rate as the total nonagricultural EAP. By the end of the 
period, therefore, the proportion employed in the modern urban sector 
was the same as it had been three decades earlier. Estimates of the
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excess labor supply in cities during this period ranged from 30 to 60 
percent of the urban EAP (Garcia and Tokman 1981; Fortes 1985).
Table 2. Demographic Trends in Latin America 
and Selected Indicators
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Table 2. Demographic Trends in Latin America 














































SOURCE: ECLA (1991,tables 1,2,3,5,7); United Nations (1991a, 1991b).
a. Definition of urban varies across countries. Figures are for the year ending the decade.
b. Figure is for the period 1980-85.
Measuring the Informal Economy in Latin America
The informal economy is difficult to measure, since it consists of 
activities generally unrecorded in official statistics. All measurement 
strategies attempted so far suffer from limitations. PREALC has relied 
on proxies available in national censuses and in household surveys in 
their attempts to determine the magnitude of the informal economy. 
The approach consists of designating entire occupational categories as 
informal on the basis of their presumed correspondence with the con 
ceptual definition.
PREALC classifies the self-employed and their unremunerated fam 
ily workers as "informal" because it is assumed that these workers 
engage in low-productivity, low-pay activities. While domestic ser 
vants were similarly so classified in earlier estimates, they have been 
excluded from more recent figures for reasons that are not clear. On the 
other hand, owners and salaried workers in small enterprises were 
absent from earlier estimates of the informal sector, but they are 
included in recent ones. How "small enterprises" are defined also var-
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ies across countries and years, ranging from businesses employing 
"less than twenty" workers to "less than five."
Despite these changes and inconsistencies, PREALC is the only 
agency that has prepared estimates of the informal sector for every 
country in Latin America. Summary figures of these estimates for 1960 
and 1989 are presented in table 3. According to PREALC, during this 
period approximately 31 percent of the Latin American urban EAP 
were employed informally. That this estimate is virtually unchanged 
from 1960 to 1989 is noteworthy, given both the important changes in 
Latin American economies and the shifting occupational categories 
included in PREALC's definition of the informal sector.


















































SOURCE: PREALC estimates given in Garcia and Tokman (1981, table 1); Garcia (1991, tables 
5,7,9); and Infante and Klein (1990, tables 2,4).
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Variations of the magnitude of the informal sector by country are 
rather large. The estimated share of persons in the informal sector 
within the total urban labor force ranged during the period from a low 
of approximately 20 percent in the more-developed countries such as 
Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Venezuela to about 40 percent in Peru and El 
Salvador, to approximately 60 percent in Bolivia and Ecuador.
The organization created by Hernando De Soto, the Institute for 
Liberty and Democracy (ILD), has not produced similar region-wide 
estimates, but has concentrated on documenting the extent of informal 
ity in metropolitan Lima, focusing on three sectors: housing, transport, 
and petty commerce. ILD estimates that, in 1982, some 43 percent of 
all housing in Lima was built informally, providing shelter to 47 per 
cent of the city's population. The replacement cost of this housing was 
calculated at US $8.3 billion. In commerce, over 91,000 street vendors 
supported an estimated 314,000 people and generated gross sales of 
US $322 million per year. In addition, according to ILD, 39,000 other 
informal merchants built 274 street markets with an estimated value of 
US $41 million, supporting 125,000 people. In transport, informal 
entrepreneurs controlled over 90 percent of urban public buses. The 
1984 replacement value of their fleet was estimated at US $620 mil 
lion. The value of the related infrastructure (gas pumps, repair shops, 
etc.) was estimated at US $400 million.
Other estimates made by De Soto and his associates include the 
claim that in the mid-1980s, 61.2 percent of total work hours in Peru 
were dedicated to informal activities; that 48 percent of the economi 
cally active population was engaged in informal activities; and that the 
latter accounted for 38.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), a 
share projected to rise to 61.3 percent by the end of the century (De 
Soto 1989: 12).2
It is worth noting that De Soto's definition of the informal sector 
coincides roughly with the definition of the "underground" economy in 
developed societies, although methods for measuring the latter have 
not been applied systematically in Latin America. Underground activi 
ties in developed economies have been defined as those activities that 
take place outside the existing legal framework. Their aggregate value, 
in terms of relative proportion of the GDP, have typically been esti 
mated by macroeconomic methods (Feige 1990).
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It is possible that failure to apply macroeconomic methods to the 
Latin American economies, despite the similarity of definitions, stems 
from the lack of suitable data. For the more-advanced Latin American 
countries, however, this difficulty is not insurmountable. The Center 
for Economic Research of the Private Sector (CEESP) estimated the 
size of Mexico's underground economy between 1970 and 1985 on the 
basis of two macroeconomic methods. The first, adapted from Tanzi 
(1980, 1982), estimates the currency required for the operation of the 
legal (aboveground) economy and then subtracts this figure from actual 
currency in circulation. The difference multiplied by the velocity of 
money provides an estimate of the magnitude of the underground econ 
omy. The ratio of that figure to observed GDP then gives the proportion 
of the national economy represented by these activities. The method 
depends on the identification of a base period in which the informal 
economy is assumed to be insignificant.
Estimates of the Mexican underground economy based on Tanzi's 
monetary method are reproduced in table 4, column 1. The Mexican 
underground economy is estimated to be 25 to 30 percent of official 
GDP in 1985, the last year for which these figures are available. Table 
4 also presents estimates of the Mexican underground economy based 
on the "physical input" method. With this method, the ratio of some 
physical input of wide use (electricity consumption in this case) is cal 
culated for the base period and then extrapolated to the present. 
Assuming a relative constant ratio of electricity consumption to GDP, 
it is possible to calculate the expected GDP for each year following the 
base period. The difference between observed and expected GDP is 
attributed to the underground economy. As seen in table 4, these meth 
ods yield estimates of the informal sector ranging from 20 to 40 per 
cent of GDP in the 1980s. CEESP notes that both methods show the 
magnitude of underground activities as increasing steadily.
These macroeconomic estimates have been criticized on various 
grounds. They do not differentiate between criminal activities and 
informal activities proper. The latter involve goods and services that 
are otherwise licit, but whose production and sale are irregular (Cas- 
tells and Portes 1989). Hence, the huge estimates of informality that 
are sometimes reached through these methods may be inflated by the 
inclusion of large organizations that provide "illegal" goods and ser 
vices (e.g., cocaine, prostitution). These underground operations are of
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a nature and size different from those of microentrepreneurs and arti 
sans in the informal sector proper. Macroeconomic estimates have also 
been criticized for being sensitive to the choice of benchmark (base) 
year. Despite these limitations, macroeconomic methods provide the 
best available approximations of the relative weight of unregulated 
activities in national economies. Their application in Latin America is 
still rare.
Table 4. Estimates of "Subterranean" Economy in Mexico as a Percent of 





















































SOURCE: CEESP (1987, table 10).
Empirical work undertaken from a structuralist perspective has 
focused mainly on documenting the relationships between the formal 
and informal sectors of urban economies. For national estimates, this 
school has relied on secondary figures on the proportion of the eco 
nomically active population that is not covered by the social security
The Informal Economy 159
system. Absence of coverage serves as a proxy for unregulated work. 
Most estimates of social security coverage or exclusion are reported for 
the total, not urban, economically active population. They also do not 
differentiate between workers and microentrepreneurs. Further, cover 
age by the social security system does not exclude the possibility that 
workers engage in unregulated activities on the side; hence it underes 
timates the actual magnitude of informality. Lastly, as Mesa-Lago 
(1991) notes in his analysis of Latin American social security systems, 
the quality of the data is generally poor and furthermore does not dif 
ferentiate between types and levels of coverage.
Despite these limitations, a comparison of the figures on the EAP 
excluded from legal labor protection and figures on "underemployed" 
workers, provided by PREALC, is instructive. This comparison is pre 
sented in table 5 for the Latin American economies. Except for Brazil, 
where the extension of some assistance to the entire population led to 
an official claim of near universal coverage, the uncovered percentage 
of the EAP shown here consistently exceeds the PREALC estimates. 
The range of the gaps is from a few percentage points to over 40 per 
cent of national EAP. These gaps can be tentatively interpreted as an 
approximation to the proportion of wage workers who labor under 
irregular conditions, a category implicitly defined by PREALC as for 
mal and by the structuralists as informal. For Latin America as a 
whole, the difference is approximately 14 percent of the EAP in 1980.
One of the few large data sets that contain reliable information on 
both employment category and social security coverage is the Mexican 
government's Urban Employment Survey of 1989. The survey col 
lected data on a representative sample of about 30,000 adult Mexican 
workers in seven metropolitan areas, including the four largest cities. 
As analyzed by Roberts (1993), this survey yields estimates of the pro 
portion of the employed labor force working informally according to 
the PREALC and structuralist definitions, as well as an internal differ 
entiation of the informal sector by employment categories.
Table 6 presents results of a reanalysis of these data using the four 
largest urban centers. Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, and 
Ciudad Juarez. The empirical definition of informality commonly 
employed by PREALC yields estimates that are approximately half in 
magnitude (19.6 percent) relative to those produced when the lack of 
social security protection is the basis of categorization (46.8 percent).
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Inclusion in the PREALC estimates of owners of and workers in 
microenterprises significantly reduces this difference (37.6 percent), 
but the figures are still lower than those based on lack of coverage 
(46.8 percent). The remaining gap is directly attributable to workers in 
large firms who do not receive legal protection (46.8 - 37.6 = 9.2 per 
cent).
Table 5. Estimates of Informal Sector in Latin America, 1980
Economically active 
population not covered Underemployed8 within
by social security economically active 























































SOURCE: Mesa-Lago (1985, p. 342, 1991, p. 50): Fortes, Blitzer, and Curtis (1986, p. 731); 
PREALC (1982, pp. 34-81); Wilkie and Perkal (1985, table 1308); Wilson (1985, p. 254). 
a. Defined by PREALC as the sum of self-employed workers minus professionals, unremunerated 
family workers, domestic servants, and "traditional" rural workers.
b. Coverage in 1980 is based on selected assistance programs according to universalistic criteria 
rather than tied to employment, 
c. 1985 figure.
d. Based on a probability survey of Montevideo's working-class population in 1985. Official fig 
ures report near-universal coverage based on selected programs extended to all citizens, 
e. Weighted average.
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Table 6. Estimates of Urban Informal Economy in Mexico Based on
Occupational Classification and Lack of Social Coverage, 1989
Share of informal employment within the urban economically active 
population (percent)_____________________________
By occupation
Unremunerated family workers plus the self-employed 19.6
Above two categories plus workers in micro- 
enterprises and unregistered microentrepreneurs 37.6






SOURCE: Roberts (1993, table 3).
a. Entrepreneurs, workers, and the self-employed without social security protection.
The breakdown of the informal sector by employment reveals that 
microentrepreneurs, the best-paid class within the sector, represent 
about 7 percent of the employed labor force in the largest cities in 
Mexico. The self-employed comprise an average of 14 percent of the 
urban EAP and 30 percent of those working informally. Unprotected 
wage workers represent one-fourth of all urban workers and the major 
ity (55 percent) of the informal labor force.
Summary
There exists a rich literature on the underground economy for the 
industrialized economies. In contrast, understanding the informal 
economy is more challenging for students of the less-developed econo 
mies because researchers have been less consistent when defining 
informal activities for this set of nations. The lack of consistency in
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describing the informal economy for the developing world may be a 
result of the greater diversity found in the economic organization and 
in the level of development of these economies.
Broadly speaking, three different descriptions of the informal econ 
omy in the developing world can be found in the literature. The dualist 
model adapted by the ILO characterizes the informal sector as a poor, 
noncompetitive sector, employing those who fail to gain entry into the 
modern "productive" sector. Using this approach it has been estimated 
that about 30 percent of workers in Latin America are employed in the 
informal sector.
In contrast, De Soto characterizes the informal sector as competition 
emerging through and in spite of confining state regulations and an oli 
gopolistic market structure. In this view, informal activities introduce 
dynamism and strength into the economy. Using information gathered 
from Lima, Peru, De Soto estimated that about 40 percent of Lima's 
GDP is produced in informal markets.
Structural articulation is a third approach to the informal economy 
in developing areas. As in the De Soto view, the avoidance of regula 
tions gives impetus to this sector. However, unlike the ILO approach, 
the formal and informal sectors are closely linked, and to a degree, 
complementary to each other. The profitability of the formal sector is 
enhanced due to the availability of low-cost inputs from the informal 
sector and due to the possibility of subcontracting in the informal mar 
ket, where costly regulations are easily skirted. Using information that 
attempts to differentiate workers who are employed in jobs that are 
regulated versus jobs that are not, it is suggested that, on average, more 
than half the economically active population in Latin America are 
informal workers.
NOTES
1. Much of the material in this chapter can be found in Fortes and Schauffler (1993) and Fortes 
(1994).
2. The validity of these estimates has been questioned by Rossini and Thomas (1987), who 
argued that they are inaccurate due to: the inappropriate use of monetary measures of transactions 
counted in the GDP; poorly specified models; and mishandling of econometric methods.
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